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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
Introducing subtle discrimination 
 
When I was at the post office, a white male was waiting to be served by 
an African American post office assistant. His number was called but he 
was slow approaching the counter so the assistant jokingly said: “Sorry, 
can’t help you, you are too late”. The white male got very angry at the 
assistant and became increasingly rude in his communication. The 
African American assistant came to the assistant who was serving me 
and said: “Will you take over this customer, this is not going to work 
out anymore”.  I was left wondering whether the white male was just 
nasty and could not appreciate a joke, or had responded the way he did 
because of the ethnicity of the post office assistant. Clearly the post 
office assistant interpreted the behavior in the form of prejudice, but I 
was not sure. To me this was the clearest demonstration I had ever had 
of how ambiguous discrimination can be.  
 
(personal experience)  
 
This example of an unpleasant interaction that is tinted by possible 
underlying prejudice illustrates how unclear it can be to targets of discrimination 
(and to those observing the interaction), whether the negative treatment they 
receive is due to their individual behaviors, such as a mistimed joke, or due to the 
group-based prejudice of another. This ambiguity for members of stigmatized groups 
regarding the causes of their personal outcomes is illustrative of the kind of 
discrimination that takes place in society at present (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). 
Whereas in the past the blatant expression of prejudice was not only common but 
also accepted within society, past decades have seen the social and legal sanctioning 
of these more overt forms of prejudice. In consequence discriminatory behavior has 
taken on more subtle forms that are less easily detected by targets of discrimination 
(Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002b; Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998). Expressions of 
these more subtle forms of prejudice in, for example, interpersonal communication 




 of the perpetrator or, not necessitating actual interaction, in unjustified negative 
personal treatment (i.e. not being invited for a job interview or accepted for a job). 
These types of expression can create considerable ambiguity concerning whether the 
(negative) personal treatment received is due to one’s personal deservingness (such 
as lack of ability/interpersonal skills) or due to one’s membership of a devalued 
group and the prejudice of another.  
It is this ambiguity concerning whether treatment is individually or group 
based that will be the focus of this thesis. Specifically I will consider how individuals 
‘switch’ from an individual level focus in which one’s personal characteristics are 
most salient to a group level focus in which one’s group membership is considered a 
possible cause of one’s personal outcomes. I will focus on the following two 
questions: When do targets of prejudice perceive a situation to be discriminatory? 
How do these ambiguous situations influence targets’ psychological well-being? 
Below I first outline in more detail what constitutes subtle discrimination. I then 
present a working model to show the processes underlying responses to subtle 
discrimination. This working model will also be used as a framework to review prior 
research in this area and introduce the studies conducted in this dissertation.  
 
Subtle discrimination 
The historical development of expressions of discrimination from more 
blatant to more subtle forms of discrimination means that for members of 
stigmatized groups it can be very unclear how to attribute their personal outcomes. 
Crocker and Major (1989) have defined this attributional ambiguity as the 
uncertainty whether the cause of one’s personal outcomes can be attributed to 
personal deservingness (i.e., lack of personal ability, another’s disliking of oneself) or 
to the social prejudices that others have against one’s group.  Not only is this an 
unpleasant emotional state to be in – given the strong evidence that individuals 
dislike uncertainty (Gao & Gudykunst, 1990; Kagan, 1972) – it can also lead to 
misinterpretations of situations. Indeed members of stigmatized groups may both 
miss instances of discrimination or over-interpret situations as due to discrimination. 
An early experiment by Kleck and Strenta (1980) showed how strong and 
misleading this uncertainty can be. In this classic study, the researchers led 
participants to believe that their interaction partner thought they had a stigma 
(facial scar or disability). In fact the interaction partner received no stigma 
information and displayed behavior similar to the control group. Nevertheless, 




negatively than a ‘non-stigmatized’ control group. In this case participants who 
thought they had a stigma were very focused on their group membership and 
possible negative treatment on the basis thereof. Clearly the opposite can occur such 
that individuals are so focused on individual level characteristics of the situation that 
they do not realize they are being treated on the basis of to their group membership 
and attribute their failure to personal inadequacies instead of their devalued group 
membership. Both over and under attributing situations to discrimination can have 
negative consequences for well-being, albeit in different ways. Below I further 
discuss possible determinants of this ‘individual’ versus ‘group’ level focus on 
perceptions of discrimination.  
Situations that are attributionally ambiguous can have negative 
consequences for group member’s well-being (i.e., self esteem) both at an individual 
and at a group level: They can have negative consequences for personal self esteem 
when individuals blame negative treatment that can in fact be attributed to their 
group membership on themselves. When a situation is attributed to discrimination, 
this can have negative consequences for collective self esteem (i.e., one’s feelings 
with respect to one’s group, Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) as group members realize 
that their own group is devalued by others.  In fact, situations that are ambiguous 
can threaten well-being both at the individual and the group level, precisely because 
group members are experiencing uncertainty concerning whether to blame 
themselves or their group membership for their personal outcomes. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Crocker and Major (1998), paradoxically it may in some ways be less 
threatening to experience more old-fashioned and blatant forms of discrimination as 
opposed to modern and subtle discrimination: At least when discrimination is 
blatant it is clear to targets how to attribute the cause of their negative treatment 
(see also Cihangir, Barreto, & Ellemers, 2009).  
In sum, attributionally ambiguous discrimination can be misleading 
concerning group members’ perceptions of discrimination, they may either fail to 
perceive discrimination when it occurs, or misattribute personal treatment to the 
prejudice of another when this is not the cause of their outcomes. Furthermore, this 
ambiguity concerning the causes of personal outcomes can have rather negative 
consequences for personal well-being as group members may feel threatened at an 
individual and/or group level. In studying these processes it is important to look at 
their determinants. Above I pointed out that individuals may be focused on more 
individual (i.e., attributing negative treatment to personal characteristics, 




treatment to the prejudice of another, experiencing negative collective self esteem) 
aspects of a situation and that this can determine both the nature of prejudice 
perceptions as well as well-being responses.  Below I present the model of subtle 















Figure 1.1. Perceiving and responding to attributionally ambiguous situations of 
personal failure/success 
 
This model assumes that individual differences (box A) and situational cues 
(box B) determine the extent to which group members are focused on individual 
level aspects (i.e., personal characteristics, interpersonal liking) or group level 
aspects (i.e., devalued group membership, social identity) of the situation (box C). 
The relative focus on individual or group level aspects of a situation in turn 
influences the extent to which group members perceive discrimination (box D), as 
well as their motivational concerns with respect to this situation (box E). 
Motivational concerns can be the need to protect the self from personal failure (i.e., 
individual level) or to protect or enhance one’s group membership in response to 
devaluation of one’s group (i.e., group level). Perceptions of discrimination and 
motivational concerns result in certain outcomes for the target, ranging from 
personal well-being to broader perceptions of justice (box F). In the following 
sections I will use this framework to organize and review recent work in the area of 
























A. Individual Characteristics 
Stigma consciousness 
Research by Mendoza Denton and Pinel indicates that members of low 
status groups can differ in the extent to which they are likely to perceive 
discrimination against their race and gender respectively (Mendoza-Denton, 
Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002; Pinel, 1999). Mendoza Denton and 
colleagues developed a scale of race rejection sensitivity and provided evidence that 
ethnic minority members who score highly on this scale were more likely to 
perceive interaction partners and personal treatment as (racially) prejudiced 
(Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). Similarly, Pinel’s stigma consciousness scale (1999) 
measures the extent to which members of minority groups are attentive to signs of 
gender discrimination. In a series of studies Pinel showed that people high in stigma 
consciousness were more likely to report past experiences of discrimination and 
expect future discrimination. Recent research by Kaiser and colleagues indicates that 
individuals who are high in stigma consciousness are in fact more attentive to 
prejudice related cues at a subconscious level (Kaiser, Vick, & Brook, 2006).   
In a similar vein, research by Inman and Baron (1996) indicates that members of 
disadvantaged groups (i.e., women) are more likely than members of privileged 
groups (i.e., men) to perceive discrimination against other disadvantaged groups (i.e., 
African Americans). Note that this is not necessarily due to differing positions of 
men versus women with respect to African Americans: In this context both men and 
(White) women could be considered privileged with respect to African Americans. 
The explanation given here is that women, having personally experienced 
discrimination, are more able to recognize prejudice in their encounter with others 
than men who have little experience of discrimination. 
Therefore, group members can be more attentive to discrimination when 
they are chronically aware of stigma (i.e. high in rejection sensitivity, stigma 
consciousness) and/or themselves have had many past experiences of discrimination. 
Obviously these aspects can not always be separated and the extent to which group 
members are chronically aware of their stigma may be highly related to the extent 
to which they have experienced discrimination in the past. 
 
Social categorization and group identification 
One of the tenets of Self Categorization Theory (Turner, 1987) is that 
individuals cognitively structure their environment to perceive the position of 







environment gives meaning to and enables individuals to process their environment. 
Individuals can give meaning to their environment at different levels of abstraction 
such as at a purely individual level (i.e., inter-individual comparisons) or at an 
intermediate level (i.e., intergroup comparisons). One of the focuses of this 
dissertation is to consider the relative influence of determinants that focus 
individuals on ‘individual level aspects’ of a situation, with no reference to group 
membership (i.e., individual level), as opposed to factors that increase the salience of 
one’s group membership (i.e., intermediate or, in this dissertation, ‘group’ level). 
This concept will be discussed in more detail in section C of the introduction. As 
will also become clear in the course of this introduction, this may influence both the 
extent to which individuals perceive a situation as discriminatory as well as their 
motivational concerns. I consider the individual versus group level focus a cognitive 
factor that determines how people categorize their environment.  
By contrast, research in the area of subtle discrimination has mainly focused 
on a more ‘emotional’ component of individual’s group membership (Branscombe, 
Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; see also Stroebe, Lodewijkx & Spears, 2005), the extent to 
which they identify with their group. According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) people vary in the extent to which group membership is personally 
and emotionally meaningful to them. In consequence, some members identify more 
with the group(s) they belong to than others. Studies looking at the relation between 
group identification and perceptions of and appraisals of situations as discriminatory 
have indicated that the more group members identify with their group, the more 
likely they are to perceive and appraise situations as discriminatory (e.g., Eccleston 
& Major, 2006; Operario & Fiske, 2001). These studies indicate that in considering 
targets’ propensity to perceive discrimination, it is important to consider how 
central the group is to the self. It is likely that high identifiers are more attentive to 
discrimination cues than low identifiers – in other words, they are more focused on 
group level aspects of their surroundings1.  
Turning back to Self Categorization Theory and my definition of the 
individual versus group level focus I assume that social identification may aid, but is 
not a prerequisite for prejudice perceptions. Rather the salience of cognitive 
categories should be sufficient to enhance prejudice perceptions.  
   
B. Situational cues 
Situations can differ in the extent to which they make individual or group 




characteristics of the other person group members are interacting with but also more 
generally by the nature of the situation or the type of information offered in any 
given situation. For example, information that already offers some kind of 
categorization (i.e. salaries of men versus women) may elicit a stronger group level 
focus than information that does not do this (i.e., salaries of a number of individuals 
with no special reference to gender).  Situational cues may interact with individual 
differences to enhance, or inhibit, the extent to which individuals perceive 
discrimination and influence their motivational responses. For example, an 
individual who is high in stigma consciousness may be more likely to perceive 
discrimination when processing information containing evidence of discrimination 
(see also Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker 1986). 
 
Characteristics of the perpetrator.  
Surprisingly little research considers how differences in perpetrator 
attitudes and behavior influence targets’ responses to possible discrimination. 
Research mainly stems from the area of interethnic interactions, considering, for 
example, how implicit and explicit attitudes of a perpetrator influence interethnic 
interactions (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Interestingly, the main finding 
of this research is that perpetrator’s implicit racial attitudes, rather than their 
explicit behaviors, are determinant of target’s perceptions of, and well-being during, 
interethnic communication.  Thus research by Dovidio and colleagues (2002) 
revealed that White Americans’ score on an implicit measure of prejudice 
influenced the extent to which they were perceived as biased during interethnic 
interactions by both the African American communication partner as well as 
observers of the situation. By contrast, explicit reports of prejudice by White 
Americans did not influence perceptions of bias on the side of the target or observer. 
This research indicates that targets of discrimination are able to pick up very subtle 
cues of prejudice and that it is the implicit intergroup attitudes on the side of the 
perpetrator that can cue a target to group level aspects of a situation.  
At a more explicit level, research indicates that the reasons given to targets 
for the negative treatment they receive (that can be attributed to the prejudice of 
another) can determine the extent to which targets perceive situations as 
discriminatory. Research by Kappen and Branscombe (2001) revealed that targets 
who received discriminatory treatment but were given a deflecting and gender 
related reason for their treatment (i.e., you received this treatment because you are 




explicit reason (i.e., you received this treatment because of your gender). Similarly, 
the extent to which a perpetrator’s behavior is perceived as intended to discriminate 
and/or harmful to the target influences the extent to which targets (and observers) 
attribute negative treatment to discrimination (Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & 
Stangor, 2003). This research indicates that more explicit information on attitudes or 
underlying reasons for perpetrator’s behaviors can influence the extent to which 
targets attribute the behavior of the perpetrator to discrimination.  
In sum, the (little) research that has considered the influence of 
perpetrators’ attitudes and perceived behavior (both explicit and implicit) on targets’ 
perceptions of prejudice reveals how perceptive targets can be to the prejudice of 
others, even when it is not explicit, but at the same time, how easily they can be 
deflected from perceiving, or making attributions to discrimination. It is important 
to note that in contrast to the research by Dovidio and colleagues (2002), the studies 
just reviewed are more ‘explicit’ in two ways: Firstly, they actually inform targets (to 
a greater or lesser extent) that a situation may be discriminatory, secondly, they 
explicitly ask (rather than implicitly measuring) the extent to which targets felt this 
situation could be attributed to discrimination. This means that one cannot be sure 
whether targets are actually deflected from perceiving a situation as discriminatory, 
or are wary of attributing/reporting a situation as discriminatory. It highlights the 
importance of considering both more subtle ways of providing cues concerning 
whether a situation is discriminatory (one of the foci of the second chapter of this 
dissertation) as well as designing implicit measures of prejudice. 
 
Nature of situation 
Many situations in which people encounter discrimination are by nature 
very individualistic, enhancing a focus on the self (see also Barreto, Ellemers, 
Cihangir, & Stroebe, 2009). Indeed, as also reflected by the experimental paradigms 
used (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2004), 
discrimination may manifest itself in settings in which individual evaluations take 
place, such as in job applicant evaluations, promotion decisions or class admission. 
This type of situation is strongly associated with merit beliefs that assume that 
individual achievements are the result of and the reward for hard work. Therefore, 
in first instance, individual failure may be attributed to merit based reasons (i.e., lack 
of personal ability, hard work) rather than the prejudice of another person. On the 
other end of the continuum are situations that focus on the experience of one’s 




on group-based disadvantage, such as activities taking place to uncover or address 
group disadvantage (e.g., women’s rights movements).  
 
Information format 
The way information is formatted can also make individual or group level 
aspects of a situation more salient. A number of studies have considered the role of 
information format in influencing perceptions of discrimination. The basic idea 
underlying these studies is that people may make information processing errors 
when provided with information indicative of discrimination because they are not 
aware of the fact that categorization or systematic treatment on the basis of group 
membership is taking place. For example, in order to recognize that indeed women 
receive lower salaries than men in a certain company, it is necessary to compare the 
salaries of a group of women to a group of men. This requires what I would define as 
a group level focus: A focus on differences between, as opposed to within, groups. A 
number of studies have revealed that individuals who were asked to judge salaries 
and not given information that focused them on possible discrimination were less 
likely to perceive discrimination indicating that men received higher salaries than 
women when provided with case-by case information of male and female salaries. 
Individuals provided with aggregate salary information that allowed direct 
comparisons of salaries of males versus females as a group were more likely to 
perceive discrimination (Cordova, 1992; Crosby et al., 1986; Rutte & Messick, 1996). 
This research indicates that the way in which information about discrimination is 
presented influences the processing of information and the ease with which group 
based discrimination is perceived. 
Research on information format highlights a so far neglected area in 
discrimination research: How do people process information that contains evidence 
of discrimination and to what extent does the manner in which this information is 
presented aid or hinder the recognition of prejudice? At the same time it raises an 
interesting question. Whereas this research provides insights concerning the 
likelihood of recognizing, in this case, salary discrimination, it only considers this 
question from the perspective of the observer not of the target of discrimination. 
This may be an essential difference. Providing some indications concerning possible 
differences in search behavior depending on an observer or target perspective, 
studies by Kessler, Mummendey and Leisse (2000) and Postmes, Branscombe, Spears 
and Young (1999) indicate that people make different types of social comparisons 




or against their group (see also the perception of discrimination section). These 
studies indicate that it may be important to consider how people process 
information about discrimination not only with regard to other ingroup members 
but also when concerning themselves personally.  
When focusing on how targets process information individual level aspects 
of a situation (that are unrelated to group membership) such as the extent to which 
information is personally threatening, may also influence search behavior and 
ultimately the likelihood of perceiving discrimination. Research by Blanton and 
colleagues (Blanton, George, & Crocker, 2001) asked people to evaluate satisfaction 
with pay rate and revealed that whether people were focused on potential changes 
(i.e., focus on future pay compensation) or not (i.e., focus on past payment) 
determined the types of social comparisons people made. In fact this research 
revealed that people who could not change their personal outcomes made more 
within as opposed to between group comparisons. Supposedly, within group 
comparisons were less threatening, given that participants were less likely to realize 
they had received less payment in the past than comparable outgroup members 
when they did not compare themselves to other outgroup members. This study 
highlights the necessity of - when focusing on individuals’ personal experiences of 
discrimination - also considering individual and situational differences that may 
influence how targets process information.  Indeed this is addressed in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation.  
 
C. Individual versus group level focus 
How people respond to situations in which it is ambiguous whether they 
are being treated on the basis of group membership or personal characteristics is, in 
my view, largely influenced by the extent to which individual or group level aspects 
of the situation are more salient to individuals. The salience thereof is determined by 
individual and situational characteristics (sections A and B). In essence I see the 
distinction between individual and group level focus as a cognitive process 
comparable to Turner’s (1987) distinction between abstraction levels within which 
individuals categorize their social surroundings. Turner distinguishes between a 
subordinate level of categorization which I refer to as individual focus when 
applying it to a subtle discrimination context, and an intermediate level of 
categorization which I refer to as the group level focus. At a subordinate level, 
individuals are focused on similarities and distinctions between themselves and 




intermediate level, individuals are focused on similarities to other ingroup members 
and differences between the own group and other relevant outgroups.  Drawing a 
parallel to the area of subtle discrimination, my definition of individual level focus 
implies that individuals are focused on aspects of the situation that relate to 
themselves such as making interpersonal comparisons and/or dealing with (possible) 
personal failure. Given the individualistic nature of many situations of 
discrimination that targets are likely to experience (see nature of situation section) it 
is not surprising that targets confronted with discrimination are (in first instance) 
likely to focus on individual level aspects of the situation (see also Barreto et al., 
2009). For individuals with a ‘group level focus’ aspects of their (devalued) group 
membership such as the treatment of other ingroup members or the implications of 
their group membership for their personal future are salient. This is not to say that 
having an individual level focus precludes perceiving discrimination. 
 
D. Perceptions of discrimination 
Above I have discussed indicators that may determine the extent to which 
individuals are focused on group level aspects of a situation (i.e., stigma 
consciousness, identification, information format). In most cases these determinants 
of group level focus also increase attendance to prejudice cues, and perceptions of 
discrimination and are therefore more or less directly linked to this concept. Yet it is 
important to note that motivational factors (see section E) may also determine the 
extent to which people perceive discrimination. In the area of subtle discrimination 
perceptions of and attributions to discrimination are generally seen as 
interchangeable concepts. Yet, there is some evidence (although see Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation) that attributions to discrimination may be the result of 
motivational processes that can increase or decrease the extent to which people 
make attributions to discrimination (see Sechrist et al., 2004). Therefore it is not 
necessarily the case that perceptions and attributions match one another. In other 
words, perceptions of discrimination may measure the extent to which targets 
(subconsciously) recognize discrimination, whereas attributions to discrimination 
may be the result of some (conscious) censoring (i.e., not wanting to blame someone 
for being prejudiced) and/or motivational influences (see section E). When this is 
not the case (i.e., no motivational influences) attributions are likely to reflect 
perceptions of discrimination. More subtle indicators or measures of discrimination 
are required to consider this distinction (see Operario & Fiske, 2001; Dovidio et al., 




discrimination by presenting discrimination information via personal outcomes of 
other ingroup and outgroup members (see Chapter 2).  
At a more abstract level, a considerable amount of work has focused on 
differences between ‘perceptions’ of individual versus group level discrimination. 
Although this work in fact measures attributions to discrimination, it is considered 
in this section because the processes that determine the direction of these 
attributions have been shown to be cognitive (i.e., differences in the frames of 
reference people have). Nevertheless it is the case that within these cognitive frames 
of reference different motivational processes may take place (see Postmes, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999).  
 An early study of Crosby (1984) revealed that although working women 
reported being aware that women workers generally do not receive the rewards 
they deserve and are discriminated against, they did not report personal experiences 
of discrimination. This finding demonstrates that whereas at a more abstract level 
(treatment of one’s group) group members may perceive unjust treatment, this need 
not necessarily translate to perceptions of individual level injustice. Why do targets 
perceive group level discrimination but not discrimination at an individual level? 
Building on the work of Crosby, numerous studies have found that although 
members of low status groups recognize discrimination against their group as a 
whole, they fail to report instances of personal discrimination (D.M.Taylor, Wong-
Rieger, McKirnan & Bercusson, 1982;  D.M.Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). This 
person-group discrimination discrepancy (D.M.Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & 
Lalonde, 1990) has since been reported across many disadvantaged groups, including 
women, African Americans and Inuits (see D.M.Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994 for a 
review).  
Much research has focused on possible explanations for these differences 
between reports of personal as opposed to group level discrimination. The initial and 
for a long time most prominent explanations centered on possible motivational 
processes (Crosby, 1984;). Motivational explanations assume that perceiving 
discrimination at a personal level is threatening to members of disadvantaged groups 
and that therefore lower reports of personal level rather than group level 
discrimination stem from the need to deny personal discrimination to protect the 
self (Crosby, 1984). Although not contesting that motivational processes take place, 
two lines of work provide strong support that the direction of peoples’ attributions is 
largely determined by cognitive aspects, namely peoples’ frames of reference 




when group members make judgments of personal discrimination they think at a 
different categorization level and make different social comparisons than when 
making judgments of group discrimination. Specifically, both papers argue that in 
making personal judgments of discrimination people are focusing on their personal 
identity and using an interpersonal frame of reference. This means that peoples’ 
judgments of personal discrimination are likely to be influenced by interpersonal 
comparisons by which group members assess their standing with respect to other 
individuals. In contrast, when making judgments of group discrimination, group 
members categorize at a group level and assess the standing of their group with 
respect to other groups. In support of this idea, both Kessler et al. (2000) and 
Postmes et al. (1999) in two very different series of studies (field versus laboratory) 
showed that whether group members made interpersonal versus intergroup 
comparisons differentially predicted levels of perceived personal and group 
discrimination respectively. In further support of differentiating between personal 
versus social identities, Postmes and colleagues also provided evidence that factors 
feeding into group level categorization, such as group identification, only 
differentially influenced attributions to group level but not to personal level 
discrimination. 
This research underlines the importance of considering the reference 
groups individuals use when asked to make judgments of discrimination. Yet it is 
important to note that the levels of abstraction at which people make judgments of 
group discrimination may differ. Measures of group discrimination in the above 
research are referring to discrimination against one’s group within society in general 
(as opposed to within a certain context). In more specific contexts (i.e., within an 
organization, sports club etc.) perceiving group discrimination may involve assessing 
whether other group members in one’s direct environment (i.e., one’s company) are 
receiving similar outcomes to oneself. Here people are more inclined to consider 
their individual outcomes with respect to others (i.e., individual level focus). In 
order to perceive discrimination, it will be necessary to adopt a group level focus in 
this context and to pay attention to whether outgroup members’ outcomes differ 
from those of the ingroup. I focus on this question in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
 
E. Motivational concerns 
The attributional ambiguity of discrimination can threaten its targets in 
different domains, those more related to the self (i.e., individual focus) and those 






perceive relatively more threat at an individual as opposed to group level, will 
determine motivational concerns with respect to discrimination. Motivational 
concerns are studied by examining the level or domain in which targets feel the 
strongest need to buffer themselves from threat. Below I will outline three 
motivations and argue that the motivation to self protect is largely triggered by an 
individual level focus, whereas the motivation to protect social identity is triggered 
by a group level focus. New is the system motivation (see Chapter 4) which, as will 
be discussed below, is more abstract than an individual or group level focus.  
 
Motivation to self protect 
When situations of subtle discrimination make personal failure and possible 
lack of personal ability very salient, peoples’ self views can be threatened. In 
consequence, people may be motivated to self-protect to be able to maintain a more 
positive view of themselves. Different research findings in various areas of social 
psychology provide support for the idea that people have a very strong and inherent 
need to defend and maintain positive self views. For example, research in the area of 
self affirmation indicates that when people experience threat in a certain domain, 
affirming the self both in the same or different domains can reduce threat to the self 
(Steele & Liu, 1983; see Tesser 2000 for a review). Similarly, social comparison 
research indicates that when people have a strong need to self protect they make 
downward rather than (threatening) upward comparisons to close others (e.g., 
Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Pyszcynski, Greenberg, & La Prelle, 1983).  
Evidence for these mechanisms to protect the individual self have also been found in 
the area of subtle discrimination. In 1989 Crocker and Major proposed the 
somewhat controversial and counter-intuitive idea that being able to attribute a 
negative personal outcome to the prejudice of another may be self-protective 
because it buffers targets’ personal self esteem from the experience of personal 
failure. As discussed earlier, many situations of discrimination can be very 
attributionally ambiguous to targets of discrimination: Personal negative outcomes 
could be due to one’s lack of ability, inferior personal characteristics, or other 
shortcomings. On the other hand, these situations may be due to one’s devalued 
group membership and the prejudice of others against one’s group. Drawing on 
Kelley’s attribution theory (1973), Crocker and Major’s discounting hypothesis 
(1989) argues that being able to attribute personal failure more externally, such as to 
the prejudice of another, allows targets to discount their own role (i.e. lack of 





attributions to discrimination are seen as more external than attributions to lack of 
personal ability. Considering the consequences of this attribution process for 
psychological well-being and drawing on emotion theory, Crocker and Major (1989) 
argue that the effects of discounting protect self esteem and decrease levels of self-
directed negative affect (i.e., depression) in response to personal failure.  
Early support for the discounting hypothesis was provided by two studies of 
Crocker and colleagues (1991) revealing that women (Study 1) and African 
Americans (Study 2) who were placed in an attributionally ambiguous situation 
experienced less negative self-directed well-being (i.e., lower depressed affect, 
higher self esteem) when they could attribute the negative treatment of another to 
prejudice as opposed to lack of personal ability. Further evidence for the underlying 
role of attributions in these self-protective processes was provided by a later scenario 
study of Major and colleagues (2003a) indicating that people who could attribute 
personal failure to discrimination as opposed to personal deservingness made less 
internal and more external attributions. Importantly, the extent to which people 
could discount their personal ability in causing failure (i.e., in favor of 
discrimination) mediated people’s self-directed well-being responses. People who 
could discount personal failure in favor of discrimination reported lower levels of 
depressed emotions. 
So far I have only discussed how attributions to discrimination can be self-
protective with respect to the effects of personal failure. One of the questions also 
considered within this approach, and further elaborated in the present dissertation 
(see chapters 2 and 3) concerns situations in which members of stigmatized groups 
experience personal success. Research in the area of attribution theory has revealed 
that just as people prefer to attribute personal failure externally, they also like to 
attribute personal success internally. Yet, because situations of attributional 
ambiguity raise concern about the cause of personal treatment, members of devalued 
groups may come to doubt whether their personal success is due to own (superior) 
ability, or due to preferential treatment on the basis of their group membership. 
Take the example of affirmative action by which members of disadvantaged groups 
are specifically encouraged to apply for jobs or are promoted within companies. 
These laws, although good for promoting diversity within organizations, may 
increase uncertainty concerning personal ability and own input with respect to 
personal success. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that experiencing personal 




the (positive) well-being effects of positive feedback (Crocker et al., 1991, Study 2; 
Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich, & Lee, 2007).  
In sum research on the discounting approach provides evidence that 
responses to situations that provide indications of discrimination can be motivated 
by the need to self-protect. In the case of personal failure, attributions to 
discrimination can serve to self protect from attributing this failure to the self. In the 
case of personal success, attributions to discrimination may actually counter the 
possibility to self enhance by attributing success internally. When considering 
discrimination as potentially self-protective it is important to keep in mind that the 
situations studied in line with the discounting hypothesis are by nature likely to 
focus targets on individual failure and their personal outcomes. For example many of 
the studies employed in this area consider interpersonal evaluation settings such as 
study progress tests or job selection procedures (i.e., Crocker et al., 1991; Major et 
al., 2003a). This means that individuals may be relatively more focused on averting 
the negative consequences of experiencing failure rather than on the negative 
implications of being devalued on the basis of their group membership. In 
consequence they may adopt an individual (not group level) focus to understand the 
situation. As will be discussed later on, situations in which individuals have more of 
a group level focus and are aware of the (negative) future implications of their 
devalued group membership may carry less potential to protect targets from personal 
failure by making attributions to prejudice. In this case the self-protective aspects of 
attributing failure to prejudice are countered by the negative consequences of 
perceiving one’s group membership as devalued (see below section ‘motivation to 
protect one’s social identity’).  
The idea that perceiving discrimination is always self-protective and, 
specifically, that an attribution to discrimination should be seen as relatively 
external to the self has been contested by a number of researchers. It forms the basis 
of the second motivational process I discuss below. 
 
Motivation to protect one’s social identity 
The discounting approach has been countered by those who argue that 
attributing situations to discrimination is also harmful to the self (Branscombe et al., 
1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a, b). In line with social identity theory 
Branscombe and colleagues have posited that attributing a situation to 
discrimination should not be considered as a purely external attribution, as realizing 




the self, namely one’s social self or group-based self (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). 
In response to the Discounting Hypothesis, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002b) 
showed that with respect to purely external attributions for personal failure, an 
attribution to discrimination was perceived as both internally and externally caused. 
Note that in this case internally caused did not mean that targets felt they personally 
caused their failure, rather they perceived their outcome as partially due to 
something in themselves, namely their group membership.  
Perceiving discrimination is not only considered harmful because it 
threatens people’s social identity, but also because it makes people aware of the 
negative implications of being a member of a devalued group. Indeed, it provides a 
future perspective of not being judged on the basis of one’s individual abilities and 
personal strengths, but rather on the basis of an (in many cases) irrelevant 
characteristic of the self, one’s group membership. In line with this idea, 
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) argue that the more structural and pervasive 
group members experience discrimination to be, the more negative are the 
consequences for personal well-being when making attributions to discrimination 
(Branscombe et al., 1999).  Two lines of research provide some initial evidence for 
this assumption. One line considers the extent to which group members are 
structurally as opposed to not structurally disadvantaged, assuming that structural 
disadvantage is related to perceiving discrimination as pervasive. In a number of 
studies Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b; Schmitt, 
Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002c) showed that attributions to 
discrimination were negatively related to well-being for members of disadvantaged 
(i.e., women) but not for members of advantaged (i.e., men) groups. Unfortunately, 
these studies cannot separate the severity of reported discrimination (less for men) 
from their group’s status. Therefore it is difficult to judge whether it is the low status 
and structural disadvantage that explains well-being effects or the fact that women 
know better what it is like to experience discrimination, and therefore give a more 
realistic response to situations of discrimination.  
 A second line of research has measured or manipulated the pervasiveness of 
discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003). 
This research provides support that discrimination that is perceived as pervasive is 
negatively related to well-being. One of the few studies to manipulate the 
pervasiveness of discrimination (Schmitt et al., 2003; cf. Major, Kaiser, & O’Brien, 
2007) revealed that discrimination that was perceived as pervasive as opposed to rare 







Research studying effects of pervasiveness of discrimination on well-being 
provides initial evidence that the extent to which discrimination is perceived as 
pervasive may be an important moderator in determining whether the experience of 
discrimination is likely to be relatively self protective (i.e., averting failure) versus 
harmful. Although the studies discussed above do not show direct evidence for the 
self-protective potential of incidental discrimination, they do suggest that situations 
that are perceived as more incidental may have more potential to be protective of 
the individual self than those in which individuals are also aware of the negative 
consequences of discrimination for their future. Here the negative implications of 
discrimination are likely to cancel out the self-protective properties of attributions 
to discrimination. I test this idea in Chapter 4 of the present dissertation.  
 Given this relatively strong evidence that attributions to discrimination are 
also harmful at a ‘group level’, because they threaten people’s social identities and 
make salient the possibility of future disadvantage, it is likely that group members 
are motivated to protect their social identity. Indeed research on social identity 
theory has shown that people have a strong need to maintain a positive view of the 
groups they are a member of (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When social 
identities are threatened, group members will be motivated to re-establish a positive 
view of their group. In the area of subtle discrimination, research indicates that one 
way in which group members cope with the threat to social identity posed by 
discrimination, is to seek support of other group members and to increase 
identification with their group. Referred to as the rejection identification model 
(RIM, Branscombe et al., 1999), the idea is that (increased) identification with one’s 
group in the face of discrimination which represents the exclusion from an 
outgroup, can buffer group members from the negative consequences of 
discrimination and feelings of exclusion. Initial evidence for this argument was 
provided by a study showing that the negative consequences of attributions to 
discrimination for well-being were countered when group members identified 
highly with their group (Branscombe et al., 1999). Therefore, high identification 
with one’s group can serve as a source of strength in response to discrimination (see 
also Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Redersdorff, Martinot, & 
Branscombe, 2004). 
 Although identification may signal buffering against the negative 
consequences of discrimination, research also indicates that it may be a source of 
vulnerability: High identifiers are likely to feel more threatened by discrimination 





central to the self. A study that measured identification and manipulated 
discrimination indicated that group members who identified highly with their group 
experienced more negative well-being in response to discrimination than low 
identifiers (McCoy & Major, 2003). Although these findings may seem equivocal 
with those of the RIM, it is important to distinguish between determinants of an 
individual versus group level focus, and determinants of perceptions of 
discrimination, versus (motivational) responses thereto. It is possible that 
participants who identified highly in the McCoy and Major study (2003) also 
perceived more discrimination than low identifiers (the relation between 
identification and perceptions of discrimination was not reported in this work). This 
does not preclude the option that group members who face pervasive discrimination 
further increase levels of identification to cope with this social identity threat. 
 
System motivations 
Research on people’s worldviews, frequently focusing on system 
legitimizing or system justifying beliefs, indicates that people have a strong 
underlying need to view the world as a place that functions on the basis of principles 
of fairness and equality (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Situations that challenge 
these principles by being inherently unjust and unfair can be experienced as very 
threatening by individuals. Discrimination, especially, as I argue in the present 
dissertation (Chapter 4), discrimination that is perceived as pervasive and inherent 
in society, may be particularly threatening to people’s worldviews. Below I will 
consider evidence indicating that discrimination threatens people’s worldviews, as 
well as discussing individual and situational differences that can make certain 
individuals particularly vulnerable to these ‘worldview threats’. I conclude by 
considering ways in which individuals can be motivated to cope with these threats.  
 Studies considering the experience of discrimination in relation to peoples’ 
worldviews have generally focused on beliefs concerning peoples’ individual 
achievements such as beliefs in individual merit. Instances of discriminatory 
treatment, arguably not based on merit, are likely to threaten merit beliefs. 
Surprisingly, research so far has not experimentally established this causal relation. 
A number of studies have provided some indirect evidence by showing that people 
who endorse meritocracy beliefs report lower levels of well-being in response to 
structurally experienced (as opposed to incidental) personal discrimination (Foster, 
Sloto, & Ruby, 2006; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Major et al., 2007). These studies 






they are to the experience of discrimination. These studies do have an important 
limitation: The use of individual difference measures does not allow one to draw 
conclusions concerning the causal relation between perceptions of discrimination 
and peoples’ worldviews and thus how perceptions of discrimination influence 
worldviews. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I address this by studying whether and 
under which circumstances discrimination actually threatens people’s worldviews, 
specifically peoples’ beliefs in the world as being just.  
I argue that in studying threats to worldviews it is important to focus on how targets 
perceive discrimination and that a factor that may increase vulnerability to the 
threat to one’s worldviews lies in the extent to which people experience 
discrimination as pervasive and thus structural within society. Prior research has 
indicated that the experience of discrimination as pervasive, as opposed to more 
incidental and rare, has negative consequences for targets’ well-being. Explanations 
for the negative effects of pervasive discrimination so far have centered around 
targets’ personal fear of encountering future negative treatment and outcomes on 
the basis of their group membership, which can lead to feelings of helplessness and 
depression (Schmitt et al., 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Causes that are seen 
as more stable and/or global, such as discrimination that is perceived as pervasive, 
are likely to increase proneness to depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989).  
In the present dissertation I propose and show that another potential reason why 
perceptions of pervasive discrimination have such negative consequences for well-
being may be because only discrimination that is perceived as pervasive threatens 
these core elements in the way people (want to) think about the world as being just. 
Discrimination that is perceived as more incidental and rare by contrast can be 
dismissed as an unusual aberration in a world that is basically just whereas being 
structurally disadvantaged in a pervasive and enduring way on the basis of group 
membership is more likely to threatens peoples’ beliefs in the world as just.  
 In sum, there is evidence supporting the idea that discrimination can 
threaten peoples’ worldviews. This threat to peoples’ worldviews may be 
particularly strong the more people endorse these views, and the more the 
experience of discrimination is perceived as pervasive. How do people cope with 
these threats to their worldviews? The general idea underlying a worldview or 
system based perspective is that when confronted with injustice, individuals will be 
motivated to re-establish the system as just (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978). Research in the area of system legitimizing beliefs indicates that there 




(1) show enhanced ideological support for the status quo (2) use complementary 
stereotypes to bolster the system or (3) blame the victim of injustice (Jost & Banaji, 
1994; Kay, Jost, Mandisozda, Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007, Lerner & Miller, 
1978). Additionally, although nowadays receiving less attention in the area of 
system legitimization which assumes that people will try to legitimize rather than 
change the status quo (i.e., being disadvantaged on the basis of one’s group 
membership), I will discuss a fourth option: (4) addressing injustice. I discuss these 
four options in more detail below.  
Enhanced ideological support for the status quo refers to the fact that 
people may increase their support for a system in response to threats to this system 
(Kay et al., 2007).  Within the area of subtle discrimination, research has not 
necessarily indicated enhanced ideological support for the status quo but a number 
of studies have provided evidence that targets of discrimination who endorse (i.e., 
were primed with) meritocracy beliefs or the belief in individual mobility are less 
likely to report injustice in the form of discrimination than people who did not 
endorse these beliefs (Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 
2002a; McCoy & Major, 2007). Explanations of these results focus on the fact that 
these individuals are legitimizing the system by under-reporting discrimination. 
Alternatively, one might argue that people who are primed with meritocracy beliefs 
or who are high endorsers of meritocracy beliefs may be more likely to blame 
themselves for negative personal outcomes that can be attributed to discrimination - 
given their belief that one is responsible for one’s individual achievements. 
Therefore one cannot be sure whether people who endorse meritocracy beliefs and 
report less injustice are doing so because they feel more threatened by the injustice 
of discrimination (i.e., threat to their system legitimizing beliefs) or because the 
nature of their beliefs is focusing them on their individual achievements (i.e., an 
individual level focus) rather than on unjust behaviour due to discrimination. In the 
latter case individuals would not be reporting this injustice (i.e., discrimination) 
because they do not perceive it. 
 The use of complementary stereotypes as a way of dealing with threats to 
system justifying beliefs refers to the fact that stereotypes can serve to justify status 
differences within society (Jost & Hamilton, 2005; Kay et al., 2007). In other words 
stereotypes that portray group members conform their present status can protect 
peoples’ system legitimizing beliefs. For example, the African American stereotype 
of lazy can ‘justify’ the lower status of African Americans within the job hierarchy. 







targets of discrimination (and stereotyping) may increase self and ingroup 
stereotyping as a means of system justification (McCoy & Major, 2007): Targets of 
discrimination who were primed with a meritocracy as opposed to a neutral prime 
engaged in more self and group stereotyping. The authors reasoned that for those 
individuals who received a meritocracy prime, the experience of discrimination was 
more threatening to system legitimizing beliefs, thus increasing the need to justify 
the system by confirming stereotypes indicative of low status. Note that here 
individuals are in fact engaging in ‘coping strategies’ that although protective of 
their system justifying beliefs, may be harmful at both an individual and group level 
by undermining both one’s self view (i.e., self stereotyping) and one’s view of one’s 
group (i.e., group stereotyping). This indicates that discrimination may affect 
different domains – not only in reference to the self or one’s group membership, but 
also at the level of system justifying beliefs that are not necessarily linked to self 
motivated processes (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
 Regarding the motivation to deal with system threats by derogating the 
victim of injustice, numerous studies in the area of just world beliefs have provided 
evidence for this phenomenon (e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; see Lerner & Miller, 
1978, for a review). Seeing others as deserving of their fate rather than as recipients 
of unjust treatment can help individuals to preserve the idea of the world as a just 
place. This need is so strong that individuals will even blame victims of rape for 
their fate as a means of re-establishing the world as just. Within the area of subtle 
discrimination victim derogation has thus far not been studied. There is some 
research considering high status members’ responses to evidence of discrimination 
of a low status group. This research indicates that Caucasian Americans (i.e., high 
status group members) who endorsed system legitimizing beliefs blamed African 
Americans more for their discrimination than low endorsers (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & 
Hagiwara, 2006). In the present dissertation I considered victim derogation as a 
means for studying the causal processes underlying responses to discrimination 
(Chapter 4). I argue that if discrimination threatens people’s worldviews, being able 
to derogate a victim of injustice should help re-establish the world as just. Targets of 
discrimination are given the opportunity to re-establish the world as just by 
derogating a victim of injustice (in a domain unrelated to discrimination). I study 
whether this opportunity for victim derogation has the potential to reduce the 
threat posed to system justifying beliefs by (pervasive) discrimination.  
 The strategies for coping with threats to one’s worldviews I have discussed 




justifying the status quo and therefore the system, rather than on changing the 
actual status quo by challenging the system. Within research on just world beliefs, 
one way of reducing threat to just world beliefs (by reinstating justice) is to 
compensate the victim of injustice (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Miller, 
1978). Although at a lower level this changes the status quo (i.e., for the victim), it 
does not address the source of injustice or challenge or change the system at a higher 
level. Yet, in studying discrimination I believe it is essential to focus on when and 
how targets of discrimination whose worldviews are threatened, are likely to address 
the source of injustice or even challenge the system supporting this injustice. 
Research so far has mainly focused on responses to those who voice that they have 
been discriminated against (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Kaiser & Miller, 2001). 
Research in the area of tokenism indicates that targets may be more likely to address 
injustice when the system is completely closed (i.e., there is no access possible to the 
high status group). Those who achieve a token position (i.e., individual success in 
the face of their disadvantaged group membership) are unlikely to address the 
disadvantage of their group (Ellemers, 2001; Wright & Taylor, 1999). Focusing on 
the type of situation individuals may encounter when they face discrimination, 
these situations are likely to create the illusion of individual mobility in which 
positive individual achievements are possible, as long as one works hard enough for 
them (Barreto et al., 2009; McCoy & Major, 2007). This may even imply that 
members of devalued groups need not perceive situations of discrimination as 
unjust. A first step in studying to what extent individuals are likely to address 
injustice lies in considering these perceptions of injustice (see also following 
section). In the present dissertation I focus on processes that may indicate readiness 
to address injustice by considering individual level perceptions of injustice not only 
with regard to the self but also with respect to the disadvantaged position of one’s 
group. Furthermore, I study the circumstances under which targets are likely to 
perceive and respond to injustice against their group (chapters 3 and 4). 
 
The interplay between perceptions of discrimination and motivational concerns 
 So far I have presented determinants of perceptions and motivational 
concerns with respect to discrimination. It has become clear that individual and 
situational variables may both influence perceptions of, and motivational concerns 
in response to, discrimination (i.e., identification with one’s group). Yet, in my 
model I suggest, albeit between brackets, that these two factors may interact with 




extent discriminatory it is unlikely that the motivational concerns described above 
will arise. Alternately, some have argued that individuals may be motivated to make 
attributions to discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1989; Sechrist et al., 2004). This 
again raises the question of whether attributions to discrimination can be considered 
equivalent to actual perceptions of discrimination. In other words individuals may 
perceive a situation to be discriminatory to the same extent, yet differ in their 
reports of (i.e., attributions to) discrimination due to their underlying motivations. I 
come back to the distinction between perceptions and attributions in Chapter 5. 
Certainly, more research is needed to determine the (possible) interplay between 
perceptions of discrimination and motivational concerns. 
 
F. Outcomes 
 The discussion of motivational concerns provided indications that 
discrimination can differentially affect personal well-being depending on the 
underlying motives affected by the experience of discrimination. Below I discuss 
contextual versus more global indicators of the outcomes individuals and their 
groups may experience as a consequence of discrimination. I will focus on indicators 
relevant to this dissertation such as general and specific well-being measures and 
perceptions of justice. I do not address indicators such as possible 
performance/achievement measures and collective action tendencies in the research 
conducted in this dissertation because I was primarily interested in studying the 
question of how and under which circumstances discrimination negatively (or 
positively) affects targets’ well-being. I do see well-being measures as a possible 
indicator of targets’ (future) performance and collective action tendencies and 




In considering the consequences of discrimination for the well-being of 
stigmatized group members, studies so far have mainly focused on self esteem and 
health indicators.  
Health. Focusing on the consequences of discrimination with respect to 
global and long term indicators of well-being, many studies have considered the 
consequences of membership of a stigmatized group for the health of its members. 
Obviously it is difficult to establish a direct link with experiences of discrimination 




members of stigmatized groups are at a higher risk of depression, hypertension, 
coronary heart disease and stroke (Nazroo, Jackson, Karlsen, & Torres, 2000; Krieger, 
1990). Indications that discrimination may play a role in causing these reduced 
health effects are provided by evidence revealing that members of stigmatized 
groups may have less access to healthcare (Williams & Rucker, 1996). Also, from a 
stress-coping perspective (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), those who experience frequent 
discrimination are suffering frequent stressful events that form a threat to individual 
health – although the impact of discrimination on health is likely to be moderated 
by people’s appraisals and coping mechanisms with respect to discrimination 
(Landrine, Klonoff, Corral, Fernandez, & Roesch, 2006; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
In part due to the difficulty of testing causal relations and the necessity of 
conducting longitudinal studies, I do not focus on health indicators in this 
dissertation.  
Self esteem. An early review by Crocker and Major (1989) noted that 
although members of stigmatized groups face frequent and pervasive discrimination 
this is not reflected in levels of global personal self esteem. Indeed numerous studies 
have shown that African Americans have personal self esteem that is equal to or 
even higher than that of Caucasian Americans (Hoelter, 1983; Porter & Washington, 
1979). Similarly women generally do not report lower levels of self esteem than men 
(Hoelter, 1983). Although discrimination therefore does not seem to have long term 
effects on individuals global self esteem, the experience of discrimination may lead 
to situational variations in (state) personal self esteem (see Heatherton & Polivy, 
1991). As reviewed above (section D), being able to attribute personal failure to 
discrimination may protect personal self esteem. In my research (see Chapter 4), I 
find evidence that attributions to discrimination can also be negatively related to 
personal self esteem. This is in line with self esteem research that stresses the 
necessity of keeping in mind contextual variations in self esteem (e.g., Morse & 
Gergen, 1970). Take the example of the job applicant who is applying for a job and 
sees another very competent job applicant – research indicated that this temporarily 
lowered the self esteem of the applicant (Morse & Gergen, 1970). This contextual 
approach is fitting if one views self esteem as a measure of self efficacy that indicates 
to what extent one feels competent and in control over one’s environment. 
Situations that block these feelings of competence and control may (temporarily) 
lower self esteem (Gecas & Schwalbe, 1983). The experience of discrimination can 
lower feelings of self efficacy, either by indicating one’s lack of personal ability (i.e., 




being a member of a devalued group may be a barrier in achieving successful 
personal outcomes (i.e., when discrimination is perceived as pervasive).  
Affect. When focusing on situational indicators of well-being it is important 
to also consider affect. The experience of injustice is frequently related to anger (see 
Miller, 2001 for a review). In the area of subtle discrimination research by Hansen 
and Sassenberg (2006) has stressed the necessity of distinguishing between self 
versus other-directed indicators of anger. Whereas prejudice in general is likely to 
elicit anger (towards the perpetrator), the experience of self-directed anger may 
depend on the extent to which individuals also attribute this discrimination 
internally. Research in the area of subtle discrimination stresses the necessity of 
focusing on more self-directed affective responses such as depression (Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005; Major et al., 2003a; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001).Whereas other-
directed emotions are focused on factors external to the self (i.e., other’s personality, 
prejudice of another), self-directed emotions have been shown to be influenced by 
experiences that affect the self (i.e., personal loss, personal failure, negative future 
implications of discrimination for the self, see also Chapter 4 of this dissertation). 
This distinction is important because discrimination need not necessarily affect 
overall emotional well-being but may, as outlined, differentially influence emotion 
measures (see also Chapter 4).  
 
Perceptions of injustice 
Although one might think that perceiving discrimination is equivalent to 
perceiving injustice, this need not be the case. For one, targets of discrimination may 
report discrimination yet differ in the extent to which they find discrimination 
unjust. For example, research considering responses of individuals who are 
discriminated against on the basis of their obesity indicates that these targets report 
perceiving discrimination but may to some extent find their treatment justified3 
(Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993, see also Major et al., 2002b). Furthermore, our 
research indicates that perceptions of justice may also depend on the perspective of 
the person making judgments (Chapter 3). Judgments of injustice against one’s 
fellow group members may in part be determined by the extent to which one 
personally experiences injustice. So far perceptions of injustice as an outcome 
variable have received fairly little attention in the area of subtle discrimination. Yet, 
I would argue that perceptions of injustice are important because they can tell us 
more about the likelihood that targets of discrimination will (behaviourally) address 




discrimination has focused on the extent to which both targets and observers of 
discrimination are likely to report instances of discrimination and shows that the 
likelihood thereof is surprisingly low (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Kaiser & Miller, 
2001). Possibly this is because there is no direct relation between the 
perception/experience of discrimination and perceptions of injustice: As mentioned 
above, the experience of personal injustice is not necessarily related to perceived 
unjust treatment against one’s group as a whole. Yet, in order to engage in collective 
action against this injustice with fellow group members it may be essential that 
group members translate personal injustice to group level injustice, or alternatively, 
that they perceive group level injustice even when they do not experience personal 
injustice (see Chapter 5). Indeed Miller (2001) points out the necessity of 
distinguishing experiences of personal injustice from ‘victimless’ crimes against 
others, such as other members of one’s group. Although perceptions of group 
injustice are likely to raise somewhat less strong emotional responses, they 
nevertheless can induce strong ‘moralistic and punitive impulses’. Drawing on 
Heider (1958), Miller points out that injustice at a group level is seen as an 
infringement of a moral contract, the ‘ought forces’ of a community. As also pointed 
out in early work on just world beliefs (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978), people have a 
need to view the world as stable and orderly in order to be able to commit to long 
term goals and engage in meaningful interactions with their environment. Injustice 
at a group level (even if not experienced personally), is likely to be perceived as a 
breach of this moral contract that needs to be punished. In studying the broader 
effects of perceptions of subtle discrimination it may be very important to consider 
to what extent perceptions of personal discrimination (and injustice) are related to 
perceptions of injustice at a group level, against members of one’s group. In the area 
of subtle discrimination no research I am aware of has considered the extent to 
which targets perceive injustice at a group level in response to (personal) 
discrimination. I address this question in Chapter 3 and at a more abstract level the 
relation between discrimination and just world beliefs in Chapter 4. 
 
Conclusions 
 In this chapter I have presented a model that looks at the processes 
underlying individuals’ outcomes and responses to subtle discrimination. Subtle 
discrimination concerns situations in which individuals receive negative personal 
treatment but cannot be entirely sure whether the cause of this treatment is the 




membership and the prejudice of another. How do targets recognize and cope with 
these types of situations? The present model considers how individual and 
situational determinants can increase the extent to which individual or group level 
aspects of a situation are salient.  The extent to which people have an individual 
versus group level focus can in turn have consequences both for perceptions of and 
(motivated) responses to discrimination. When focused more on individual level 
aspects people may fail to recognize prejudice as a cause of their personal outcomes. 
A group level focus may increase perceptions of discrimination. From a motivational 
perspective, the focus of individuals on protecting the self from failure (i.e., 
individual level focus) or protecting one’s view of one’s group (i.e., group level 
focus) can determine responses to discrimination.  
 
The present dissertation 
 The studies conducted in this dissertation address different parts of this 
model and answer a number of questions raised by the model. All studies share the 
idea that individuals can be focused on more individual or group level aspects of a 
situation – and that this focus may influence responses to subtle discrimination. In 
Chapter 2, I consider how factors enhancing individual level focus such as the self 
relevance and nature of personal outcomes affect information processing and 
responses to subtle discrimination. In Chapter 3, I consider the relative influence of 
personal outcomes (individual level focus) and group outcomes (group level focus) 
on the extent to which individuals attribute situations to discrimination. I also focus 
on well-being responses. In Chapter 4, I move beyond an individual versus group 
level focus, contrasting the need to self protect by making attributions to 
discrimination with the extent to which experiences of discrimination form a threat 
to peoples’ worldviews.  
Below I outline in a more detail the questions addressed by the separate chapters. 
 
Chapter 2: How do individual level motivations influence information search and 
well-being in the face of subtle discrimination? – an individual level focus on subtle 
discrimination  
 In this chapter I study people’s motivation to search for information about 
the cause of personal outcomes that can be attributed to personal discrimination, and 
the effects this information search might have for well-being. I consider to what 
extent aspects relating to an individual level focus such as the self relevance and 




information (Study 2.2) encourage or block information search in situations in 
which it is ambiguous whether or not targets are being discriminated against. In my 
paradigm the information sought provided the only indication of discrimination to 
targets. This research builds on prior research in the area by considering information 
search from a target’s perspective. As outlined earlier, research on information 
format thus far only considered observers’ responses to instances of discrimination. 
The present study allows us to study to what extent people are motivated to search 
for information that can provide evidence of discrimination when dealing with 
personal outcomes that differ in the extent to which they are relevant to the self. 
Although self relevance may increase a focus on the self, and thus inhibit 
perceptions of discrimination (which require also having a group level focus), 
research in the area of information processing has indicated that the more self-
relevant situations are, the more individuals engage in information search, to some 
extent regardless of the negative implications for the self (Dunning, 1995). I also 
consider to what extent information about and the discovery of discrimination are 
harmful or self-protective for well-being. Furthermore, I focus more in depth on the 
processes underlying responses to discrimination that is harmful for well-being: Do 
people suffer from the fate of their group, or rather from the negative consequences 
of their group membership for the self? 
 
Chapter 3: To what extent does the nature of personal outcomes (individual level 
focus) versus the fate of one’s group (group level focus) determine attributions to 
discrimination, perceptions of injustice and well-being? – an individual and group 
level focus on subtle discrimination 
 This chapter presents two studies examining how (in-) congruence between 
personal and group outcomes affects outcome attributions, procedural justice 
perceptions and emotional well-being of individuals who are exposed to subtle 
discrimination. As discrimination by definition involves both negative personal 
outcomes as well as negative group outcomes (i.e., the prejudiced attitude of 
someone against oneself and other group members in general), I was interested in 
considering to what extent the fact that one receives a negative personal outcome, as 
opposed to one’s group being treated negatively, would determine responses to 
discrimination and perceptions of injustice. I manipulated the nature of individuals’ 
personal outcomes (success versus failure) and the nature of group outcomes (no 
outcome versus group disadvantage in Study 3.1, group disadvantage versus group 




suffer or profit from their group membership and do they, independently of their 
personal fate and motivations, perceive injustice against their group? In other words, 
how does the knowledge of outcomes of one’s group influence individuals’ 
psychological well-being? The second question this research addressed was to what 
extent attributions to discrimination are motivated by the need to self-protect, or are 
merely the result of information processing. In other words, if people discount 
personal failure in favor of discrimination (i.e., the discounting hypothesis), do they 
make these attributions to protect the self, or because information about prejudice 
provides clear indications that not personal ability but prejudice is causing one’s 
personal outcomes? In the former case this would mean that individuals only 
discount personal outcomes in favor of a group outcome when experiencing personal 
failure but not success. 
  
Chapter 4: Integrating motivational approaches: Countering the negative 
consequences of pervasive discrimination by affirming the world as just – beyond an 
individual versus group level focus 
 The present chapter considers conditions under which perceptions of 
discrimination may buffer against or exacerbate the adverse effects of negative 
treatment on targets’ psychological well-being as well as exploring the underlying 
mechanisms for this effect. As such it aims to integrate seemingly conflicting 
findings in the area of subtle discrimination: Research has indicated that perceptions 
of discrimination can sometimes protect psychological well-being by allowing 
targets to attribute negative personal treatment and outcomes externally (e.g., to the 
prejudice of another) rather than internally (e.g., self-blame) (e.g., Crocker et al., 
1991; Major et al., 2003a). Yet there is also evidence that perceiving discrimination 
is harmful to well-being because it signals devaluation of part of the self, the group 
self, as well as implying negative future treatment on the basis of one’s group 
membership (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2002c). In this fourth 
chapter we study the role of the pervasiveness of discrimination as a moderator of 
these processes. Although prior research has suggested pervasiveness of 
discrimination as a moderator of these processes (Schmitt et al.,2003), no research so 
far has provided evidence that the same situation of discrimination (i.e., being 
rejected by a prejudiced evaluator) can induce different processes depending on 
people’s perceptions of pervasiveness (rare versus pervasive): We predicted that 
perceiving discrimination as rare, and thus incidental, may serve to buffer targets 




convenient external attribution for failure and is relatively unlikely to occur again in 
the future.  By contrast, discrimination that is perceived as pervasive may be 
harmful in part (but see below) because it implies future negative treatment and 
outcomes on the basis of one’s group membership, which can lead to feelings of 
helplessness and depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a; 
Schmitt et al., 2003).  
Importantly, in contrast to prior research that has manipulated 
discrimination that is contextually pervasive in the sense that the number of 
prejudiced persons in the specific context differed (see Schmitt et al., 2003), we 
manipulated discrimination that was personally experienced but differed in the 
extent to which it was likely to occur in the future (i.e., temporal pervasiveness: rare 
versus recurrent). In our view this covered the essence of discrimination as being 
threatening – as opposed to self-protective - when it provides targets with a negative 
perspective for the future.  
 A further aim of this chapter was to examine the processes underlying 
responses to pervasive discrimination. Prior explanations of the negative 
consequences of discrimination for well-being have largely focused on the fact that 
it implies future negative treatment and outcomes on the basis of one’s group 
membership which can lead to perceptions of barriers to one’s success and to 
consequent feelings of helplessness and depression (Abramson et al., 1989; Schmitt 
& Branscombe, 2002a; Schmitt et al., 2003). In this chapter I propose that attributing 
a situation to discrimination when this discrimination is perceived to be pervasive 
may not only be threatening because it has negative (future) implications for the 
self, but also because it threatens peoples’ worldviews, such as the belief that the 
world functions on the basis of principles of equality and fairness. I study this idea 
by giving individuals the opportunity (or not) of affirming the world as just.  
 Overall, this chapter therefore moves beyond the individual and group level 
focus outlined in above introduction: In the present chapter I argue that beyond the 
level of individual or group level focus discrimination may affect more abstract 
concepts such as the way in which people view the world. In the discussion of the 
present dissertation I integrate findings of this chapter to provide a more refined 






1. I refer to identification as an individual difference level determinant of 
perceptions of and responses to discrimination. Research indicates that perceiving 
discrimination can also influence levels of identification (Branscombe et al., 1999).  
2. One might say that whereas cognitive aspects determine the direction of people’s 
attributions, the magnitude of these attributions may be determined by motivational 
factors operating at these different levels (see Postmes et al., 1999). 
3. The explanation given for this finding is that obesity is perceived as a controllable 
stigma, thus inducing higher levels of self blame in targets than uncontrollable 







When searching hurts: 
The role of information 
search in reactions to 
subtle discrimination1 
As the blatant expression of prejudice is sanctioned in present society 
(Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), expressions of prejudice have become more 
subtle and implicit (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002b; Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 
1998). As a result, women often fail to recognize prejudicial attitudes and 
discriminatory treatment (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). Yet, in order to achieve social 
change and improve the status of women it is essential to recognize and report 
discrimination.  
Why would women fail to perceive they are discriminated against? 
According to research by Crosby and colleagues, failure to perceive gender 
discrimination at the individual level may be due to lack of group-level information 
(Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986; Rutte, Diekmann, Polzer, Crosby, & 
Messick, 1994). Women typically only have information about individual cases of 
discrimination (e.g. their own treatment), whereas inferring discrimination may 
require the comparison of a larger number of cases (e.g., the treatment of other 
women and men members). Consequently, in many situations these inferences 
require an active search for additional information. Yet, we also know that elaborate 
information processing does not always occur (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991). Thus, when studying perceptions of gender discrimination it is 
important to consider to what extent its targets are motivated to search for and 
process the necessary information to discover discrimination in the first place. The 
first aim of the present research is to study conditions under which women are 
motivated to actively search for information about the cause of the treatment they 
receive, when placed in a situation in which it is ambiguous whether or not they are 
victims of discrimination. We focus on settings in which the relevance of individual 
characteristics seems primary (i.e., in evaluation settings in which women 
experience personal success or failure). 
   
A second aim of this research is to examine the consequences of searching 
for information, and thus viewing evidence of discrimination, for women’s well-
being. Does the realization that a personal outcome is due to one’s gender rather 
than personal ability have positive or negative consequences for well-being? Past 
research has provided conflicting answers to this question. By studying differences 
in information processing the present studies can provide more insight into the 
mechanisms underlying responses to gender discrimination.   
 In the following we will first consider when targets may be motivated to 
search for information. We then review literature on the effects of discrimination on 
well-being and consider the possible role of information search in this process. 
 
The role of information search in perceptions of discrimination 
In 1984 Crosby published a paper on “The denial of personal 
discrimination” in which she discussed the paradox that although females were 
frequently aware of gender discrimination at the societal level, this awareness did 
not transfer to reports of personal discrimination. This pattern of results has been 
widely documented across a number of minority groups (e.g., Guimond & Dubé-
Simard, 1983; D.M. Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994).  
Research studying this phenomenon has indicated that failing to perceive 
personal discrimination may be due to lack of information that would allow 
perceivers to shift from thinking about personal treatment to a more abstract level at 
which that personal treatment can be attributed to one’s gender (Crosby et al., 1986; 
Rutte, 1998; Rutte et al., 1994; Rutte & Messick, 1996). Indeed, many situations in 
which discrimination takes place do not include cues to group membership and in 
fact imply personal failure (such as when an individual is rejected for a job 
interview, see also Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002) rather than gender 
discrimination. 
Yet, one important question prior research has not considered is whether, 
and under what circumstances, women are at all motivated to actively search for 
information that can reveal evidence of personal discrimination. Most of the prior 
research examining the relationship between information search and perceptions of 
discrimination focused on the role of ‘cold’ cognitive factors on prejudice 
recognition. In this research participants were asked to consider whether a company 
discriminated against its female co-workers and provided participants with the 
necessary information to be able to conclude that this was the case (e.g. Crosby et 






part as an observing third party, these studies do not consider to what extent women 
who have received negative information about themselves (in the form of personal 
rejection) are motivated to search for extra information that may reveal 
discriminatory treatment. Are women prepared to search for such information when 
this information is self-relevant to them? A focus on targets instead of observers 
allows us to examine peoples’ motivations to search for and process group-level 
information that may contain evidence of (personal) discrimination.  
 
Motivation to search for information 
In the present research (Study 2.1) we consider to what extent women 
engage in information search in situations that differ in the extent to which they are 
relevant to the person in question. When considering people’s motivation to search 
for information about themselves, it is important to realize that, in the first instance, 
information search may not be instigated or guided by any references to one’s group 
membership. In fact, the realization of group-based treatment may often only 
happen during or even after (Ellemers & Barreto, 2006) (and not before) information 
search. This means that to understand when women search for information about 
the cause of success or failure, we need to address other factors, for example at the 
individual level, that provide the initial motivation to search for such information. 
Accordingly, in this paper, we examine one factor that is likely to influence need to 
search for information by increasing the self-relevance of the situation and thus of 
the information provided after success or failure.  
Although there is no work that looks at the impact of self-relevance on the 
need to search for information in situations of discrimination, more general 
knowledge about information processing indicates that people attend to and process 
information more carefully when the issue is one that is more personally relevant. 
By contrast, in situations of low self-relevance, people use heuristic cues to derive 
their judgments and they engage in minimal amounts of information processing and 
base judgments primarily on easily processed heuristic cues (Eagly, & Chaiken, 1993; 
Petty, & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). For instance Petty and 
Cacioppo (1979) showed that college students who had to consider evidence on an 
issue that was of higher personal relevance processed information more thoroughly 
and gave more consideration to the arguments presented than when the issue was of 
less personal consequence to themselves. Dunning (1995) examined people’s 
attentiveness to information under conditions that more closely resemble the 
situation we are interested in, as he researched people’s interest in further 
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performance feedback after individual success or failure. This research indicated that 
participants were more interested in additional feedback that was of high as opposed 
to low relevance to the self (and there was a perceived opportunity to self improve). 
Importantly, this research revealed that under high self-relevance, people are 
motivated to search for information regardless of whether this feedback concerned 
situations of success or failure. This research thus indicates that people can be 
motivated to search for information under self-relevance, regardless of the extent to 
which a situation is personally threatening (i.e. whether it concerns personal success 
or failure). 
We therefore expect that women who either fail or succeed are more likely 
to be motivated to search for information about the cause of the outcome they 
receive when the situation is of high as opposed to low self-relevance to them. Since 
in the situation we examine the information women search for contains evidence of 
gender discrimination, we can say that the more participants search for information, 
the more evidence they receive of discriminatory treatment. As a consequence, self-
relevance should be associated with greater exposure to evidence of gender 
discrimination. 
 
The consequences of discrimination for well-being 
What are the consequences of searching for information and viewing 
evidence of gender discrimination for well-being? So far we have largely focused on 
individual level aspects of an evaluation setting such as the self relevance of personal 
outcomes and the need to search for information about these outcomes. People 
confronted with this type of situation are likely to be focused on their personal 
characteristics such as competence or lack of ability. Viewing evidence of group 
disadvantage (in part) shifts the focus from these individual level aspects to one’s 
gender group membership and the implications thereof for oneself and one’s 
personal outcomes. We examine the situation in which the more information targets 
collect, the more cases they see of other ingroup (female) members who are treated 
unjustly with respect to outgroup (male) members. By also varying the nature of 
individual level outcomes (success versus failure, Study 2.1), the present research has 
the advantage of allowing us to focus on the interplay between having evidence of 
group disadvantage and the extent to which this disadvantage also affects the self 
(i.e., individuals also experience personal failure).  
How does evidence of group disadvantage influence targets’ well-being? 






to the prejudice of another person can have both positive and negative consequences 
for target’s well-being. On the one hand, research indicates that making attributions 
to discrimination can help protect the self in the face of personal failure. Research in 
line with the discounting hypothesis (Crocker & Major, 1989) has revealed that 
making attributions to discrimination has positive consequences for well-being to 
the extent that these attributions allow targets to avert self blame for failure by 
making attributions to the prejudice of another. In this case attributions to 
discrimination can alleviate the initial negative consequences of personal failure by 
adding an external element to the causal attribution of failure (Crocker, Voelkl, 
Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, et al., 2002b). From this perspective, viewing evidence 
of group disadvantage may increase levels of personal well-being in the face of 
personal failure as it allows women to have a more positive view of themselves. The 
need to self protect (by making attributions to discrimination) may be particularly 
strong when women have experienced personal failure that is very self-relevant.  
On the other hand research by Branscombe and colleagues has provided 
evidence that perceiving discrimination is harmful because it signals that one’s 
group and therefore part of the (group) self is devalued (Branscombe, Schmitt, & 
Harvey, 1999). Furthermore group devaluation implies that negative outcomes can 
be expected in the future, limiting both future and present opportunities (Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2002a;b; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003). Indeed research by 
Schmitt and colleagues (2003) revealed that attributing personal failure to 
discrimination in an evaluation context in which women were judged by one of a 
number of male evaluators had more negative consequences for both group level 
(i.e., private and public collective self esteem) and personal level well-being (i.e., 
affect) when individuals perceived gender discrimination to be more contextually 
pervasive (i.e., all male evaluators are prejudiced) than when this was not the case 
(i.e., only the male evaluator evaluating the participant is prejudiced). This research 
provides initial evidence that discrimination may be more harmful the more 
pervasive women perceive it to be.  
Therefore, based on this approach we would expect gender discrimination 
to have particularly negative consequences for group and personal level well-being 
the stronger the evidence of discrimination. In the present research discrimination 
becomes pervasive the more cases female participants see of (prior) disadvantage of 
women with respect to men. By also varying the nature of individual level outcomes 
(i.e., success versus failure), the present research allows us to focus more in depth on 
the processes underlying responses to pervasive discrimination. Past research that 
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has looked at the influence of pervasive discrimination on well-being (Branscombe 
et al., 1999; Major, Kaiser, & O’Brien, 2007; Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & 
Owen, 2002c; Schmitt et al., 2003) cannot discern whether the negative 
consequences of experiencing pervasive discrimination for well-being are due to the 
fact that individuals suffer from the fate of their group, or from the knowledge that 
they experience, and will in the future experience, negative personal outcomes. 
Indeed in these studies discrimination that is perceived as pervasive (and thus 
harmful for well-being) always considers situations in which both the group is 
(potentially) devalued and discrimination is (potentially) personally experienced 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Major et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2002b; Schmitt et al., 
2003). No studies we are aware of have so far considered the relative influence of 
personal interest versus the fate of one’s group in determining responses to pervasive 
discrimination.  In the present research we consider whether viewing a lot of 
evidence of group disadvantage (i.e. many women receive unfair treatment) is 
harmful for womens’ personal well-being because they suffer from the fact that their 
group which is a central part of their (group) self is devalued (empathy explanation). 
In other words, do women empathize with and suffer from the fate of their group 
(and its members) irrespective of how this affects themselves and their personal 
outcomes? Alternatively, we considered whether women suffer from discrimination 
that is pervasive because it negatively affects their personal outcomes (personal 
interest explanation). Therefore the present research provides additional insights 
into the processes underlying responses to pervasive discrimination.  
Overall, the present research studies whether and when women are 
motivated to process information about gender discrimination by considering how 
the self relevance of individual outcomes affects information search (Study 2.1). 
Furthermore, it considers how searching for evidence of discrimination affects 
womens’ group and personal well-being. We focus on two related questions: Firstly, 
what are the consequences of viewing evidence of discrimination for group and 
personal well-being (i.e., self-protective or harmful). Secondly, if information about 
group disadvantage does have negative consequences for levels of well-being (group 
and personal), is this because women suffer from the fate (i.e., disadvantaged 
position) of other group members, or because they personally suffer from 
disadvantage? We consider these questions by varying the extent to which group 
disadvantage affects the self (Study 2.1) and by comparing responses to information 
search with respect to personal failure that can or cannot be attributed to gender 







Study 2.1 was conducted in the context of a selection procedure. We 
manipulated the nature (personal outcome: success/failure) and self relevance (self 
relevance: low/high) of personal outcomes as well as the type of feedback (feedback: 
positive/negative) women received before their outcomes. The participants were 
female and the person in charge of the evaluation procedure was male. Importantly, 
after the selections were made (i.e., women receive their personal outcomes) female 
participants were given the opportunity to search for information that could provide 
evidence of gender discrimination. The information consisted of cases of prior male 
and female applicants in the same procedure and with the same evaluator. This 
information revealed that no females had been selected in prior procedures whereas 
many males had, despite being less qualified (see dependent measures section). For 
participants this was the only indication that the person making the evaluations 
might be prejudiced.  
In this study we were interested in when targets search for this 
information, and how they respond to information search. We predicted that 
women would generally have a higher motivation to search for information under 
high self-relevance. Additionally, we predicted a main effect of self-relevance on 
information search irrespective of success or failure (see Dunning, 1995). Since prior 
research has sometimes suggested that amount of negative information received 
(e.g., negative feedback and rejection, see also S.E.Taylor, Neter & Wayment, 1995) 
and unexpectedness of the outcome (e.g., negative feedback and acceptance or 
positive feedback and rejection, see also Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Wong & Weiner, 
1981) can affect information search, we controlled for these processes by 
independently manipulating feedback (negative vs. positive) and outcome 
(acceptance vs. rejection). 
Although information search was a dependent variable in this study, we 
also examined the consequences of information search on well-being and 
distinguished between more individual (negative affect) versus group level 
(collective self esteem) indicators of well-being. This allows us to study the interplay 
between how women feel ‘about themselves’ in relation to how they feel about their 
group membership.  
If indeed responses to evidence of discrimination are based on the need to 
self-protect, we would expect that the need to self-protect (and the ability to do so) 
increases when personal failure is self-relevant. Therefore we predicted that women 
would not necessarily experience lower levels of personal well-being when personal 
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failure is self-relevant (as opposed to not being self-relevant). In Study 2.2 we 
directly tested well-being hypotheses in line with the discounting approach. 
Concerning levels of group well-being our predictions were less clear as alternative 
predictions seemed plausible and prior research in line with the discounting 
approach does not measure group level well-being (e.g. Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 
2003a). Although on the one hand one might predict that the more information 
women view about the disadvantage of their group, the lower their group level well-
being, it is also possible that women are so focused on their personal outcomes (i.e., 
self-protecting from personal failure) that they do not internalize the disadvantage 
of their group. In other words, group level well-being may also remain unchanged. 
Looking at the relation between individual (affect) and group (collective self-esteem) 
level well-being when information about the disadvantage of one’s group serves to 
self protect from personal failure, we therefore had two alternative predictions. We 
either expected to find a positive relation between collective self esteem and affect 
(lower collective self-esteem is related to lower levels of negative affect) or no 
relation between these measures.  
If, on the other hand, women suffer from evidence of (pervasive) 
discrimination, we would expect them to experience more negative individual and 
group level well-being the more evidence of discrimination they view. Based on a 
personal interest explanation we would predict an interaction of self relevance by 
outcome such that women only experience lower levels of individual and group 
level well-being when they also experience negative personal outcomes and view a 
lot of evidence of discrimination (i.e., high self relevance). Based on an empathy 
explanation we would predict a self relevance main effect as women should also 
experience lower levels of group well-being when they experience positive personal 
outcomes but view a lot of evidence of discrimination against members of their 
group (i.e., high self relevance). We did not predict that individual level responses to 
success and failure would be the same in this case because when a situation is highly 
self-relevant, failure is more threatening than success (under low self-relevance this 
distinction is likely to be less strong or non-existent) and - although this may not 
affect information search - it is likely to be reflected in the individual level well-
being participants report (see also Mc Farland and Ross (1982) for similar results). 
Concerning the relation between individual and group level well-being, based on 
the RIM and in contrast to the discounting approach, overall we would predict that 
collective self esteem and affect should be negatively correlated such that lower 







Design and Participants 
One hundred and eighty-four female students of Leiden University took 
part in the experiment for course credits or payment of € 6 (US$ = 7.70). Participants 
were randomly assigned to a 2 (self-relevance: high/low) X 2 (feedback: 
positive/negative) X 2 (outcome: rejection/selection) between participants factorial 
design. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival in the lab participants were received by a female experimenter 
and seated in front of computers in separate cubicles. Participants read they were 
(supposedly) taking part in a joint project of Leiden University and F., a bogus 
company specialized in coaching and recruitment, to study how selection 
procedures are experienced by job applicants. They were informed they would be 
taking part with a number of other participants in a selection procedure for a 
traineeship. It was stressed that, although they would not be offered an actual job at 
the end of the procedure, it was likely they would experience similar selection 
procedures in the future. Participants read the actual selection would be conducted 
via the computer by an interviewer of the company, Hans Brockens, in fact a 
confederate. Participants could see the confederate, dressed in a suit, sitting in front 
of a computer in an adjacent room as they entered the laboratory.  
Before filling out a selection questionnaire on the basis of which 
participants allegedly would be accepted they were provided with information that 
contained the manipulation of self-relevance.  
Manipulation of self-relevance. One way of increasing the self-relevance of 
a situation is by stressing the extent to which the personal outcome is also personally 
consequential (Dunning, 1995). Participants in the in the high self-relevance 
condition read that the company was looking for characteristics that are diagnostic 
of future success in the job market. Therefore, a high score on the selection 
questionnaire would mean the participants had a profile that was not only attractive 
to this particular company but also to other employers. Participants read that prior 
research had shown that this particular selection questionnaire was a reliable 
indicator of one’s chances in the job market. 
 In the low self-relevance condition participants read that in the present 
selection procedure the company was looking for characteristics specific to the 
present job at this particular company. Therefore, a high score on the selection 
questionnaire would mean the participants had a profile that was only attractive to 
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this particular company and not necessarily to other employers, providing no 
indication of how well participants would do later when on the job market. Before 
filling in the selection questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate whether 
they had understood the instructions so far (manipulation check of self-relevance).  
Selection questionnaire. The selection questionnaire consisted of two parts. 
The first part asked a number of demographic questions (e.g., age, married status). 
The second part consisted of 20 questions said to be related to happenings in daily 
life (e.g., “I like to do things my own way”) which only functioned as part of the 
cover story.  
  Manipulation of feedback and outcome. After filling in the selection 
questionnaire participants were asked to wait while the computer calculated their 
score on this questionnaire. All participants received a score of 73. In the negative 
feedback condition participants were told this was a comparatively low score and 
that they stood little chance of being selected. In the positive feedback condition 
participants were told this was a comparatively high score and they stood a good 
chance of being selected by the company.  
Participants then received a message from the interviewer via the computer 
informing them that they had either been accepted (personal outcome: selection) or 
rejected (personal outcome: rejection). At this stage they were asked to answer a 
number of questions (see assessments).  
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation checks. After the outcome decision, participants answered 
three questions that consisted of our manipulation check of self-relevance (e.g., “I 
find it very important for my personal development that I am selected for this job”, 
 =.85) as well as two filler questions about the selection procedure to enhance 
credibility of the cover story (e.g., “I want to be better than other participants”). 
Participants indicated agreement on a 7 point scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly 
agree).  
Information search.We had two indicators of information search, namely 
participant’s indications of their wish to search for information, and their actual 
search behavior.  
Wish to search for information. Before being given the opportunity to 
examine the information matrix (but after the manipulations), participants indicated 
in five items the extent to which they wished to search for information (e.g., “I 






Actual search behavior. Participants were also asked to indicate whether 
they would like extra information concerning the selection procedure (yes/no). 
Participants who indicated yes were able to see the information matrix. It provided 
information about other applicants who had taken part in selection procedures 
conducted by the same interviewer. This matrix showed the first names of eight 
female and eight male bogus applicants (in order for gender to be clear without 
making explicit that it was important in the present context). Participants could 
access further information about each bogus applicant by clicking the cells with his 
or her name. Participants could click 32 cells in total, 2 per bogus applicant. Search 
behavior could thus range from 0 clicks to 32 clicks. Per bogus applicant, one cell 
revealed his/her score on the selection questionnaire, the other whether the 
applicant was rejected or accepted. Each cell remained visible in the matrix after it 
had been clicked so that the more cells were clicked the more information stayed on 
the screen and could be compared. All bogus males had lower scores, ranging from 
35 to 65 (M = 50) than all bogus females, ranging from 65 to 85 (M = 75) yet six out 
of eight males were accepted whereas no females were accepted. Thus participants 
who clicked all matrix cells could see that more women than men were rejected 
despite having higher qualifications. It is important to note that the information 
matrix thus provides the only cue to participants that they may be dealing with an 
interviewer who discriminates against women.  
Perceived prejudice of the interviewer. Participants indicated to what 
extent they saw the interviewer, Hans Brockens, as being “prejudiced” or 
“discriminatory” (r = .65). These items were disguised by a number of other items 
that measured other characteristics of Hans Brockens (e.g., “intelligent”, “cold”). 
Scale endpoints ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Affect. After information search, participants completed measures of 
negative affect (e.g., sad, angry,   = .96) taken from McFarland and Ross (1982). 
Responses were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Collective self esteem. The public (e.g., “at this moment I feel women are 
valued”, “in this selection procedure women are seen as less efficient”, last item 
reverse scored;   = .72) and private (e.g., “at this moment I am happy to be a 
woman”, “I find it a shame that I am a woman”; last item reverse scored,   = .57) 
collective self esteem subscales of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective self 
esteem scale (CSE) were administered after being modified to be specific to gender 
and the present selection situation. Scale endpoints were 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 
(strongly agree).  
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Results 
Unless otherwise stated, data were analyzed using a 2 (self-relevance: 
high/low) X 2 (feedback: positive/negative) X 2 (outcome: rejection/selection) 
between participants analysis of variance. Relevant means are presented in Table 
2.1.  
Manipulation check 
The manipulation check of self-relevance showed that participants in the 
high self-relevance condition found their outcome more self-relevant (M = 5.34, SD 
= .87) than participants in the low self-relevance condition (M = 4.87, SD = 1.16), 
F(1, 153) = 9.59, p < .01, 2  = .05. No other effects were reliable, Fs < .69, ps > .41, 2 
< .01. 
Information search 
Wish to search for information. Only nineteen of the 184 participants 
indicated they did not want to view the information matrix. This group was too 
small to conduct separate analyses of variance (ANOVA) and was therefore excluded 
from further analyses. Four participants were not able to look at the information 
matrix due to computer problems and were excluded from further analyses. Chi-
square analyses on the remaining number of participants in the self-relevance, 
feedback and outcome conditions showed no reliable difference in distribution 
across the eight conditions, ²(7, N = 161) = 1.44, ns.  
As expected, participants in the high self-relevance condition indicated a 
greater desire to gain extra information concerning the outcome and procedure (M = 
5.44, SD = .91) than participants in the low self-relevance condition (M = 5.02, SD = 
.95), F(1, 153) = 9.43, p < .01,  2  = .052.  No other main or interaction effects were 
reliable, Fs < 1.5, ps > .22, 2 < .01.  
Actual search behavior. Information search was meant to be assessed as a 
continuous measure (from 0 to 32 possible cell clicks). However, as 105 of 161 
participants clicked all 32 cells we had to distinguish between participants who were 
motivated to acquire all the information available (32 cells clicked) and those who 
gave up before that was the case (0-31 cells clicked) when given the opportunity to 
search for information. A 2 X 2 X 2 log linear analysis on matrix clicks revealed only 
a reliable main effect of self-relevance on information search, ²(1, N = 161) = 3.81, p 
= .05. There were no other reliable effects. Within the low self-relevance condition 
42 % of participants collected incomplete information, whereas 58 % collected all 
available information. By contrast, in the high self-relevance condition only 27 % 






information. Therefore, as predicted, and despite the limitations of these analyses, 
participants for whom the situation was highly self-relevant searched for more 
information than participants for whom the situation was less self-relevant. 
Perceived prejudice of the evaluator 
 Analyses of perceived prejudice of the evaluator (M = 4.16, SD = 1.19) 
revealed no significant main or interaction effects, Fs < 3.25, ps > .07, 2 < .02. There 
was a marginal Outcome X Feedback interaction indicating that participants who 
received negative feedback and were rejected evaluated the interviewer as 
somewhat more prejudiced (M = 4.46, SD = 1.26) than in the other conditions (M 
ranges from 3.91 to 4.17, SD from 1.21 to 1.16 respectively).  
Affect 
Analyses of negative affect revealed a reliable interaction effect of outcome 
by self-relevance only, F(1, 153) = 4.76, p = .03, 2  = .03 (see Table 2.1). No other 
effects were reliable, Fs < 3.08, ps > .08, 2 < .02. There was a marginal effect of 
outcome which was qualified by the Outcome X Self Relevance interaction. 
Simple effect analyses revealed that participants for whom personal 
outcomes were self relevant reported more negative affect after they were rejected 
than after they were accepted, F(1, 157) = 7.35, p < .01. There was no difference in 
affect for low self-relevance, F(1, 157) = .72, ns. This is consistent with a personal 
interest and inconsistent with an empathic response to discrimination explanation. 
Collective self-esteem 
Public and private collective self esteem were included as the repeated 
measures (scale) in a mixed model MANOVA. We found a reliable self-relevance X 
outcome effect,  F(1, 153) = 10.61, p < .001, 2 = .07, which was qualified by a scale X 
self-relevance X outcome interaction, F(1, 153) = 6.87, p < .01, 2 = .04. No other 
effects were reliable, Fs < 2.55, ps > .1, 2 < .02 (see Table 2.1). 
Univariate analyses on the separate private and public self esteem scales 
revealed a reliable self-relevance by outcome interaction only for public collective 
self esteem, F(1, 153) = 8.83, p < .01,  2  = .06. This effect was not reliable for private 
collective self esteem, F(1, 153) = 1.07, p = .3,  2  = .01. 
Simple effects analyses for public collective self esteem revealed that under 
high self-relevance, participants experienced lower public collective self esteem 
when they were rejected rather than accepted, F(1, 157) = 23.53, p< .001. There was 
no difference in public collective self esteem for outcome in the low self-relevance 




   
Table 2.1 - Negative affect and public collective self esteem (SD) as a function of 
self-relevance (high / low) and outcome (selection /rejection) in Study 2.1.  
 
Cells in the same row that do not share the same superscript reliably differ from each other at 
p < .05 
* p < .07  
 
Correlational analyses  
In order to demonstrate that participants’ well-being was related to feelings 
about group membership, rather than simply to the experience of personal failure 
that is highly self-relevant, we conducted correlational analyses between negative 
affect and public collective self esteem. We found reliable correlations between the 
public collective self esteem scale and negative affect, r = -.47, p < .01, indicating 
that affective responses relate to group based self esteem.  
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2.1 provide support for our hypothesis that women are 
more likely to search for information concerning their situation when this is highly 
self-relevant to them. Admittedly our measure of information search presented some 
limitations as we only had limited variance on this measure (this limitation is 
addressed in Study 2.2). Nevertheless the results on this measure were not only 
convergent with our predictions, but also with a five item continuous measure of 
participant’s self-reported wish to search for information (indicated before 
information was sought). In sum, and consistent with prior research conducted in a 
different area (e.g., Dunning, 1995), participants in the high self-relevance condition 
both indicated a greater need to search for information, and did indeed search for 
more information in the information matrix than participants in the low self-
relevance condition.  
 Self relevance 
               Low                    High 
 Selection Rejection  Selection Rejection 
Negative affect 2.31 (1.02)a  2.23 (.92) ab*  2.04 (.86)a 2.61 (.91)b* 
Collective self 
esteem (public) 








Also consistent with research on information search after success and 
failure (Dunning, 1995), we found no effect of outcome on information search. In 
addition, the present study provided no evidence that the content of the feedback 
(negative vs. positive) or its relationship to outcome (acceptance vs. rejection) had an 
effect on need to search for information or on information search. This indicates 
that also in this context, higher self-relevance instigates information search 
irrespective of the personal treatment received.  
Considering the effects of searching for information that contains evidence 
of gender discrimination on well-being we found that knowledge about group level 
discriminatory treatment had a negative effect on both individual (i.e., affect) and 
group (i.e., collective self esteem) level indicators of well-being when women 
personally suffered rejection and had sought a lot of evidence of discrimination (i.e., 
under high self relevance). In line with research by Branscombe and colleagues 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2003) these results indicate that 
experiencing self-relevant personal failure that is consistent with group based 
discriminatory treatment has negative consequences for personal well-being by 
undermining group based self esteem. Furthermore, our results have interesting 
implications when considering the processes underlying responses to pervasive 
discrimination. We see that rather than suffering from the disadvantaged position of 
their group, women only experience lower levels of group and personal level well-
being when they also personally suffer from this disadvantage (i.e., in the case of 
personal failure). Therefore, we have reason to believe that the experience of 
disadvantage contains an element of self interest rather than merely empathy or 
concern about the group in general (see also Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & 
Mummendey, in press). 
Overall the present study provides initial evidence for our contention that 
the conditions that motivate women to search for information which contains 
indications of gender discrimination also have negative consequences for women’s 
well-being when much evidence of discrimination is viewed (and women have also 
been rejected). However, although the present study provides strong indications that 
not only rejection that is highly self-relevant, but also the amount of evidence of 
gender discrimination viewed, influenced well-being, its focus lay on motivators of 
information search. This meant that we could not consider the effects of information 
search, and evidence of discrimination viewed, entirely separately from possible 
motivational influences of the manipulations on women’s’ well-being. By directly 
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manipulating information search, we provide a more precise examination of the 
effects of information search on well-being in Study 2.2. 
 
Study 2.2 
In Study 2.2 we focus more on information search and well-being responses 
in situations of personal failure that can or cannot be attributed to gender 
discrimination. Whereas in Study 2.1 information search was motivated by self-
relevance, in Study 2.2 participants were simply encouraged (or not) to examine the 
available information. The present study allowed us to further study the processes 
underlying responses to self sought evidence of discrimination with respect to Study 
2.1. Specifically, we considered whether the negative consequences of information 
search we found for women’s well-being in Study 2.1 were indeed due to an increase 
in information processing that reveals strong evidence of discrimination rather than 
being instigated by the self-relevance (and stronger negative implications) of 
personal failure. Furthermore, by manipulating whether or not the information 
viewed provided evidence of gender discrimination (evidence of discrimination: 
present vs. absent) we were able to further examine whether the negative 
consequences of information search for well-being are due to viewing more 
information containing indications of discrimination (as we argue), or are the result 
of spending more time thinking about a situation of rejection. Arguably, our finding 
that women only report more negative perceptions of their group membership and 
experience more negative personal level well-being in the case of self relevant 
personal failure may be due to the fact that dissatisfaction about receiving a self-
relevant personal outcome not only induces lower levels of personal well-being but 
also spreads to perceptions with respect to one’s group membership and therefore 
one’s group level well-being. The present manipulation allows us to potentially rule 
out this alternative explanation.  
The manipulation of discrimination also provided a more direct test of the 
possible self-protective function of discrimination by allowing us to compare 
responses to situations of failure that do or do not provide the opportunity of more 
external attributions of this failure to discrimination. In line with the discounting 
hypothesis we would predict that women experience higher levels of well-being 
when they have indications that personal failure can be attributed to discrimination 
(i.e., under high information search/discrimination present). In line with research 
by Branscombe and colleagues (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2003), we 






have negative consequences for women’s well-being compared to when no such 
evidence is available. By contrast, under conditions of low information search, and 
thus weaker evidence of discrimination, we expected less negative consequences of 
information search, compared to when no such evidence is provided.  
In the present study we also focused on assessing negative emotions that 
might be specifically related to experiencing discrimination such as threat and 
despair. Prior research has shown that being a target of discrimination is related to 
the experience of threat (Kaiser, Major &, McCoy, 2004; McCoy, & Major, 2003). 
Whereas threat can be regarded as an immediate reaction to a situation posing a 
threat to social identity, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002b) have pointed out that the 
experience of discrimination may also lead to a realization that one is likely to 
encounter discrimination again in the future. One emotion that is linked to 
awareness of long term adverse consequences of discrimination is despair. Research 
by Van Overwalle, Mervielde, and De Schuyter (1995) showed that students 
experienced despair in the face of personal failure when they made a stable 
attribution to failure. Other research linked despair to long term regret of inaction 
(Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998). Similarly, the experience of discrimination 
can be related to feelings of long term loss of control.  
 
Method 
Design and Participants 
One hundred and seven female students of Leiden University took part in 
the experiment for course credits or payment of 6 € (US$ = 7.70). Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (information search: high/low) X 2 (evidence of 
discrimination: present/absent) between participants factorial design.  
Procedure 
The procedure in Study 2.2 was almost identical to that of Study 2.1 except 
that we did not make use of a confederate but told participants we were interested 
in researching selection procedures via internet and that they would take part in an 
on-line selection procedure conducted by a male evaluator of the same company 
(F.). After the introduction to the study participants supposedly completed an on-
line selection procedure. After completion all participants were told the computer 
had calculated their score on the questionnaire. All participants received a score of 
60. Having waited some time and answered a number of filler questions participants 
read that the selector had made his decision and had not found them suitable as an 
employee of the company. 
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Manipulation of information search. In contrast to the first study where 
participants could indicate whether or not they wanted to view extra information 
about the selection procedure, all participants in Study 2.2 saw the information 
matrix. However, all the relevant information on the matrix was covered, and had to 
be clicked to become visible. Therefore, participants could search more or less 
thoroughly for information about prior applicants in the selection procedure. In the 
low search condition participants were told they could use the matrix to collect 
information about other applicants if they felt the need to do so, but that this was 
not necessary for the rest of the study. In the high search condition, participants 
were informed that it was important to thoroughly examine the information about 
other applicants in the matrix, and that they might need this information later on in 
the study. In both conditions it was emphasized that participants were free to decide 
how many of the other applicants they examined in the matrix. 
The information matrix and discrimination manipulation. Participants were 
then given the opportunity to search for information in the matrix containing data 
about ten male and ten female names. To increase the variance on this measure, 
information search was made more difficult than in Study 2.1 as participants viewed 
more applicants (twenty instead of sixteen) and had to open four follow up screens 
(instead of only 1) to collect all the relevant information for each applicant they 
selected. Only then was return to the main screen possible to view the following 
applicant. Per applicant, the first screen gave the selection questionnaire score of the 
applicant, the second his/her age, the third study major and the fourth indicated 
whether the applicant had been rejected or accepted. Upon return to the main 
screen, participants received a brief summary of the available information about the 
viewed applicant, consisting of the questionnaire score and the selection decision. 
The already viewed information remained visible on the main screen while 
participants continued their information search. 
In the discrimination present condition the information matrix revealed 
that all female applicants were rejected despite higher scores on the selection 
questionnaire (ranging from 61 to 78, M = 70) whereas eight out of ten male 
applicants were accepted despite lower scores on the same questionnaire (ranging 
from 41 to 58, M = 50). Therefore, as in Study 2.1, this information provided strong 
evidence that the male co-worker was discriminating against female and in favour of 
male applicants. In the discrimination absent condition, an equal number of male 
and female applicants were accepted. According to the information provided, 






than rejected participants (ranging from 41 to 68, M = 52). Therefore, this condition 
provided indications of a fair selection procedure based on qualifications (i.e., score), 
implying personal failure rather than group membership as the main cause for 
rejection.  
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation checks. To determine whether participants had correctly 
comprehended the information search manipulation, participants completed one 
item (“I expect to be asked questions about what I have read about the other 
applicants in the procedure”). Scale endpoints were 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 
(strongly agree). As a behavioral check of actual information search the number of 
cells participants had clicked to reveal information about other participants was 
computed. Endpoints were 0 (=none) and 20 (=all). We also measured the amount of 
time (in seconds) spent examining the information matrix.  
Perceived discrimination. Because all individuals who had information 
about prejudice also were personally rejected, we administered a combined four 
item measure consisting of evaluations of the interviewer’s prejudice (i.e., 
prejudiced, discriminatory) and attributions of the personal outcome to 
discrimination (my outcome was: due to a prejudiced selector, due to Hans 
Brockens’ attitude towards men and women). Scale endpoints ranged from 1 
(completely disagree/not at all) to 7 (completely agree/very much for the 
interviewer and personal attribution items respectively. Cronbach’s alpha of the 
perceived discrimination scale was .64.  
Affect. Despair was measured with two items taken from Van Overwalle et 
al.’s measure (1995) of despair (hopeless, desperate,  = .56). Threat was measured 
with three items (worried, threatened, uneasy,  = .73). Scale endpoints were 1 (not 
at all) and 7 (very much).  
Collective self esteem. The same private ( = .82) and public (  = .70) 
collective self esteem subscales of Crocker and Luhtanen’s CSE scale (1992) were 
used as in Study 2.1. 
 
Results 
Unless otherwise stated, data were analyzed using a 2 (information search: 





   
Analyses of participants’ comprehension of the manipulation of information 
search revealed a main effect of information search, F(1,102) = 14.16, p < .001, 2  = 
.12. Discrimination had not been manipulated at this point and therefore was not 
included in this analysis. As expected, participants in the high information search 
condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.78) thought it was more important for them to study the 
information than participants in the low information search condition (M = 2.93, SD 
= 1.56).  
Furthermore, the behavioral measure of information search (matrix clicks) 
revealed that participants in the high information search condition (M = 11.57, SD = 
6.00) indeed searched for more information than in the low information search 
condition (M = 9.18, SD = 6.24), F(1, 102) = 4.09, p = .05, 2  = .04.  No other effects 
were reliable, Fs < .98, ps > .32, 2 < .01. The measure of time spent examining the 
matrix revealed the same pattern, such that participants in the high information 
search condition (M = 128.68, SD = 62.49) spent more time examining the matrix 
than those in the low information search condition (M = 100.40, SD = 60.53), F(1, 
102) = 5.73, p = .02, 2  = .05. No other main or interaction effects were reliable, Fs < 
1.04, ps > .31, 2  < .01. Therefore the manipulation of information search was 
successful. 
Attributions to discrimination  
 Analyses of the perceived discrimination scale revealed a main effect of 
discrimination on the perceived discrimination scale, F(1, 102) = 7.46, p < .01, 2 = 
.07. Participants perceived more discrimination in the discrimination present (M = 
3.78, SD = 1.01) than absent (M = 3.30, SD = .80) condition. No other effects were 
significant, Fs < 1.58, ps > .21, 2 < .02. Conform Study 2.1, amount of information 
sought does not influence perceptions of discrimination.  
Affect 
Analyses of the threat scale revealed no reliable main effects, Fs < .49, ps > 
.49, 2 > .01, but revealed a marginally reliable information search X discrimination 
interaction, F(1, 102) = 3.76, p = .06, 2  = .04 . Although simple effects were not 
reliable, Fs < 1.91, p > .17, the means were in the expected direction, such that in the 
high information search condition, participants felt more threat in the 
discrimination present (M = 2.36, SD = .92) than discrimination absent (M = 1.92, SD 
= .83) condition, F(1, 102) = 3.02, p = .09. Means in the low information search 
condition did not differ significantly F(1, 102) = .59, p = .44 (Mabsent = 2.25, SDabsent = 






Analyses of the despair scale revealed no reliable main effects , Fs < .46, p > 
.79, 2 < .01, but a reliable information search X discrimination interaction, F(1, 102) 
= 6.75, p < .01, 2 = .06. As expected, participants in the high information search 
condition felt more despair when discrimination was present rather than absent, 
F(1, 102) = 5.18, p = .03. In the low information search condition there was no 
difference between the discrimination present and absent conditions, F(1, 102) = 
1.91, ns. Thus, these affect responses do not seem to be simply a function of 
spending more time thinking about the negative outcome, as they are the result of 
both engagement in information search and of whether or not the information 
reveals discriminatory treatment. 
 
Table 2.2 - Despair and private collective self esteem (SD) as a function of 
information search (low/high) and discrimination (absent / present) in Study 2.2. 
 
Means in the same row that do not share subscripts reliably differ from each other at p < .05 
Means in the same row that share * or ** differ from each other at p < .07 level  
 
Collective self esteem 
Public and private collective self esteem were included as the within 
participants variable (scale) in a mixed model MANOVA. No between participants 
effects of the experimental manipulation were reliable, Fs < 1.69, ps > .20, 2 < .02. 
There was a reliable interaction between need to search for information, 
discrimination and the within participants variable (scale). When considering public 
and private collective self esteem at the univariate level, we found no reliable effects 
for the public collective self esteem scale, Fs < 1.27, p > .26, 2 < .01. Analyses of the 
private collective self esteem scale revealed the expected information search X 
 Information Search 



















   
discrimination interaction, F(1, 102) = 5.67, p = .02, 2 = .05. Simple effects analyses 
showed that participants in the high information search condition experienced 
lower private collective self esteem when discrimination was present rather than 
absent, F(1, 102) = 5.22, p = .02. In the low information search condition there was 
no difference between the discrimination conditions, F(1, 102) = 1.12, ns.  
Correlational analyses  
In order to further demonstrate that our emotion effects were related to 
perceptions of discrimination and feelings about group membership rather than to 
the experience of personal failure in itself, we conducted correlational analyses 
between threat and despair on the one hand, and the private collective self esteem 
scale on the other. We found reliable correlations between private collective self 
esteem and both threat, r = -.44, p < .001, and despair, r = -.40, p < .01. These 
correlations indicate that, the extent to which persons view and internalize evidence 
that the group is discriminated is related to feelings of threat and despair.  
 
Discussion 
Study 2.2 revealed that, as predicted, viewing much as opposed to little 
evidence of gender discrimination can indeed be harmful for well-being. Therefore 
this study provides further support that viewing strong evidence of gender 
discrimination in the face of personal failure is harmful rather than self-protective. 
We found no effects of information content on well-being when information search 
was low, rather, as expected, these effects emerged when women engaged more 
deeply in information search: Women who processed more information that 
revealed evidence of gender discrimination had lower collective self esteem and 
experienced more despair and marginally more threat. Importantly, lower levels of 
private collective self esteem were related to increases in threat and despair, 
indicating that women’s well-being responses, as in Study 2.1, were influenced by 
feelings with regard to their group membership in the face of evidence of 
discrimination. Therefore our alternative explanation that suffering from personal 
failure and experiencing lower levels of individual well-being spreads to feelings 
with respect to one’s group membership (i.e., group level well-being) received little 
support: women’s feelings with regard to their group membership were only more 
negative when they had actual evidence of discrimination.  
Although we found the predicted patterns for threat, despair and private 
collective self esteem, we do not find effects on public collective self esteem. This is 






conclusive explanation for these differences but it is important to realize that 
participants were placed in quite different situations in Studies 2.1 and 2.2. In Study 
2.1 women either contrasted (i.e., success) or assimilated (i.e., failure) their personal 
outcomes with the disadvantage of their group. This likely provided a stronger 
contrast concerning women’s personal outcomes versus concerns about how others 
view one’s group (public collective self esteem). The fact that in Study 2.2 all 
participants experience personal failure but that the extent to which this failure can 
be attributed to one’s group membership differs may explain why here women were 
more focused on their connection to the group (i.e., private collective self esteem).  
In sum, the present study provides support for the idea that as women 
search for and see increasing evidence of the disadvantage of their group this has 




The present research provides the first link between information 
processing, attributions to discrimination and well-being. It addresses the question 
of how women come to realize they are victims of gender discrimination in 
situations in which they are likely to be focused on individual level aspects such as 
personal competence or individual ability. Furthermore, we studied how viewing 
evidence of group disadvantage that shifts the focus to one’s gender group 
membership and possible devaluation on the basis of this group membership 
influences both group and individual level well-being.  
In the present research we focused on situations of personal success or 
failure in which women had no prior cues to gender discrimination and needed to 
actively search for information about their personal outcomes in order to perceive 
the disadvantaged position of their group. Our research shows that women are 
motivated to search for information in the face of both personal failure and success: 
They sought more information when personal outcomes were self relevant. These 
results were conform our hypotheses based on prior research in the area of self-
evaluation (Dunning, 1995) and information processing (e.g., Petty, & Cacioppo, 
1979; Eagly, & Chaiken, 1991). Furthermore, findings across both studies revealed 
that women were able to shift from being focused on individual level aspects of a 
situation to realizing group disadvantage: even women who were arguably very 
focused on individual level aspects of the situation because their personal outcomes 
were self-relevant reported perceiving prejudice against their gender group. In sum, 
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the present research provides evidence that even when women are very focused on 
personal outcomes they are able to ‘shift’ to a group level and perceive group level 
disadvantage.  
These results provide interesting additional insights with regard to research 
that has considered the relation between information processing and perceptions of 
gender discrimination. Although research in this area so far has not considered how 
factors at the individual level, such as the self relevance of personal outcomes, 
motivate information search, this prior research provides some indications that at a 
group level, the extent to which, in this case, observers are emotionally invested in 
the issue of gender discrimination increases recognition of discrimination – when 
this discrimination is somewhat subtle (i.e., presented in a piecemeal fashion) 
(Crosby et al., 1986). Therefore we have indications that, at a group level, the 
relevance of the judgment at hand influences the recognition of discrimination. The 
present study provides insights into the extent to which emotional investment at an 
individual level – with respect to the target of discrimination him/herself - may aid 
or hinder the extent to which women want to search for evidence about themselves 
and therefore recognize gender discrimination.  
Importantly, in contrast to prior research in the area of information 
processing, the present work also considered the consequences of searching for 
evidence of discrimination for women’s well-being. Prior research has provided 
indications that making attributions to discrimination can have relatively positive 
consequences for well-being when it allows women to avoid self blame by 
attributing personal failure more externally, to the prejudice of another (Crocker et 
al., 1991; Major et al., 2003a). Yet, the present research reveals that searching for 
more, and therefore stronger, evidence of past discrimination against fellow gender 
group members has negative consequences for women’s well-being both at a 
personal and a group level – even when women may be highly motivated to self-
protect from failure because personal failure is highly self relevant.  
Although prior research has provided evidence that the extent to which 
discrimination is pervasive increases the extent to which individuals suffer from 
discrimination (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2002c, 2003) it raises the question concerning 
why pervasive discrimination has these negative consequences for well-being. Are 
individuals suffering more from pervasive discrimination because their group is 
central to themselves and they feel concern with respect to other group members 
(empathy explanation), or because pervasive discrimination has negative 






has focused on negative personal outcomes that can be attributed to the prejudice of 
another. Therefore, negative attitudes with regard to one’s (devalued) group always 
affected the self. In contrast to prior research, by varying the extent to which group 
disadvantage affected individual outcomes, we could consider these possible reasons 
why women would suffer from pervasive discrimination. We found that rather than 
suffering from the fate of their gender group in general, women seemed to suffer 
from group disadvantage because it has negative consequences for personal 
outcomes (personal interest explanation). Conform this idea we found that women 
experienced lower levels of personal and group level well-being when they had 
more evidence of group disadvantage and experienced personal failure – not in the 
case of personal success (Study 2.1). Furthermore, group level well-being was only 
lower when women experienced personal failure in the face of group disadvantage 
(i.e., not when information provided no indications of disadvantage) (Study 2.2). 
Therefore our research provides support for the idea that women seem to suffer 
from strong or pervasive evidence of gender discrimination largely because this has 
negative implications for themselves, and potentially for their future outcomes. 
Although our findings provide little support for the self-protective 
properties of being able to make attributions to discrimination (i.e., discounting 
approach), it is important to view the present results in the correct context. Studies 
that have provided support for the discounting approach have generally focused on 
evaluation settings in which there is no explicit evidence that emphasizes the acts of 
discrimination (behavioural manifestations of bias) would be pervasive. We believe 
that when evidence of group disadvantage is very strong, this may outweigh the self-
protective potential of attributing failure to discrimination – because individuals 
become aware of the negative consequences of discrimination for themselves in the 
future. In other words, in studying when discrimination is harmful versus self 
protective it may be important to focus on the relative balance of threats at an 
individual versus group level. Determining the relative strengths of these threats can 
inform us when and whether attributions to discrimination are likely to be self-
protective or harmful. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
One might expect that the amount of information sought containing 
evidence of discrimination would increase attributions to discrimination and not 
only influence perceptions of group membership. Across both studies this is not 
what we found. Indeed, it would seem that whereas women’s attributions reflect 
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whether or not a situation can be attributed to prejudice, similar levels of 
attributions can be based on more (i.e., high information search) or less (i.e., low 
information search) evidence of discrimination. Therefore it is possible that women 
who made attributions to discrimination on the basis of much evidence of 
discrimination were more certain that they had been discriminated against. Indeed, 
the standard deviations of the discrimination present versus absent conditions 
indicate that our manipulation of prejudice induced greater variability in the extent 
to which women felt certain that the person evaluating them was prejudiced: The 
standard deviations for attributions to discrimination were higher in the prejudice 
present (SD = 1.01) than absent (SD = .80) condition (Study 2.2). The fact that 
attributions to discrimination do not necessarily reflect the extent to which women 
perceive, or their feelings with respect to, discrimination, stresses the importance of 
studying responses to evidence of discrimination that is provided in a more implicit 
way, as we have done in the present studies. It also points to the necessity of 
considering implicit measures of discrimination in the future (see also Kaiser, Vick, 
& Major, 2006 for an implicit measure).These can provide insights concerning 
differences in the extent to which women actually perceive versus are prepared to 
report discrimination.  
 
Practical implications 
The link we make in our research between information search, attributions 
to discrimination and well-being also has important practical implications. It allows 
us to discern when women will make an effort to discover discrimination in 
everyday life. In 1984 Crosby reported being shocked by the fact that females were 
aware that gender discrimination takes place in organizations, yet failed to realize 
they themselves were also being discriminated against. As Crosby (1984) pointed out 
in an explanation of this phenomenon, realizing one has been discriminated against, 
involves being aware of diagnostic information concerning not only personal 
treatment, but also treatment of others. This stresses the importance of studying 
when women are motivated to search for information about themselves and others 
in a manner that enables them to conclude that personal treatment can be attributed 
to a systematic pattern of group treatment. 
Yet it is also crucial to understand what effect this search has on women’s 
well-being. Whereas the women in our study did engage in information search, 
despite the negative consequences they could envisage, one can question whether 






the psychological costs of this search. We therefore believe that studying the extent 
to which women approach information about discrimination and the effects this has 
on their well-being can be important when considering ways to support women in 
potentially discriminatory settings. One way of helping women to cope with the 
painful consequences of the process of discovering discrimination may be to stress 
the long term benefits of discovering discrimination. Because, paradoxically, 
engaging in this process is the only way in which future well-being can be 
increased. In order to deal with gender discrimination in society it is crucial that 
women realize they are being discriminated against and report this discrimination.   
In sum, our research illustrates that, even in situations in which women are 
very focused on individual level aspects of a situation, such as implications of 
personal outcomes, and there is no direct reference to gender, women can become 
aware of gender discrimination. We show that women can be motivated to search 
for information even when this search may be hurtful, such as in situations that are 
highly self-relevant. Our research stresses the importance of considering the 
interplay between aspects relevant to a personal and a group level in studying well-
being responses to subtle discrimination. 
When searching hurts
63
   
Footnotes 
 











For better or for worse: 
The congruence of 
personal and group 




When Bill Cosby became a star on American television there were not 
many African Americans in similar positions. In fact, he probably knew that in those 
times it would not be easy for African Americans to gain acceptance and make a 
career as he had done. How does it feel to reach the top, knowing that many fellow 
group members will not attain a similar position within society?  Are successful 
individuals happy to have escaped their group’s plight, or does their personal success 
make the disadvantage of other group members seem even more unjust? Although 
insights on social justice suggest that people’s evaluations of their personal outcomes 
are guided by information about the legitimacy of procedures (e.g., Folger, 1977, 
Greenberg, 1987), previous research on tokenism, discrimination and relative 
deprivation suggests that people only suffer from illegitimate group-level 
disadvantage when this affects their personal outcomes (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, 
& Major, 1991; Smith, Spears, & Owen, 1994; Wright & Taylor, 1999). This raises 
the more general question of how information about individual and group outcomes 
both separately and in combination affect the way people perceive and respond to 
their situation.  
In the present research we consider how information about group level 
treatment influences responses to personal outcomes in situations in which the 
relevance of individual characteristics seems primary (i.e., in evaluation settings in 
which positive/negative feedback is given). In line with prior research we argue that 
in this type of setting, that provides a focus on personal outcomes, knowledge of 





one’s personal outcomes as it allows people to attribute negative personal outcomes 
such as personal failure to the prejudice of another rather than to lack of personal 
ability.  By looking at situations in which personal outcomes are assessed in the 
presence versus absence of information about group level disadvantage (Study 3.1), 
as well as situations in which personal outcomes are congruent or incongruent with 
group level treatment (Study 3.2), we extend prior research to consider three 
questions we view as central to the area of discrimination: First, is knowledge of 
group level disadvantage self-protective in that it has more positive consequences for 
well-being than not having any information about group level treatment (Study 
3.1)? Second, do these effects simply stem from the congruence (vs. incongruence) of 
information about individual level and group level treatment, or is group level 
information attributed in a way that it reflects positively on the self (Study 3.2)? 
Third, do perceptions of procedural justice depend on information about group level 
treatment, or will personal outcomes determine the extent to which individuals 
perceive procedures as fair (Study 3.1 and 3.2)? 
In the following we first review literature that considers how (negative) 
group level information influences responses to personal outcomes, in situations in 
which personal outcomes are either congruent or incongruent with group level 
treatment. We raise the question to what extent this concern with personal 
outcomes inhibits perceptions of illegitimate procedures that disadvantage one’s 
group. 
 
The Effects of Group Disadvantage on Responses to Personal Outcomes 
Prior research has considered situations in which the individual self is 
either, as is the case in tokenism and relative deprivation research, successful or, as is 
the case in discrimination research (with the exception of Crocker et al., 1991) 
unsuccessful in the face of group disadvantage. The studies we report in this paper 
are not only aimed at providing a connection between these lines of research but 
also at enabling us to consider to what extent responses to individual outcomes 
depend on group level outcomes and whether these processes generalize beyond 
situations of group disadvantage. Below we first consider evidence from research on 
the effects of tokenism. 
Research on the effects of tokenism studies how members of minority 
groups respond to individual success (i.e., gaining access to advantaged positions in a 
higher status group) while knowing that the majority of their group remains in a 






Research in this area provides evidence that responses to ingroup disadvantage can 
depend on individual outcomes (see Wright, 2001 for an overview). For instance 
research by Wright and Taylor (1999) revealed that group members only responded 
negatively to ingroup disadvantage (i.e., less personal satisfaction, need to engage in 
collective action) when this ingroup disadvantage also affected the nature of their 
personal outcomes. Thus even though the awareness of ingroup disadvantage in 
itself indicates that the current situation is unjust, people may have difficulty 
identifying the injustice of procedures when they have been personally successful 
(see also Ellemers, 2001). Additionally, studies in the area of relative deprivation 
reveal that when intergroup contexts are salient this can even augment the 
psychological benefits of positive personal outcomes in the face of group 
disadvantage (Smith et al., 1994). Overall this research indicates that when personal 
and group outcomes diverge, individual level outcomes may be more determinant of 
well-being and perceptions of procedural legitimacy than the disadvantage of the 
own group – even when group disadvantage is highly salient.  
Research in the area of subtle discrimination also provides some evidence 
implying that the individual self often remains primary in the face of ingroup 
disadvantage. Note that we are now considering a different type of evaluative 
situation compared to the research reviewed above, one in which individual and 
group level outcomes are congruent rather than incongruent. This allows us to 
consider how people respond to personal outcomes in the face of group disadvantage 
both when ingroup level outcomes are congruent with and can therefore inform 
targets about their own outcomes (see below) as well as situations in which ingroup 
outcomes are incongruent with and therefore provide a contrast with individual 
level outcomes (i.e., tokenism/relative deprivation research).  
Crocker and colleagues argue and provide evidence that attributing one’s 
own negative outcomes to prejudice against one’s group allows targets of 
discrimination to avoid self-blame by discounting lack of personal ability as a cause 
of their failure (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1991). This is in line with 
insights from the social justice literature (Folger, 1977, Greenberg, 1987), indicating 
that the way people respond to their personal outcomes depends on the perceived 
legitimacy of the procedures that led to these outcomes. Thus the conviction that 
group based disadvantage underlies negative personal outcomes (by making 
attributions to discrimination) can have relatively positive consequences for 
individual well-being (e.g., Crocker et al., 1991; Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003a; 
McCoy, & Major, 2003).  






Taken together, the research reviewed above shows a paradoxical effect 
when considering responses to group disadvantage in evaluative settings: 
Information about group based disadvantage always improves how people respond 
to personal outcomes, regardless of whether their personal outcomes are positive or 
negative. When personal outcomes are positive (e.g., tokenism), information about 
ingroup disadvantage helps individuals stand out from their group. When personal 
outcomes are negative (as in the case of discrimination), individuals can find comfort 
in the fate of their group, as this helps them to explain personal failure by referring 
to unjust procedures. Hence the studies discussed above provide evidence that in 
settings in which personal outcomes are highly salient individual group members 
may focus on the positive interpretation of their personal outcomes even in the face 
of ingroup disadvantage. As will become clear in the present research, this focus on 
individual outcomes may even guide perceptions of illegitimacy of procedures 
affecting the group.  
 
The Present Research 
Although this reasoning is based on, and appears to be supported by, what 
we know from previous studies, the present research goes further than prior work in 
a number of ways: Whereas discrimination in principle implies that negative 
personal outcomes are related to ingroup disadvantage, considering situations in 
which personal and group outcomes differ allows us to gain more insight into the 
separate and interactive effects of these two types of outcomes. This allows us to 
examine three central processes associated with subtle discrimination.  
Firstly, separating personal and group level outcomes allows us to consider 
to what extent people suffer or profit from the fate of their group in the face of 
actual discrimination and stigmatized group membership. That is, by contrasting 
situations in which people do or do not have information about group disadvantage 
(Study 3.1), we can consider to what extent responses to personal outcomes are 
augmented or dampened by knowledge about group disadvantage2.  
Secondly, the present research (Study 3.2) can provide insights concerning 
the extent to which discounting in the face of subtle discrimination is a general 
process or, as previously assumed but not directly tested in this area of research, one 
that is motivated by the need to self-protect from failure. We look at these 
alternative processes by giving congruence information (i.e., in which personal and 
group outcomes match) that does (rejection/group disadvantage) or does not 







situation congruent information reflects less positively on the individual self because 
it implies that personal success is due to group membership rather than own ability. 
Study 3.2 allows us to reflect on whether people adjust attributions to personal 
characteristics in view of group-based information (i.e. due to the congruence 
between them) or also consider the implications thereof for the individual self.  
A third contribution of the present research is to examine to what extent 
perceptions of group level treatment are also influenced by personal outcomes. 
Although tokenism research has considered the relation between personal outcomes 
and justice perceptions, research in the area of subtle discrimination focuses on 
measures that assess individual coping responses, not on examining broader 
perceptions of legitimacy. As a result, we do not really know how the experience of 
personal failure or group level disadvantage affects perceptions of procedural justice. 
Research in the area of procedural justice has repeatedly found what is referred to as 
the ‘fair process effect’, namely that perceived procedural fairness has a strong 
influence on how people respond to personal outcomes (Folger, 1977, Greenberg, 
1987). At the same time we know from research on the person-group-
discrimination-discrepancy that perceptions of group level injustice do not always 
translate into perceptions of personal disadvantage (e.g., Taylor, Wright, 
Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). The fact that the present studies assess both general 
perceptions of procedural justice and more specific perceptions regarding personal 
outcomes can thus help us to explore the interplay between justice perceptions and 
responses to personal outcomes that are, in some cases, the result of discrimination. 
Furthermore, it enables us to consider ways in which the personal experience of 
discrimination is likely to raise feelings of injustice which can lead to other (group-
level) responses, for instance to challenge existing procedures, to publicly voice 
opinions about these procedures, or to raise support for collective action.  
 
Study 3.1 
In Study 3.1 we considered how the presence vs. absence of information 
about group disadvantage affects outcome attributions, well-being and perceptions 
of procedural legitimacy. We manipulated personal outcome (acceptance/rejection) 
and information about group disadvantage (yes/no).  
 With regard to the extent to which these outcomes are attributed to 
personal characteristics vs. group based treatment, we predicted that having 
information about group level disadvantage would enable participants who 
experience personal rejection to decrease attributions to personal characteristics, 






while increasing these attributions under personal success. In terms of discounting, 
information about group disadvantage allows participants to discount personal 
characteristics as a cause of their failure. Therefore making attributions to 
discrimination should buffer individuals’ well-being from the effects of personal 
rejection. 
For perceived illegitimacy of the procedure, two possible predictions can be 
made. If perceptions of illegitimacy are invoked to cope with personal rejection, we 
expected that people who were made aware of group level disadvantage to seize this 
information as providing an opportunity to regard the procedure as illegitimate 
when they are personally rejected, while they should be less likely to engage in such 
a strategy when they are personally accepted. If, however, perceived illegitimacy of 
the procedure is driven by the awareness that one’s group is treated unjustly, the 
provision of information about group level disadvantage in itself should raise 
illegitimacy judgments, irrespective of one’s personal outcomes.   
 
Method  
Design and Participants 
Eighty-two female students of Leiden University (M age = 20.15) took part 
in the experiment for payment (1 Euro) or course credits. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (personal outcome: rejection/acceptance) X 2 (information 
about group disadvantage: yes/no) between participants factorial design. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival in the lab participants were received by a male or female 
experimenter3 and seated in front of computers in separate cubicles. Participants 
read they were (supposedly) taking part in a joint project of Leiden University and 
F., a bogus company specialized in coaching and recruitment, to study the personal 
experience of online selection procedures. They were informed that they would be 
taking part in a selection procedure. It was stressed that, although they would not be 
offered an actual job at the end of the procedure, it was likely they would 
experience similar selection procedures when applying for a job in the future. After 
some information about company F., participants were asked to fill in a selection 
questionnaire on the basis of which they would allegedly be selected by an 
interviewer of the company, Hans Brockens.  
Manipulation of personal outcome. Participants in the rejection condition 






Participants in the acceptance condition were told Hans Brockens considered them 
suitable as an employee. 
Manipulation of information about group disadvantage. All participants 
then received some additional information (i.e., number of prior applicants) about 
the selection procedure, ostensibly to evaluate to what extent job applicants like to 
have extra information about the procedure they are taking part in. Participants in 
the information about group disadvantage condition also read how other applicants 
that were evaluated by Hans Brockens had done: 4 % of all women and 60 % of all 
men had been accepted. Participants in the no information about group 
disadvantage condition did not receive this information. Following this, participants 
were asked to complete a number of dependent measures. To ensure anonymity of 
participants’ responses with respect to the evaluator, it was stressed that responses 
would not be sent to Hans Brockens. 
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation checks. As a manipulation check of personal outcome 
participants indicated whether they had been found suitable as an employee (1= not 
suitable; 2= suitable). The manipulation check of group outcome consisted of two 
items (“how many men/women were accepted in this selection procedure”: 1=less 
than 10 % of all men/women; 2=between 10 and 50 % of all men/women; 
3=between 50 to 100 % of all men/women).  
Personal and group level threat. In order to test to what extent participants 
were affected by both information about their personal and the group outcome, we 
measured threat at a personal and a group level. Personal level threat was measured 
by asking participants to indicate the extent to which they experienced the emotions 
“threatened”, “worried” and “uneasy” when thinking about their own outcome ( = 
.81). Group level threat was measured by asking participants to indicate to what 
extent they experienced these emotions when thinking about the position of women 
in this selection procedure ( = .88). Scale endpoints were 1 (not at all) and 7 (very 
much) 
Attributions. Two items measured the extent to which participants felt their 
personal outcomes were due to group-based treatment by asking participants 
whether they thought their outcome in the selection procedure was due to Hans 
Brocken’s “attitude towards men and women” and “due to my gender” (r = .86). 
Attributions to personal characteristics were measured by asking participants to 
indicate the extent to which they thought their outcome was due to “something in 
me” and “because of who I am” (r = .64, see Major et al., 2003a ; Schmitt & 






Branscombe, 2002b, for similar attribution measures). Scale endpoints were 1 
(strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). In accordance with prior research 
studying discounting in the area of discrimination (i.e., Major et al., 2003a; Major, 
Quinten, & Schmader, 2003b), we also computed a direct measure of discounting by 
subtracting (standardized) attributions to personal characteristics from 
(standardized) attributions to group-based treatment. Higher scores on this measure 
therefore indicate greater discounting. 
Affective well-being. Participants completed a measure of (negative) affect 
that consisted of a list of 10 emotions taken from the Multiple Affect Adjective 
Check List (MAACL; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) (e.g., blue, discouraged, happy, last 
item reverse-scored;  =  .87). Scale endpoints were 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much).  
Legitimacy of the selection procedure. We included a three item measure of 
overall perceived legitimacy of the selection procedure to see to what extent people 
perceive unfair treatment at a group level (e.g., “In general the choice of candidates 
took place in a legitimate way/the selections were fair”,   = .76). Scale endpoints 
were 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much). 
 
Results 
Unless otherwise stated, data were analyzed using a 2 (personal outcome: 
rejection/acceptance) X 2 (information about group disadvantage: yes/no) between 
participants factorial design. 
Dependent Measures 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check of personal outcome 
indicated that all participants correctly indicated their personal outcome in the 
selection procedure. The check of information about group disadvantage indicated 
that all participants correctly indicated the percentage of women that was accepted. 
One participant incorrectly indicated the percentage of men accepted. This 
participant was not excluded from analysis as participants who gave an incorrect 
response again received information telling them the correct result.  
Personal and group level threat. Analyses revealed a main effect of personal 
outcome on personal level threat, F(1, 78) = 18.14, p < .001,  2 = .19. Participants 
who were rejected experienced more personal threat (M = 2.56, SD = 1.16) than 
accepted participants (M = 1.64, SD = .77). No other effects were significant, Fs < 
1.94, p > .17,  2 < .02.  
Participants who received information about group disadvantage felt more 







information (M = 2.09, SD = 1.30), F(1, 78) = 35.51, p < .001,  2 = .31. No other 
effects were significant, Fs < .32, p > .57,  2 < .004. These results indicate that 
negative personal and negative group outcomes are both experienced as relatively 
threatening by participants. 
Attributions. Attributions to group-based treatment versus personal 
characteristics were examined with a 2 (personal outcome: rejection/acceptance) by 
2 (information about group disadvantage: yes/no), by 2 (type of attribution: group vs. 
personal), mixed design, with type of attribution as a repeated measure. This yielded 
two-way interactions of type of attribution with personal outcome, F(1,78) = 27.64, 
p < . 001,  2 = .26, and type of attribution with information about group 
disadvantage, F(1,78) = 43.17, p < .001,  2 = .36, which were both qualified by a 
reliable three-way interaction, F(1,78) = 28.32, p < .001,  2 = .27 (see Table 3.1). To 
interpret this complex interaction, we computed tests of lower order effects at each 
level of personal outcome.  
In the personal acceptance condition, this only yielded a reliable main 
effect of type of attribution, F(1,41) = 42.47, p < .001,  2 = .51. The relevant means 
indicate that when participants were personally accepted they generally attributed 
this more strongly to their personal characteristics than to group-based treatment. 
When participants were personally rejected, however, the main effect of type of 
attribution, F(1,37) = 4.31, p < .05,  2 = .10, was qualified by a reliable two-way 
interaction, F(1,37) = 46.30, p < .001,  2 = .56. T-tests reveal that when no 
information was available about group-level outcomes, participants attributed their 
rejection more to their personal characteristics than to group-based treatment, t(19) 
= -2.97, p < .001. However, when the experience of personal rejection was combined 
with the information that the group was disadvantaged, participants attributed their 
own outcomes more to group-based treatment than to personal characteristics, t(18) 
= 7.48, p < .001.  
In order to consider to what extent participants engaged in actual 
discounting (i.e., by making more attributions to group based instead of to individual 
based treatment), we also considered differences in the extent to which participants 
engaged in discounting (see Table 3.1). Conform our hypotheses, simple effect 
analyses revealed that rejected participants engaged in more discounting when 
receiving versus not receiving  information about group disadvantage, F(1, 78) = 
55.52, p < .001. Participants who were accepted did not differ in levels of 
discounting, F(1, 78) = .16, p = .69. 






Table 3.1 - The effects of personal outcome and information about group 
disadvantage on attributions and discounting (Study 3.1) 
 
Cells in the same row that do not share the same superscript reliably differ from each other at 
p < .01 
* p < .10  
 
 In line with our hypotheses, we also considered whether information about 
group disadvantage changed levels of attributions to personal characteristics and 
conducted simple effect analyses at this level. As predicted, simple effect analyses 
(see Table 3.1) indicated that accepted participants made more attributions to 
personal characteristics when receiving versus not receiving information about 
group disadvantage, F(1, 78) = 6.42, p < .01. Importantly (although marginal) 
rejected participants tended to make less attributions to personal characteristics 
when receiving versus not receiving information about group disadvantage, F(1, 78) 
= 2.70, p = .10. 
Affective well-being. Analyses of the measure of negative affect revealed 
reliable main effects of personal outcome, F(1, 78) = 11.30, p < .001,  2 = .13, and of 
information about group disadvantage, F(1, 78) = 3.89, p < .05,  2 = .06 only. 
Participants who were rejected (M = 2.89, SD = .89) experienced more negative 
affect than accepted participants (M = 2.33, SD = .59). Also participants who received 
information about group disadvantage (M = 2.41, SD = .67) experienced less negative 
affect than participants who did not receive this information (M = 2.79, SD = 1.88). 
The interaction effect was not reliable, F(1, 78) = 1.22, ns. These results indicate that 
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               Rejection            Acceptance 






















3.50 (1.72)a* 2.79 (1.11)a*  3.83 (1.50)a
  
4.87 (.98)b 







personal and group outcomes work in opposite directions: experiencing negative 
personal outcomes induces lower levels of individual well-being whereas by contrast 
the experience of negative group outcomes induces more well-being.  
 In order to consider the relation between attributions and well-being, 
specifically whether information about group disadvantage buffers targets from the 
negative effects of failure, we looked at within cell correlations between attributions 
to personal characteristics and negative affect. Importantly, we found that within 
the rejection/group disadvantage condition, lower levels of attributions to personal 
characteristics were related to lower levels of negative affect (r = .51, p < .05). This 
was not the case within the other conditions (r ranged from -.20 to -.22, ns). These 
results support our hypothesis that having information about group disadvantage can 
reduce negative affect after personal rejection by reducing the extent to which 
participants attribute failure to their personal characteristics.  
Legitimacy of the selection procedure. Analyses revealed a reliable main 
effect of information about group disadvantage on legitimacy of the selection 
procedure, F(1, 78) = 10.16, p < .01,  2 = .12, as well as a reliable interaction effect, 
F(1, 78) = 8.14, p < .01,  2 = .10 (see Table 3.2).   
 
Table 3.2 - The effects of personal outcome and information about group 
disadvantage on perceived legitimacy of the selection procedure (Study 3.1) 
  
 Information about group disadvantage 
 No  Yes 
Personal outcome:    
Rejection 3.98 (1.09) b  2.60 (.89) c 
Acceptance 3.37 (.98) b  3.29 (1.14) b 
Means with different subscripts differ reliably from each other at p < .05. 
 
The main effect revealed that participants who received information about group 
disadvantage experienced the selection procedure as less legitimate than participants 
who did not receive this information. Simple effect analyses of the interaction 
revealed that the main effect was qualified by this reliable interaction: Participants 
who were personally rejected only experienced the selection procedure as less 
legitimate when they had information about group disadvantage, F(1, 78) = 17.44, p 
< .001. Information about group disadvantage did not influence perceptions of 
legitimacy within the acceptance condition, F(1, 78) = .06, ns. Therefore, reports of 






illegitimacy of group level treatment are not merely determined by the disadvantage 
of the group, but increase when group members also receive negative personal 
outcomes. 
Discussion and Introduction to Study 3.2 
 In Study 3.1 we considered the consequences for well-being and justice 
perceptions of having information about group disadvantage that is more or less 
congruent with personal outcomes. This study revealed that information about 
group disadvantage made people feel better about personal acceptance and, 
importantly, helped people to cope with individual rejection as they discounted 
attributions to the self and reported higher well-being. Additionally, even though 
people reported feeling threatened by group disadvantage, they only considered the 
procedure illegitimate when they also suffered personal rejection. Thus, even 
looking beyond levels of personal well-being and considering perceptions of 
procedural justice, we see that participants report most illegitimacy when their 
personal outcomes are also negatively affected. Study 3.2 aimed to replicate Study 
3.1 and to consider in more detail the processes underlying responses to 
discrimination. Specifically, with a slightly different design, we focus on whether 
discounting is motivated by the need to self protect from personal failure (i.e. by 
making attributions to group based treatment), or simply the result of processing 
information that indicates that personal outcomes are congruent with, and can 
therefore be attributed to, group level treatment. We again manipulated personal 
outcome (rejection/acceptance), but this time we always provided group level 
information and  manipulated the nature of group level treatment at two levels, by 
either telling participants the male person making the evaluations had a preference 
for women (group advantage) or for men (group disadvantage).  
 Looking at group advantage is interesting because it can help discern the 
processes underlying responses to group level treatment. First, responses to group 
level treatment may be the result of the extent to which group level treatment can 
inform one about personal treatment. If so, when there is congruence between 
personal and group outcomes, this would attenuate personal attributions in favour of 
group level attributions (informational hypothesis). Second, it may also be that 
responses to group level information are driven by motivational concerns protecting 
the individual self. In this case, personal attributions are only attenuated in favour of 
group attributions when personal outcomes are unsatisfactory (i.e., rejection) and 
group attributions (i.e., group disadvantage) can serve as a positive reinterpretation 






(i.e., personal acceptance/group advantage) provides a situation in which 
information about group level treatment can actually serve to negatively reinterpret 
personal treatment: It indicates that individual success may have been due to one’s 
group membership rather than individual ability (i.e., one is ‘forced to’ discount 
personal success in the face of positive discrimination or realizes one is not special 
because ‘everybody’ can do this). The present design enables us to assess whether 
congruence between individual and group outcomes drives these effects 
(information hypothesis) or whether favourability of considering group level 
information to interpret personal outcomes plays a role (motivational hypothesis).  
 Previous work has yielded evidence suggesting that both hypotheses may be 
valid. In line with a motivational hypothesis, research in the area of subtle 
discrimination has argued that people’s attributions to discrimination reflect 
motivational states (Crocker & Major, 1989, Crosby, 1982). Studies that have looked 
at the self-protective properties of attributions to discrimination have frequently 
compared situations of personal failure that give no information about possible 
discrimination with those that can be attributed to prejudice. Although these studies 
(e.g., Crocker et al., 1991; Major, et al., 2003a) have provided strong evidence that 
perceiving discrimination can be relatively self-protective, the comparison of 
situations of personal rejection that vary in the extent to which they can be 
attributed to discrimination does not enable conclusions concerning whether 
individuals were ‘motivated’ to self protect or merely accommodating information 
offering an external attribution for personal failure. Testing whether attributions to 
discrimination versus the self are motivated requires considering situations in which 
discrimination or, in other words group level treatment, is constant but personal 
motives differ. In the present study we vary individual level outcomes 
(acceptance/rejection) across group level treatment (group advantage/group 
disadvantage). This enables us to consider to what extent the nature of individual 
outcomes motivates responses to individual and group level information. 
 On the other hand, and in line with an informational approach to 
attributions to discrimination, research has shown that group members are aware of 
and report discrimination experiences even when these attributions are relatively 
harmful to well-being (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999). In support of an informational 
approach one of the few studies to consider personal success in the face of (possible) 
group advantage revealed that even when information reflected negatively on the 
individual self (i.e., lower levels of well-being) because it offered an external and 
group based attribution for individual success, people made less internal attributions 






and more attributions to group based treatment (Crocker et al., 1991). It is important 
to note that in the study of Crocker and colleagues (1991) it is not entirely clear to 
what extent information about group based treatment was seen as ‘group advantage’, 
given that the African American participants in this study were simply told that 
they were visible to the person evaluating them (thus indicating that positive 
feedback may be the result of ‘affirmative action’). In the present study the group is 
explicitly ‘advantaged’.  
 Considering specific predictions based on the motivational and 
informational hypotheses, according to the motivational hypothesis people should 
be more inclined to use information about group level treatment when this reflects 
positively on the self. Thus information in which personal and group outcomes are 
congruent should only attenuate personal attributions when this reflects positively 
on the self (i.e., rejection/group disadvantage condition). We also explored whether 
the need to self-protect translated into greater attributions to group-based treatment 
when this reflected positively as opposed to negatively on the self. Based on an 
informational hypothesis we predicted that congruence information (irrespective of 
whether this concerns rejection/group disadvantage or acceptance/group advantage) 
should attenuate the extent to which people make personal attributions irrespective 
of whether this reflects positively or negatively on the self. Also, we expected that 
levels of group based attributions might not differ across congruence conditions.   
In order to distinguish to what extent people see themselves as more similar 
to the ingroup when this reflects positively on the self (motivational) or irrespective 
of how this reflects on the self (informational) across the congruent conditions, we 
also included a measure of gender differentiation.  A motivational hypothesis would 
predict that people see themselves as more similar to the group in the condition in 
which group level treatment reflects positively on the self (rejection/group 
disadvantage) than when this is not the case (acceptance/group advantage). 
According to an informational hypothesis, there should be no differences in gender 
differentiation across the congruence conditions – although greater gender 
differentiation should be observed when personal and group level outcome are 
incongruent. As in Study 3.1 we also measured perceptions of procedural justice. 
Based on our results of Study 3.1, we predicted that participants’ perceptions of 
legitimacy would not only be determined by the nature of group level treatment, 
but also by the nature of individual level outcomes. Thus we expected perceptions of 
legitimacy to be lowest when participants received information about group level 







Design and Participants 
 Seventy-nine female students of Leiden University took part in the scenario 
study for course credits or payment (1 Euro). Participants were randomly assigned to 
a 2 (personal outcome: rejection/acceptance) X 2 (group outcome: 
advantage/disadvantage) between participants factorial design. Two participants 
were excluded from the study because they incorrectly remembered the outcome of 
their group.  
Procedure 
 As in previous research in this area (e.g., Major et al., 2003a; Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2002b), Study 3.2 was a scenario4 study in which participants were 
asked to imagine a situation worded in the following way: 
Imagine you have just completed your studies and are taking part in an 
application procedure of a company or organization. You very much want the 
job and meet the requirements described in the recruitment ad. The selection 
procedure consists of a number of personality questionnaires and an interview 
with the manager who makes the selections, mister Aalders.  
 
 Manipulation of personal outcome. Participants in the rejection/acceptance 
condition were then asked to imagine receiving a phone call from Mr. Aalders 
informing them they were rejected/accepted.  
 Manipulation of information about group outcome. All participants then 
read they knew someone working at the company. Participants in the group 
advantage/group disadvantage condition were told by this person that he had heard 
Mr. Aalders saying that he normally prefers to accept/not to accept women. 
Participants then completed a number of dependent measures. 
Dependent measures 
 Manipulation checks. The manipulation check of personal outcome 
consisted of one item asking participants to indicate their personal outcome: rejected 
or accepted. The manipulation check of group preference consisted of one item 
asking participants whether Mr. Aalders had a preference to accept or reject women 
in this selection procedure.  
 Unless otherwise indicated, dependent measures were measured in the same 
way as in Study 3.1. Scale reliabilities were as follows: Personal ( =.78) and group 
( =.76)  level threat; attributions to group-based treatment ( =.88) and personal 






characteristics ( =.83); affective well-being ( =.92); legitimacy of the selection 
procedure ( =.82). 
 Gender differentiation. Gender differentiation was measured with 2 items 
asking participants to indicate to what extent their outcome was due to the fact that 
they “possessed qualities that other women do not possess” and “distinguish 





Unless otherwise stated we conducted 2 (personal outcome: 
rejection/acceptance) X 2 (group outcome: rejection/acceptance) between 
participants univariate analyses of variance. 
 Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check of personal outcome 
indicated that all participants in the rejection/acceptance condition correctly 
reported being rejected/accepted for the selection procedure. The check of group 
outcome indicated that two participants incorrectly reported group outcome. As this 
study consisted of a paper and pencil questionnaire correction of incorrect answers 
was not possible, so these participants were excluded from analyses. 
 Individual and Group Level Threat. A 2 (personal outcome: 
rejection/acceptance) X 2 (group outcome: rejection/acceptance) ANOVA indicated 
that, as in Study 3.1, participants who were rejected (M = 4.18, SD = 1.27) 
experienced reliably more personal threat than accepted (M = 3.40, SD = 1.09) 
participants, F(1, 73) = 8.07, p < .01,  2 = .10.  No other effects were reliable, Fs < .19, 
p > .67,  2 < .003.  
 Participants in the group disadvantage condition (M = 4.58, SD = 1.22) 
experienced more group threat than participants in the group advantage condition 
(M = 3.90, SD = 1.09), F(1, 73) = 6.43, p < .01,  2 = .08. No other effects were reliable, 
Fs < .79, p > .38,  2 < .01. These results show that participants were aware of and 
found the nature of group level treatment threatening.  
 Attributions. Attributions to group-based treatment versus personal 
characteristics were examined with a 2 (personal outcome: rejection/acceptance) by 
2 (group outcome: advantage/disadvantage), by 2 (type of attribution: group vs. 
personal), mixed design, with type of attribution as a repeated measure. This yielded 
a two-way interaction between type of attribution and personal outcome, F(1,73) = 






F(1,73) = 31.27, p < .001,  2 = .30 (see Table 3.3). To interpret this complex 
interaction, we computed tests of lower order effects at each level of personal 
outcome. In the personal acceptance condition, this yielded a main effect of type of 
attribution, F(1,36) = 8.55, p < .01,  2 = .19, which was qualified by an interaction 
with group outcome, F(1,36) = 16.62, p < .001,  2 = .32.  
 
Table 3.3 - The effects of personal outcome and group (dis)advantage on attributions 
and discounting (Study 3.2). 
 
Cells in the same row that do not share the same superscript reliably differ from each other at 
p < .01 (based on post-hoc Tukey comparisons across conditions) 
 
T-tests indicate that when personal and group level treatment were 
incongruent (i.e., acceptance/group disadvantage), participants attributed personal 
acceptance less strongly to group based treatment than to personal characteristics, 
t(18) = 4.94, p < .001. When personal and group treatment were congruent (i.e., 
acceptance/group advantage), personal acceptance was equally likely to be attributed 
to personal characteristics as to group-based treatment, t(18) = -.82, ns. In the 
personal rejection condition, we also observed a main effect of type of attribution, 
F(1,37) = 5.49, p < .05,  2 = .13, which was qualified by a reliable two-way 
interaction, F(1,37) = 15.67, p < .001,  2 = .30. T-tests revealed that when personal 
and group level treatment were incongruent (i.e., rejection/group advantage), 
participants were equally likely to attribute their own rejection to their personal 
characteristics as to group-based treatment, t(18) = 1.20, ns. However, when 
 Personal outcome 
























4.37 (1.55)b 3.10 (1.92)a
  




Discounting -.44 (1.51)ab 1.58 (1.71)c  .16 (1.18)b -1.38 (1.19)a 






personal rejection was congruent with group disadvantage, participants attributed 
their own outcomes more to group-based treatment than to their personal 
characteristics, t(18) = -4.29, p < .001.  
 In addition, within the attribution to personal treatment measure we 
considered whether information about group advantage/disadvantage changed levels 
of attributions to personal characteristics. Simple effect analyses indicated that the 
nature of group level outcomes only influenced attributions to personal 
characteristics when participants experienced negative personal outcomes: 
Participants who were rejected and had information about group disadvantage made 
fewer attributions to personal characteristics than those who had information about 
group advantage, F(1, 73) = 6.91, p < .01. This replicates Study 3.1. Within the 
acceptance conditions there were no effects of group outcome, F(1, 73) = 1.28, p = 
.26. 
 In order to further consider whether we replicated Study 3.1 we performed 
simple effect analyses of the discounting measure. These analyses revealed that 
within the group disadvantage condition, participants engaged in more discounting 
when they were rejected as opposed to accepted,  F(1, 73) = 42.37, p < .001. Within 
the group advantage condition personal outcomes did not influence levels of 
discounting, F(1, 73) = 1.68, p = .20. Conform Study 3.1 information about group 
disadvantage enabled participants to discount personal failure, whereas information 
about group advantage did not influence participants’ levels of discounting. 
 Because our hypotheses also focused on possible differences between the 
congruence conditions at the level of personal attributions, we performed [0, -1, 1, 
0] contrasts between the congruence conditions for attributions to personal 
characteristics. These comparisons indicated that individuals who received positive 
congruence information (i.e., acceptance/group advantage) made more attributions 
to personal characteristics than those who received negative congruence (i.e., 
rejection/group disadvantage) information, t(73) = 3.61, p < .001. In support of a 
more motivational hypothesis, information that is congruent is only translated into 
less personal attributions when people experience rejection but not acceptance.  
 We also explored to what extent people differed in the extent to which they 
made attributions to group-based treatment. Post hoc Tukey comparisons indicated 
that attributions to group level treatment did not differ between congruence 
conditions, p = .37. 
 Affective well-being. Analyses of the negative affect measure revealed a 







Rejected participants (M = 5.14, SD = .74) experienced more negative affect than 
accepted participants (M = 3.19, SD = .93). No other effects were reliable, Fs < .66, ps 
> .42,  2 < .10.   
 In order to consider the relation between attributions and well-being we 
conducted correlations within the personal outcome conditions between 
attributions to personal characteristics and negative affect. We found a relation 
between these variables only within the acceptance conditions (r = -.30, n = 39, p = 
.06) indicating that, in the case of individual acceptance, greater attributions to 
personal characteristics were related to lower levels of negative affect. Within the 
rejection condition attributions to personal characteristics were not related to affect 
(r = .07, n = 38, p = .67). Therefore we again find that attributions are relevant to 
affect well-being but in the present study in the case of individual success rather 
than failure: Complementing Study 3.1 we observe enhanced well-being when 
individual success was attributed to personal characteristics.  
 Gender Differentiation. Analyses of the gender differentiation measure 
revealed that accepted participants (M = 4.57, SD = 1.27) differentiated themselves 
more from the ingroup than rejected (M = 3.13, SD = 1.42) participants, F(1, 73) = 
25.45, p < .001,  2 = .26. There was no reliable main effect of group outcome on 
differentiation, F(1, 73) = 1.05, p = .31. We also found a reliable interaction effect of 
personal outcome by group preference on differentiation, F(1, 73) = 15.39, p < .001, 
 2 = .17.  We performed [0, -1, 1, 0] contrasts to test whether participants in the 
congruence conditions (entered as -1 and 1) differed in the extent to which they 
differentiated themselves from the group. These analyses indicated that participants 
in the acceptance/group advantage condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.12) differentiated 
themselves more from the ingroup than those in the rejection/group disadvantage 
condition (M = 2.45, SD = 1.28), t(73) = 4.32, p < .001. Levels of differentiation were 
(M = 3.84, SD = 1.21) and (M = 4.97, SD = 1.32) for the rejection/group advantage 
and selection/group disadvantage conditions respectively. In line with the 
motivational hypothesis these results reveal that people differentiate themselves 
more from the group when this reflects positively on the self.  
 Legitimacy of the Selection Procedure5. We found a reliable main effect of 
personal outcome, F(1, 72) = 24.83, p < .001,  2 = .26., and a marginal main effect of 
group outcome on legitimacy of the selection procedure, F(1, 72) = 3.55, p = .06,  2 = 
.05, as well as a reliable interaction effect, F(1, 72) = 7.54, p < .01,  2 = .10 (see Table 
3.4).  Main effects revealed that rejected participants experienced the selection 
procedure as less legitimate (M = 2.70, SD = 1.26) than accepted participants (M = 






3.95, SD = .97). Participants in the group advantage condition experienced the 
selection procedure as more legitimate (M = 3.58, SD = 1.01) than those in the group 
disadvantage condition (M = 3.09, SD = 1.47). Simple effect analyses of the 
interaction revealed that participants in the group disadvantage condition found the 
selection procedure more legitimate when they were accepted as opposed to being 
rejected, F(1, 72) = 30.68, p < .001. Within the group advantage condition, the 
nature of personal outcomes did not influence perceptions of legitimacy, F(1, 72) = 
2.44, p = .12. Conform Study 3.1, these results show that the selection procedure was 
perceived as most illegitimate when not only the group but also the self was 
disadvantaged. 
 
Table 3.4 - The effects of personal outcome and information about group 
disadvantage on perceived legitimacy of the selection procedure (Study 3.2) 
 Group advantage Group disadvantage 
Personal outcome:   
Rejection 3.30 (1.11) a 2.17 (1.17) b 
Acceptance 3.84 (.86) a 4.05 (1.08) a 
Means with a different superscript differ reliably from each other at p < .05. 
 
Discussion 
 In the present study we considered the effects of group disadvantage and 
group advantage on people’s responses to situations of personal success and failure. 
The inclusion of a group advantage condition allowed us not only to consider 
situations in which group outcome reflects positively on the self (group 
disadvantage/rejection) but also a situation in which it would reflect negatively on 
the self (group advantage/acceptance). We reasoned there might be two possible 
paths determining responses to group level treatment and assessed empirical support 
for each path: Firstly, people use information about group level 
advantage/disadvantage to help interpret personal outcomes irrespective of whether 
it reflects positively or negatively on the self (informational hypothesis), and, 
secondly, information about group level treatment is preferably used when it reflects 
positively on the self (motivational hypothesis).   
 Our results provide relatively strong support for a motivational hypothesis. 
Indeed participants made less attributions to personal characteristics when they 
received a negative personal outcome that was congruent with group level treatment 






patterns were found for differentiation from the ingroup: Participants saw 
themselves as more different from the ingroup when congruent information was 
positive (both individual and group are accepted) rather than negative (both 
individual and group are rejected). Yet, whereas based on the motivational 
hypothesis one might expect that if people need to self-protect from failure this 
should not only decrease attributions to personal characteristics but also increase 
attributions to group-based treatment (see Crocker & Major, 1989), this is not what 
we found: Participants made (equal levels of) attributions to group based treatment 
in the congruent conditions irrespective of whether this information reflected 
positively (i.e., rejection/group disadvantage) or negatively (i.e., acceptance/group 
advantage) on the self. It is therefore important to realize when considering a 
motivational approach to these results that the differences we find between the 
congruence conditions were driven largely by adjustments in attributions at an 
individual, not at a group level: People were positively biased to attribute success 
primarily to personal characteristics despite (acknowledging) evidence of a group-
based explanation.  
 In sum, although participants process information about group level 
treatment and adjust group level attributions to accommodate this information, we 
also have consistent indications of a positivity bias such that attributions to personal 
treatment are motivated by the desire to maintain a positive image of the personal 
self. Note that we originally anticipated that motivational processes might also be 
reflected in the level of group based attributions made: That individuals might also 
‘adjust’ group based attributions to reflect more positively on the self. The current 
research makes clear that to the extent that responses to subtle discrimination are 
motivational, these processes take place at the more individual level, via adjustments 
in levels of attributions to personal characteristics.   
 One might argue that these results are very much in line with general 
predictions from attribution theory, and that people were simply responding as 
individuals and not as group members. We do not disagree with this interpretation, 
yet we would like to stress that this provides further evidence for our reasoning: in 
contexts that focus so much on the individual such as the job selection contexts 
examined here, group members may only respond to group level information in 
ways that reflect favorably on the self: to enhance the implications of success or 
minimize personal failure. Indeed, in line with research in the area of tokenism and 
relative deprivation (e.g., Smith et al., 1994, Wright & Taylor, 1999), in this second 
study the effects we found on negative affect reflect only responses to personal and 






not to group outcomes. Nevertheless, as indicated by the manipulation checks as 
well as by the indicators of personal and group threat, participants were clearly 
aware of how the ingroup was treated so this does not explain the absence of further 
effects of group level treatment. Therefore the present results can provide insights 
into the interplay between personal and group level attributions as well as 
informational and motivational accounts of different types of attributions. 
 In line with this individualistic approach to group based treatment, and 
conform Study 3.1, participants reported least legitimacy of the procedure only 
when the group was disadvantaged and they themselves experienced a negative 
personal outcome as well. Again these results suggest that in this type of context 
people recognize the disadvantage of their group, but only perceive the injustice 
thereof when it affects them personally.  
 Overall, the present study indicates that that group members acknowledge 
and are aware of the nature of group level treatment, but that further consequences 
of this knowledge are individually motivated and reflected in the nature of 




 In the present research we varied the nature of individual and group level 
treatment in the face of a prejudiced evaluator to examine three questions. Firstly, is 
knowledge of negative group level treatment self-protective to such an extent that it 
has more positive consequences for well-being than not having this information 
(Study 3.1)? Secondly, does information about group level treatment always affect 
responses to individual level treatment, even when it may serve to harm rather than 
help the self (Study 3.2)? Third, do perceptions of procedural justice depend on 
information about group level treatment, or will personal outcomes determine the 
extent to which individuals perceive procedures as fair (Study 3.1 and 3.2)? 
 Across both studies we found that, at least in the type of context we 
examined, group members have an individualistic focus by which knowledge of 
(negative) group level treatment can augment the attributional consequences of 
personal success and discount personal failure. As Study 3.1 revealed, this even leads 
to increased individual well-being when observing group disadvantage as opposed to 
‘merely’ experiencing personal failure without having group level information. 
Study 3.2 indicated that discounting does to some extent reflect an informational 






whether it has the potential to reflect positively or negatively on the self. On the 
other hand, in support of a more motivational approach this study also indicated that 
neither attributions to personal characteristics nor the reported similarity with the 
ingroup are adjusted to accommodate group level information when people are 
successful whereas this is the case after individual failure. Therefore we can 
conclude that people may adjust interpretations of their personal outcomes in the 
face of information about group membership and seek this kind of interpretation 
after individual failure not success.   
 Across both studies attributions were related to affective well-being but 
there were some differences across the studies that are worthwhile addressing. 
Whereas in Study 3.1 discounting failure in favor of discrimination reflected 
positively on target’s well-being, in Study 3.2 group level information about 
disadvantage had less severe consequences for well-being. It is important to note 
that studies 1 and 2 complement each other in a way that may explain some of the 
differences in well-being patterns across studies. For one, the nature of group level 
treatment differs between these studies. Study 3.1 likely provides a stronger contrast 
at the level of group based treatment because people either receive or do not receive 
information about group level treatment, whereas in Study 3.2 people always have 
group level information, only the nature of group level treatment is varied. 
Furthermore, whereas the information about group disadvantage in Study 3.1 
provides a history of negative group based treatment (percentage of men versus 
women accepted in past), in Study 3.2 the group based treatment reflects the 
attitude of one evaluator without giving examples of actual negative treatment of 
group members. Furthermore, this manipulation is described as part of a scenario 
(i.e., Study 3.2) as opposed to being a personal experience (i.e., Study 3.1).  
 In sum we can conclude that although people recognize and report group 
level treatment, this is not necessarily reflected in the attributions they make for 
their own outcome or the well-being they experience. Furthermore, we see little 
evidence that people suffer from the disadvantage of their group: Information about 
group disadvantage neither enhanced the experience of personal failure, nor 
dampened the positive effects of personal success – as we have shown, the contrary 
seems to be the case. Yet it is important to note that in the present studies we have 
considered a very individualistic evaluative setting (i.e., a job setting) in which 
people are strongly focused on personal success and failure (see also Crocker et al., 
1991; Major et al., 2003a; Sechrist, Swim, & Stangor, 2004). Although many real life 
situations in which discrimination occurs may be evaluative and - like the one we 





examined - seemingly focused on the individual, we therefore stress the importance 
of keeping in mind the context in which discrimination takes place. Indeed we do 
not propose that people never suffer from group disadvantage, nor do we say that 
people are only motivated by individual level motives. On the contrary, research in 
the area of subtle discrimination clearly shows that people generally do suffer from 
discrimination (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2003; Branscombe et al., 1999). An important 
factor influencing whether information about the prejudice of another is harmful 
versus self-protective may lie in the extent to which discrimination is perceived as 
pervasive, thus having long term negative implications for the future (Schmitt et al., 
2003; Stroebe, Dovidio, Barreto, Ellemers, & John, 2008). We would argue that 
when the negative implications of one’s group membership override the self-
protective capacity thereof, discrimination will have negative consequences for 
personal well-being. Hence, at a theoretical level, one of the implications of our 
research may be that it is important to consider the relative salience of individual 
aspects (e.g., need to self-protect from failure, need for personal control, see Sechrist 
et al., 2004) as well as group aspects (e.g., pervasiveness of discrimination; group 
identification) of situations of discrimination when making predictions concerning 
how people will respond to information about the devaluation of their group. 
Research so far has mainly focused on ‘group aspects’, while to some extent 
neglecting the individual aspects that may influence these reactions. We believe that 
the self relevance of the personal failure or beliefs about personal ability may also be 
important determinants of the extent to which perceptions of discrimination are 
relatively harmful or self protective. It may be a fine balance between individual and 
group aspects that influences the nature of peoples’ responses to discrimination.  
 Beyond the level of individual responses to group advantage/disadvantage, 
an important aim of the present study was to consider whether perceptions of 
procedural justice of the selection procedures in general were also determined by 
the nature of personal outcomes. Across both studies we found evidence that 
perceptions of procedural justice are not only influenced by group level 
disadvantage but also by the extent to which people are personally affected by this 
injustice. This has implications for group members’ willingness to address collective 
disadvantage. We know from prior research that targets who confront those who 
discriminate against them are seen as complainers, both by in and by outgroup 
members – even when there is clear evidence that discrimination has taken place 
(Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Kaiser & Miller, 2001). Our research indicates that a 






people who do not directly suffer from discrimination, even ingroup members, do 
not perceive the situation as equally illegitimate and therefore may not see the need 
to address discrimination. Indeed research by Kappen and Branscombe (2001) also 
indicates that perceptions of (personal) illegitimacy are vulnerable to cues other than 
the disadvantage of the group. Hence, unwillingness to report discrimination against 
others may, in part, be due to differential perceptions of the injustice of the 
situation. The more far reaching consequence thereof is that individuals are unlikely 
to address group disadvantage unless they personally suffer from it. In fact research 
on the ‘queen bee effect’ has shown that females in academia who reached higher 
level positions (thus escaping the disadvantage of their group) were more likely to 
hinder rather than help other members of their group (i.e. young female faculty) 
achieve similar positions  (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 
2004). Our research complements these findings by showing that once a positive 
individual outcome has been achieved, perceptions of injustice and group 
disadvantage are reduced, and group members may be less likely to support other 
personally disadvantaged group members.  
 
Limitations 
 One of the limitations of the present research may be that we cannot 
exclude the possibility that our results in Study 3.1 are influenced by social 
comparison processes. In other words, do people feel better about personal failure 
because they realize that other group members have done equally badly and better 
about personal success because they have done better than other group members? 
Although this is a possibility, a social comparison approach would not necessarily 
predict the differences we find in attributions to personal characteristics versus 
group based treatment. Thus our attributional approach can account for both the 
differences in attributions and the emotional responses we find.  
 A further limitation can be that we look at one specific disadvantaged 
group, namely women. Whereas in the area of subtle discrimination it is generally 
assumed that responses to discrimination generalize across groups, there are some 
differential results across groups concerning how ethnic minorities versus women 
respond to positive feedback. For example, it has been found that African Americans 
(Crocker et al., 1991, Study 3.2) experienced positive feedback as negative – because 
they attributed their success to group membership rather than ability. This is 
contrary to the results Crocker et al. found for women (1991, Study 3.1), as well as 
to the results of our study indicating that information about group advantage did not 






dampen the experience of personal success. One reason may be that members of 
minority groups, as opposed to women, are more aware of the fact that people may 
try to compensate their prejudice by being friendly or supportive (i.e., Gaertner, & 
Dovidio, 1977). In view of affirmative action policies it would be interesting to 
consider whether the possibility of compensative behaviour does induce similar 
reactions in women.  
 
Conclusions 
 The present research shows that in contexts in which people are focused on 
individual benefits and ability they do not suffer from the fate of their group. In fact 
information about group membership can reflect positively on the interpretation of 
one’s personal outcomes. This focus on the self extends to perceptions of general 
illegitimacy of the treatment of other group members. Knowledge about the 
circumstances in which individuals experience group disadvantage as most 
illegitimate can help to inform us whether – and when - group members are 
unlikely to address and/or support other group members in their quest to counter 









1. This chapter is based on Stroebe, Ellemers, Barreto, & Mummendey (in press). 
2. Although research on tokenism focuses on this question with respect to collective 
action tendencies, it generally considers minimal groups, or relatively short term 
low status groups (such as college membership) that offer the possibility of achieving 
individual mobility. By contrast, research on subtle discrimination focuses on groups 
that are chronically of low status with a history of discrimination. We know from 
research in the area of discrimination that people with temporary low status respond 
very differently to discrimination than those who are members of chronically 
disadvantaged groups (Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002c). 
Furthermore, even though in some of this research (e.g., Smith et al., 1994) real 
groups were considered, the unequal treatment of participants resulted in 
differential allocation outcomes of the self versus own group. The present research 
allows us to consider to what extent personal success in the face of actual prejudice 
and discrimination of other group members also reflects positively on the self.  
3. The experimenter’s gender was unrelated to all dependent measures . 
4. Prior studies employing scenario and/or experimental studies in the area of subtle 
discrimination have shown that results are consistent over scenario and 
experimental studies (e.g., Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major et al., 2003a; 
Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003). 
5. One participant did not complete this measure.










Is the world a just place? 
Countering the negative 
consequences of 
pervasive discrimination 
by affirming the world 
as just 
 
Although being the target of discrimination has negative consequences for 
access to important tangible resources, such as health care, employment 
opportunities, housing, and education (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), the 
consequences for psychological well-being are less clear (see Major & O’Brien, 
2005). Perceptions of discrimination can sometimes protect psychological well-being 
by allowing targets to attribute negative personal treatment and outcomes (e.g., job-
related rejection) externally (e.g., due to another’s prejudice) rather than internally 
(e.g., self-blame for lack of ability) (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, 
Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003). Yet there is also evidence that perceiving discrimination 
can be negatively related to well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; 
Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002c).  The present research thus 
investigated the conditions under which perceptions of discrimination may buffer 
against or exacerbate the adverse effects of negative treatment on well-being and 
explores an underlying mechanism for this effect. Although being the target of 
discrimination has negative consequences for access to important tangible resources, 
such as health care, employment opportunities, housing, and education (see Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999), the consequences for psychological well-being are less clear (see 
Major & O’Brien, 2005). Perceptions of discrimination can sometimes protect 
psychological well-being by allowing targets to attribute negative personal 




prejudice) rather than internally (e.g., self-blame for lack of ability) (Crocker, 
Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003). Yet there is also 
evidence that perceiving discrimination can be negatively related to well-being 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt, Branscombe et al., 2002c).  The present research 
thus investigated the conditions under which perceptions of discrimination may 
buffer against or exacerbate the adverse effects of negative treatment on well-being 
and explores an underlying mechanism for this effect. 
              Perceptions of the pervasiveness of discrimination may play an important 
moderating role in the effects of attributions to prejudice on psychological well-being, 
determining the nature and direction of responses to negative treatment (Branscombe et al., 
1999; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003). Discrimination that is perceived as 
pervasive may be harmful, in part because it implies future negative treatment and 
outcomes on the basis of one’s group membership, which can lead to perception of barriers 
to one’s success and to consequent feelings of  helplessness and depression (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a; Schmitt et al., 2003). In 
contrast, perceiving discrimination as rare, and thus incidental, may serve to buffer 
targets from adverse consequences of negative treatment because it provides a 
convenient external attribution for immediate failure and is unlikely to occur again 
in the future.   
 We propose in the present work that, in addition to creating feelings of 
direct personal consequence (e.g., personal helplessness), another potential reason 
why perceptions of pervasive as opposed to rare discrimination have such negative 
consequences for well-being is because pervasive discrimination threatens people’s 
basic view of the world as a fair and just place.  Although the present research was 
not designed as a test of just world theory, it relies on the basic premise of the theory 
(as well as of other theories, such as equity theory; Messick & Cook, 1983) that 
people have a fundamental need to see the world as fair and just (e.g., Lerner & 
Simmons, 1966; see Hafer & Bègue, 2005, and Lerner & Miller, 1978, for reviews). 
Being disadvantaged in a pervasive and enduring way on the basis of group 
membership threatens perceptions of the world as just, but rare discrimination can 
be dismissed as an unusual aberration in a world that is still fundamentally fair.  In 
the current work, we examined whether pervasive (recurrent over time) 
discrimination indeed has negative consequences in terms of two measures of well-
being, personal self-esteem and depressed affect (see also Crocker et al., 1991; Major 
et al., 2003), whereas rare discrimination can be relatively self-protective for one’s 




efficacy, whereas depressed affect involves a self-directed emotional reaction to 
negative events.  In Study 4.2, we further investigated the potential contribution of 
threats to perceptions of the world as just to the negative consequences of recurrent 
(but not rare) discrimination.   
 Previous research provides some evidence that attributions to the prejudice 
of another person for one’s failure may be less harmful to the well-being of targets of 
discrimination when discrimination against one’s group is perceived as rare as 
opposed to pervasive (e.g., Crocker et al., 1991; Major et al., 2003; see Major, 
Quinton et al., 2002 for a review). These findings provide support for the 
“discounting hypothesis”, the idea that making an attribution to discrimination in a 
particular context allows targets to protect the self from failure because they can 
blame the negative feedback on the prejudice of another rather to one’s group rather 
than on internal factors unique to the self (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker, Major, 
& Steele, 1998).  
 However, when discrimination is seen as pervasive, and the experience of 
an incident of discrimination is associated with possibilities of recurrent negative 
treatment on the basis of group membership, the self-protective effect of being able 
to attribute failure more externally is likely to be mitigated by the negative future 
implications of this attribution.  Indeed, there is also some evidence that general 
perceptions of discrimination are negatively correlated with well-being 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2002c).  
 Consistent with the hypothesis that perceptions of the pervasiveness of 
discrimination moderate the impact of experiencing bias on well-being, perceptions 
of discrimination have different impact on members of structurally disadvantaged 
and advantaged groups. Specifically, Schmitt and colleagues (2002c; see also 
Branscombe, 1998) found that reports of discrimination were negatively related to 
well-being in women, who are structurally disadvantaged and traditionally 
discriminated against, but not in men, who are structurally advantaged and only 
rarely discriminated against because of their gender.   
 We were able to locate only two sets of experimental studies that directly 
manipulated the pervasiveness of discrimination and considered its effects on well-
being. Schmitt et al. (2003, Study 1) found that women who read information that 
discrimination against women was pervasive demonstrated lower levels of personal 
self-esteem than did women who read that discrimination against women was rare. 
However, Major, Kaiser, O’Brien and McCoy (2007) failed to replicate this effect 





with the same manipulation (Study 3). These studies also did not directly involve 
reactions to experiences of personal failure by women. 
 A second study by Schmitt and colleagues (2003, Study 2) did, however, 
consider personal discrimination by giving women failure feedback in a mock 
interview. Women who were led to believe that bias was contextually pervasive 
(i.e., 19 of 20 interviewers were biased) showed lower levels of positive affect and 
private collective self-esteem than did women who were led to believe that bias was 
rare (only 1 in 20 interviewers was biased). Although this study provided evidence 
that discrimination that is perceived as pervasive within a certain context can have 
negative consequences for well-being compared to a control condition, perceiving 
discrimination as rare did not buffer the effect of failure relative to the control 
condition.  Moreover, as acknowledged by the authors, this research did not 
examine the particular processes that underlie this effect. We focus on these 
processes in the present research.  
 Taken together, research on perceptions of the pervasiveness of group-based 
discrimination suggests that when discrimination is pervasive (and thus a stable 
phenomenon), attributions to prejudice have a negative impact on psychological 
well-being (see also Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). However, when discrimination 
is perceived to be rare, attributions to prejudice may relate to greater psychological 
well-being (because they provide a more salient external attribution for failure; the 
discounting hypothesis) or show little relationship with psychological well-being, 
perhaps because the incidental nature of the bias limit the perceived diagnosticity of 
the event for future outcomes.  Either way, whereas psychological well-being 
appears adversely affected by attributions to prejudice when discrimination is 
perceived to be pervasive, this negative impact seems to be “buffered” by perceptions 
that discrimination is rare.  
 The essence of pervasive discrimination in our view lies not only in the 
contextual pervasiveness of discrimination (i.e., Schmitt et al., 2003) but also in the 
promise of discrimination across time: Whereas rare discrimination, by being 
incidental, can be discounted, pervasive discrimination, by promising future 
devaluation, is threatening. In the present research we therefore specifically focus 
on discrimination that is temporally pervasive (i.e., rare or recurrent). Study 4.1 
explored this potential moderating role of the pervasiveness of discrimination 
(recurrent or rare) on women’s responses to a particular discriminatory action 
resulting in their failure; Study 4.2 attempted to replicate this effect and further 








In Study 4.1, we presented female participants with a scenario in which 
they imagined that they had failed to obtain a job and their failure could readily be 
attributed to the gender-based prejudice of the male interviewer.  We then 
manipulated whether such gender discrimination was recurrent or rare. 
Importantly, we kept the level of experienced discrimination (and attributions to 
prejudice for the particular event) equivalent across conditions while varying the 
likelihood of encountering other discrimination in the future. Because the prejudice 
of the interviewer represents a violation of norms of fairness by another person, 
which elicits other-directed negative affect toward this person (Hansen & 
Sassenberg, 2006), we anticipated that greater attributions to prejudice would be 
positively related to anger, a negative other-directed emotion, across the conditions. 
 Our primary hypothesis was that our manipulation of the pervasiveness of 
discrimination would moderate the relationship between attributions to another’s 
prejudice for one’s failure and two measures of well-being: personal self-esteem and 
negative self-directed (i.e., depressed) affect (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Major et al., 
2003; Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001). Specifically, when discrimination was presented as 
recurrent, we expected that greater attributions to the prejudice of the interviewer 
would relate to lower personal self-esteem and higher levels of negative self-directed 
affect; when  discrimination was portrayed as rare, we anticipated that attributions 
to the prejudice of the interviewer would be buffered, either relating to higher 
personal self-esteem and lower levels of negative self-directed affect or showing no 




Seventy-nine female introductory psychology students (mean age = 18.6, SD 
= .86) at a large public northeastern university in the United States participated in 
this study in partial fulfilment of one option for a course requirement. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either the rare discrimination or recurrent 
discrimination condition, representing the Pervasiveness of Discrimination 
independent variable.   
Procedure  
As in previous research in this area (e.g., Major et al., 2003), Study 4.1 was a 
scenario study that was conducted with groups of up to 15 participants by two 
female and one male experimenter. Participants were asked to imagine a 




hypothetical selection procedure in which they would be applying for a job that was 
very attractive to them (i.e., high income, many career opportunities/vacation days). 
Participants were then told that as part of the selection procedure they would take a 
career test, and that the selection decision would be made by a male interviewer. To 
provide an opportunity to attribute their eventual outcome (failure to obtain the 
position) to the interviewer’s prejudice, the person (Mr. X) making the selections 
was described as, among other qualities, being politically conservative, having 
traditional views, and as having selected 80% men and 20% women for jobs so far.   
Manipulation of Pervasiveness of Discrimination. Pervasiveness of 
discrimination (rare or recurrent) was manipulated by giving participants 
information about the likelihood of encountering someone like Mr. X in the future. 
The exact wording of the rare condition was:  
Times have currently changed and traditional views are dying out. Mr. X. is 
not the type of interviewer you are likely to meet when searching for a job. 
This means that you are very likely to come in contact with other 
interviewers who have a very different background, attitudes and beliefs 
than Mr. X. Also they will not be likely to treat men and women 
differently.  
The exact wording of the recurrent condition was:  
Although times have changed, traditional views persist. Mr. X is the type of 
interviewer you are likely to meet when searching for a job. This means 
that you very likely to come in contact with other interviewers who have 
the same background, attitudes and beliefs as Mr. X. Also they will be likely 
to treat men and women differently. 
After further description of the career test, participants received their 
evaluation from Mr. X, telling them that he did not consider them suitable for a 
position at the company. Participants then completed a set of dependent measures 
and were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
 
Dependent measures 
Unless otherwise stated, all measures were anchored with the same scale 
endpoints, 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much). 
Attributions to Prejudice were measured by asking participants to what 
extent they though Mr. X was (a) prejudiced and (b) sexist ( = .72). In order to 
ensure that our manipulations were equally credible, we asked participants to 







think this situation could happen in real life,” reverse-scored). Our check of the 
Pervasiveness of Discrimination manipulation consisted of two items: “I am not 
likely to meet an interviewer with the same background as Mr. X in the future”, 
and, “Many interviewers have as traditional views as Mr. X”. Due to their low inter-
item correlation (r = .38), these items were analyzed separately.  
Affect was assessed via a measure of other-directed affect, anger, and a 
measure of self-directed affect, depressed affect. We conducted a factor analysis of 
items from the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL, Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965) and van Overwalle, Mervielde, and de Schuyter’s (1995) measure of despair. 
Based on this analysis we extracted a self- and other-directed affect measure by 
including items that had similar conceptual meaning and had relatively high factor 
loadings (above .45). The other-directed affect measure, anger, loaded on a different 
dimension (loading = .63) than the measure of depressed affect. Depressed affect 
consisted of the following six items: pessimistic (loading = .47), hopeless (loading = 
.79), desperate (loading = .61), fine (loading = -.64, reverse-coded), blue (loading = 
.50), discouraged (loading = .58).  The composite scale of these items had high inter-
item reliability ( = .77).  
Personal self esteem was assessed with Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) four-
item performance state personal self-esteem subscale (e.g., “I would feel confident 




Our manipulation of Mr. X’s action was intended to be recognized as 
prejudiced equivalently in the rare and recurrent discrimination conditions but was 
expected to be seen as a more common event in the recurrent versus rare condition.  
Consistent with our objectives, a 2 (Pervasiveness of Discrimination: recurrent/rare) 
between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on attributions to prejudice 
revealed no effect of the manipulation, Mrecurrent = 5.55, SDrecurrent = 1.10; Mrare = 5.73, 
SDrare = 1.06; F(1,77) < 1.  With respect to credibility, participants in the two 
conditions also equivalently felt that the event they read about could happen to 
them, Mrecurrent = 6.03, SDrecurrent = .99; Mrare = 6.05, SDrare = .92; F(1,77) < 1. 
Further supportive of the intended manipulation, the ANOVAs for each 
item representing the perceived pervasiveness of such behavior revealed that 
participants in the recurrent condition had greater expectations of meeting someone 
like Mr. X again in the future than did those in the rare condition, Mrecurrent = 5.08, 





SDrecurrent = 1.21; Mrare = 3.51, SDrare = 1.53; F(1,77) = 24.75, p < .001, 2 = .25.  They 
also felt that more interviewers have traditional views like those of Mr. X. Mrecurrent = 
4.62, SDrecurrent = 1.06; Mrare = 3.41, SDrare = 1.24; F(1,77) = 20.98, p < .001, 2 = .22.  
Affect and self-esteem  
For the main dependent measures, the primary analysis was a simultaneous 
multiple regression involving as predictors a continuous participant variable 
(Attributions to Prejudice), a categorical independent variable (Pervasiveness of 
Discrimination: recurrent vs. rare), and their interaction. Attributions to Prejudice 
were first centered and then these centered terms were used to calculate interactions 
with the categorical independent variable (Aiken & West, 1991).  
 The regression analysis for the other-directed affect measure, anger, 
revealed a significant effect only for Attributions to Prejudice,  = .34, t =  2.35, p < 
.03.  In general, greater attributions to prejudice predicted more anger.  






















Figure 4.1 – Reported depressed affect as a function of pervasiveness of 
discrimination (rare/recurrent) and attributions to prejudice (Study 4.1) 
 
Regressing the self-directed affect measure, depressed affect, on 
Pervasiveness of Discrimination and Attributions to the Prejudice of Mr. X revealed 







p = .67, or of Attributions to Prejudice,  = -.02, t = -.16, p = .87. Consistent with 
predictions, we obtained a significant interaction between Pervasiveness of 
Discrimination and Attributions to Prejudice,  = .40, t = 2.37, p < .02 (see Figure 
4.1). As expected, within the recurrent discrimination condition, greater attributions 
to prejudice were related to more depressed affect,  = .49, t = 3.19, p < .003.  In 
contrast, within the rare discrimination condition, greater attributions to prejudice 
were unrelated to depressed affect,  = -.02, t = -.16, p = .87. The significant 
interaction term in the regression equation indicates that the simple slopes are 
significantly different from each other (Aiken & West, 1991).  
Regressing personal self-esteem on the Pervasiveness of Discrimination 
manipulation and Attributions to Mr. X’s Prejudice revealed no Pervasiveness of 
Discrimination effect,  = .03, t = .25, p = .81, but did show an Attributions to 























Figure 4.2 – Reported personal self-esteem as a function of pervasiveness of 
discrimination (rare/recurrent) and attributions to prejudice (Study 4.1) 
 
Overall greater attributions to prejudice were related to lower levels of personal self-
esteem. This effect was qualified by the predicted Pervasiveness of Discrimination x 
Attributions to Prejudice interaction,  =  -.51, t = -3.39, p < .001.  As expected, 
within the recurrent discrimination condition, greater attributions to prejudice 





predicted lower personal self-esteem,  = -.39, t = 2.51, p < .02. Within the rare 
discrimination condition, greater attributions to prejudice predicted higher personal 
self-esteem,  = .34, t = 2.29, p < .03 (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Discussion 
In line with the hypotheses, in Study 4.1 we found that the manipulation of 
the Pervasiveness of Discrimination moderated the effects of Attributions to 
Prejudice on negative self-directed affect and personal self-esteem. When gender 
discrimination was presented as recurrent, greater attributions to the interviewer’s 
prejudice for failure to obtain a job by women predicted more depressed affect and 
lower levels of personal self-esteem. By contrast, presenting discrimination as rare 
buffered participants from the negative impact of failure attributed to the perceived 
prejudice of the interviewer: Attributions to prejudice were unrelated to depressed 
affect and positively related to personal self-esteem.  Regardless of whether 
discrimination was perceived as recurrent or rare, attributions to prejudice were 
related to more other-directed affect in the form of anger, a result consistent with 
prior research indicating that being treated unfairly elicits other-directed negative 
affect (Hansen & Sassenberg, 2006; Major et al., 2003).  
 Although we obtained the expected results in the recurrent discrimination 
condition in line with research by Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt et al., 2003), our 
findings in the rare discrimination condition appear somewhat less consistent with 
predictions derived from the discounting hypothesis (Crocker & Major, 1989; 
Crocker et al., 1998). In the rare discrimination condition, greater attributions to the 
prejudice of the interviewer for one’s failure to obtain the job were related to higher 
personal self-esteem but were unrelated to depressed affect.  Our findings of 
somewhat stronger support for the discounting hypothesis in the rare discrimination 
conditions for self-esteem than for depressed affect suggest a potentially productive 
issue about the dynamics of discounting prejudice.  Specifically,  attributions to 
discrimination that is perceived as rare may be more effective in terms of buffering 
the negative consequences of bias (i.e., self-esteem, which is related to feelings of 
efficacy beyond the immediate context) than the immediate experience of failure 
(i.e., emotional reactions anchored to events in the context). The findings of the 
present study suggests the value of exploring the different sensitivity of measures of 
well-being to specific contexts of discrimination in future research. 
 Although the finding that attributions to prejudice are positively related to 







discrimination condition is compatible with our hypotheses, results for self-esteem 
when attributions to prejudice were low are unexpected.  We anticipated that 
responses to the manipulation of recurrent versus rare discrimination would be 
equivalent when attribution to prejudice were low, because, in the absence of seeing 
the consequences of prejudice against the own group, information about the 
pervasiveness of discrimination would likely be seen as largely irrelevant to 
participants’ personal reactions.  Instead, when attributions to the prejudice of the 
interviewer were relatively low, self-esteem was higher (see Figure 4.2) when 
discrimination was presented as recurrent rather than rare.  Perhaps these 
participants who perceived little bias against them, despite their immediate 
experience of failure, may have perceived themselves to be more able than others 
who may be victimized by recurrent discrimination (which participants’ own 
attributions to prejudice indicated that they were not).  
 While we acknowledge the value of further investigating explanations for 
this unanticipated result, as well as pursuing further the different effects for self-
esteem and depressed affect in the rare discrimination condition of Study 4.1, Study 
4.2 focused on an underlying process that may help explain why attributions to 
prejudice when discrimination is perceived to be recurrent have negative 
consequences for well-being: the extent to which bias affects people’s beliefs about 
how the world functions. Although there is considerable research studying the 
processes underlying what we describe as perceptions of rare discrimination 
(Crocker et al., 1991, Major et al., 2003), to date little research has considered why 
perceiving negative future implications of discrimination has such detrimental 
consequences for targets’ well-being.  
 
Study 4.2 
 Previous researchers have generally emphasized the expectation of future 
discrimination as the reason why targets suffer from more pervasive situations of 
discrimination (see also Kaiser, Major, & McCoy, 2004). One interpretation for this 
effect is that discrimination can be seen as directly hindering the achievement of 
personal goals, producing feelings of helplessness and thus increasing vulnerability 
to depression.  We propose that another reason why experiencing the negative 
effects of group-based prejudice (i.e., making attributions to another’s prejudice for 
one’s failure) is detrimental to one’s psychological well-being when discrimination is 
perceived to be pervasive, and thus stable and global, within society is because it 
challenges an individual’s worldview, specifically the fundamental belief that the 





world functions on the basis of principles of fairness and equality. Discrimination 
that is experienced as rare would, by virtue of its incidental nature, not be 
considered diagnostic of how the world normally functions and therefore not 
threaten people’s worldviews.  
 In Study 4.2, we considered this issue of the psychological processes 
underlying the moderating role of the pervasiveness of discrimination on the 
relation between attributions to prejudice and self-esteem and depressed affect.  We 
investigated the effect of giving people the opportunity to re-establish perceptions of 
the world as fair and just, but in a way that does not directly relate to the 
achievement of participants’ personal goals. If indeed recurrent but not rare 
discrimination threatens people’s beliefs in the world as fair and just, being exposed 
to events that can affirm these beliefs, even if the situation does not directly involve 
the participant, would likely counter the negative consequences of recurrent 
discrimination while not influencing responses to rare discrimination. The present 
study therefore integrates principles underlying research on people’s worldview 
(specifically, the view of the world as fair and just) with work on the pervasiveness 
of discrimination by considering the extent to which the negative consequences of 
experiencing structural and recurrent discrimination can be countered by enabling 
targets to satisfy their need to see the world as just. 
 There is some evidence that the experience of discrimination perceived as 
pervasive indeed threatens people’s worldviews. Research in this area has focused 
mainly on what can be referred to as status legitimizing (Major, Gramzow, McCoy, 
Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 2002) or system justifying (Jost & Banaji, 1994) 
worldviews, namely on beliefs in meritocracy, which represent the extent to which 
people believe the outcomes they and others achieve in life are based on individual 
merit. Instances of discriminatory treatment are likely to threaten meritocracy 
beliefs.  For example, Major and colleagues (Major et al., 2007) found that 
attributions of situations to discrimination were negatively related to self-esteem 
when individuals had a strong belief in meritocracy, whereas they were positively 
related to self-esteem when individuals had a weak belief in meritocracy. The 
authors reasoned that for individuals who do not believe that the system is 
legitimate, the experience of discrimination may actually confirm their system 
legitimizing beliefs – even to the extent that individuals experience positive well-
being in response to discrimination. By contrast, the experience of discrimination is 
threatening and has negative consequences for well-being when it counters 







 It is important to note that meritocracy beliefs were measured in the Major 
et al. (2007) research as a composite scale of a Protestant work ethic (belief that 
success is linked to hard work) and an individual mobility scale (belief that one can 
leave one’s group). The reliance on this composite scale leaves open the question 
whether the incompatibility between one’s worldviews and discrimination lies in 
the inability to leave one’s group or the fact that one will not be treated fairly on the 
basis of merit. Nevertheless, these studies offer evidence that when discrimination 
can challenge people’s individually held worldviews, there will be negative 
consequences for well-being.  
 Consistent with our contention that the recurrent as opposed to the rare 
nature of discrimination may specifically threaten people’s worldviews, Foster and 
Tsarfati (2005) provided correlational evidence showing that the extent to which 
individuals reported past experiences of discrimination was related to lower levels of 
individually-held meritocracy beliefs. A later study by Foster, Sloto, and Ruby 
(2006) revealed a relation with well-being: For individuals who had little prior 
experience of discrimination, belief in meritocracy was positively related to personal 
self-esteem, whereas the opposite was the case when individuals reported many past 
experiences of discrimination. Although the studies by Foster and colleagues are 
correlational in nature and therefore cannot establish the precise direction of 
causality, they suggest that the past experiences of discrimination may affect how 
people view the world. Specifically, experiencing discrimination that is more 
widespread than incidental, and, in personal experience, more recurrent than rare, 
may lower beliefs in meritocracy. Taken together, these studies concerning 
individual differences in peoples’ beliefs in meritocracy (Foster et al., 2006; Foster & 
Tsarfati, 2005; Major et al., 2007) suggest that experiencing discrimination, 
particularly when it is perceived as recurrent, may adversely influence feelings of 
well-being because it challenges people’s worldviews.   
 Whereas the research by Major et al. (2007) and Foster and colleagues 
(Foster et al., 2006; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005) focused on the correlations between 
personal experiences of discrimination and individual differences in perceptions of 
meritocracy-related worldviews, Study 4.2 attempted to manipulate general 
perceptions of the world as fair by presenting participants with information that was 
unrelated to participants’ personal achievement.  Specifically, we consider whether 
being able to re-establish perceptions of the world as just and fair can counter the 
threat posed to people’s worldviews by pervasive and recurrent (but not rare) 
discrimination. We propose that recurrent but not rare discrimination may, at a 





more abstract level beyond the level of personal achievements, influence general 
views about how society functions and the extent to which societal processes are 
generally fair and just. The perception of the world as fair and just is assumed by 
theories relating to equity and justice to play a fundamental role in human 
motivation. For instance, research in the tradition of just world beliefs posits a 
fundamental “need to believe in a world where people generally get what they 
deserve” (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 1030). This need is broader than one focused on 
immediate personal outcomes; rather, it represents a view on how the world 
(should) function. A wide range of events involving unjust treatment can threaten 
beliefs in a just world such as learning about victims of sexual assault, robbery or 
cancer (Hafer, 2000; Sherman, Smith, & Cooper, 1982-3).  
 In line with the research on meritocracy worldviews and perceived 
discrimination (Foster et al., 2006; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Major et al., 2007), we 
hypothesized that the experience of recurrent, but not rare, discrimination would 
pose a threat to people’s worldview of society as generally fair and just, which 
contributes directly to the negative effects of recurrent discrimination on well-
being.  In particular, we tested this hypothesis by, after manipulating personally 
experienced gender discrimination (i.e., rare or recurrent), providing female 
participants with information that affirmed or did not affirm a view of the world as 
fair and just in a domain that was unrelated to the experience of discrimination in a 
situation that did not have direct, material consequences for the participant (see also 
Braman & Lambert, 2001).  If perceptions of recurrent but not of rare discrimination 
generally challenge a view of the world as just, information that affirms the world as 
fair would be expected to influence responses to recurrent but not to rare 
discrimination.   
 Specifically, in Study 4.2 we exposed participants to discrimination that, as 
in Study 4.1, was described as recurrent or rare.  Subsequently, we presented 
participants with the description of a case that affirmed the world as fair and just 
(affirmation condition: a criminal who took someone’s life was killed in a car 
accident), challenged this worldview (no-affirmation condition: a surgeon who 
saved someone’s life was killed in a car accident), or did not directly affirm or 
challenge this worldview (control condition: a chef winning a prize for cooking). 
Because the control condition portrays a positive event, it also offers a comparison 
condition for differences in the general positivity in response to the incidents 
depicted in the affirmation and no-affirmation conditions. Pilot testing (n = 28) of 







revealed, as anticipated, that participants perceived the criminal, relative to the 
surgeon, as more deserving of his fate, Ms = 5.14 vs. 1.29 on a 7-point scale, F(1,26) = 
60.75, p < .001, and rated the fate of the criminal as more just than the fate of the 
surgeon, Ms = 3.36 vs. 2.17,  F(1,26) = 9.82, p < .01. 
 We predicted in Study 4.2 that when discrimination is perceived as 
recurrent and beliefs that the world is just are threatened but targets are not able to 
affirm the world as just (i.e., participants in the control and no-affirmation [surgeon] 
conditions), attributions to prejudice would predict more depressed affect and lower 
personal self-esteem, as in Study 4.1. However, when targets are able to affirm the 
world as just (i.e., participants presented with the affirmation [criminal] condition), 
this would be expected to buffer participants from the negative consequences of 
experiencing discrimination such that attributions to prejudice  would not affect 
levels of depressed affect or personal self-esteem. When discrimination is perceived 
as rare and thus seen as incidental, people’s fundamental view of the world is not 
significantly challenged. Here we expected that the relation between attributions to 
prejudice and self-esteem and depressed affect would not be influenced by the 
affirmation manipulation, and that we would replicate Study 4.1 across the 
affirmation conditions. We expected in the rare discrimination condition that, 
consistent with the discounting hypothesis, greater attributions to prejudice would 
relate to better well-being (as with the self-esteem measure in Study 4.1) or, 
reflecting a general buffering effect (as with the depressed affect measure of Study 




 One hundred and forty-nine female participants took part in this study, 
which was conducted via internet. Participants could take part in a drawing for four 
$50 gift certificates to an online store for books, CDs, and other merchandise after 
completion of the study. The study employed a 2 (Pervasiveness of Discrimination: 
recurrent vs. rare) x 3 (Affirmation of the World as Just: affirmation [criminal 
victim]/no affirmation [surgeon victim]/control [no victim]) design. 
  
Procedure  
 Participants were recruited for this study via the volunteer section of two 
internet sites (craigslist.com, backpage.com). Female respondents who indicated 
interest in the study were forwarded an online questionnaire.  




 The procedure for Study 4.2 was similar to that of Study 4.1 with a few 
minor changes to make the study more relevant for participants. We adjusted the job 
description (i.e., work for a highly renowned company) and alleged aim of the 
selection procedure test (i.e., assess competence in a work setting). The manipulation 
of Pervasiveness of Discrimination (recurrent vs. rare) occurred in the same way as 
in Study 4.1. Participants also received the same feedback as in Study 4.1.  
 Following the feedback, participants were told that the research involved 
the influence of selection procedures on reading comprehension, and thus 
participants were asked to carefully read newspaper articles that contained the 
Affirmation of the World as Just manipulation. Participants read about an innocent 
victim who had been involved in a car accident in which he (the driver, Eric A.) had 
become unwell and veered off the road. The article stressed that the driver suffered 
pain and was trapped in the car for a considerable amount of time before eventually 
dying in hospital. This part of the story was constructed such that the driver of the 
car was not to blame for this (to be perceived as) tragic accident. This part of the 
story served to (in the case of recurrent discrimination further) threaten the world 
as just. In the affirmation condition participants then read that the driver of the car, 
Eric A., was a criminal who had brutally murdered a young woman but got let off 
his life long prison sentence due to a technicality. In the no-affirmation condition 
participants read the driver of the car, Eric A., was a surgeon who had recently 
miraculously saved the life of a young woman and had employed a new surgical 
technique in doing so. In the control condition, there was no mention of a fatal car 
accident or victim.  Therefore, while unrelated to death, this story would be 
perceived as positive. The article explained that the chef had made a menu 
containing exquisite fish and different types of meat, followed by an outstanding 
range of desserts. Participants then read that the award winning chef was Eric A. 
who had become known statewide because of his excellent cooking skills.  
 After reading the newspaper article participants completed a set of 
dependent measures and were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
 Dependent measures. Our manipulation check of pervasiveness of 
discrimination consisted of the same items as in Study 4.1, r(142) =  .66.3 We 
analyzed the two items as a scale. With respect to the manipulation check for 
affirmation of the world as just, we measured comprehension of the newspaper 
article by asking participants to indicate whether the person, Eric A., described in 
the newspaper article was a cook, criminal or surgeon. Attributions to prejudice 







prejudiced and sexist ( = .77).  Affect was assessed with an other-directed affect 
measure, anger, that consisted of two additional items in comparison to Study 4.1 
(i.e., cooperative, agreeable, both items reverse-scored,  = .75) and the same self-
directed affect measure of depressed affect as in Study 4.1 ( = .87). Self esteem was 
assessed with same Heatherton and Polivy (1991) personal state self-esteem scale as 




A 2 (Pervasiveness of Discrimination: recurrent vs. rare) x 3 (Affirmation of 
the World as Just: affirmation/no affirmation/control) between subjects ANOVA on 
the manipulation check of pervasiveness of discrimination revealed only, as 
expected, a significant main effect of Pervasiveness of Discrimination, F(1,136) = 
29.91, p < .001, 2 = .18. Participants in the recurrent discrimination condition 
reported a greater likelihood of encountering people with similar backgrounds or 
views as Mr. X again in the future (M = 4.60, SD = 1.37) than participants in the rare 
discrimination condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.40) 
 The manipulation check of the world as just, the measure of newspaper 
comprehension, revealed that six participants had incorrectly remembered the 
occupation of Erik A. (i.e., the main character in the newspaper article). These 
participants were not included in further analyses.  
 As in Study 4.1, an ANOVA on attributions to prejudice revealed no 
significant main or interaction effects, Fs < 2.19, p > .12, 2 < .03. Therefore, as 
expected, our manipulations did not influence the extent to which targets 
experienced personal discrimination. 
Affect and self-esteem 
 In order to test our main hypotheses for Study 4.2 concerning the influence 
of an affirmation of the world as just, we conducted regression analyses involving a 
continuous participant variable, Attributions to Prejudice, and two categorical 
independent variables: Pervasiveness of Discrimination (rare, recurrent) and 
Affirmation of the World as Just (affirmation, no affirmation, control). Attributions 
to prejudice were first centered and then these centered terms were used to 
calculate interactions with the categorical independent variable. The three-level 
affirmation condition was coded into two orthogonal vectors.  One vector compared 
the control condition to the no-affirmation condition (0, +1, -1).  The other vector 
directly tested our main prediction about the effects of re-establishing a just world; 





it compared the combination of the control and no-affirmation conditions to the 
affirmation condition (+2, -1, -1). Interactions and subsequent analyses were 
conducted in accordance with procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991). Note 
that based on our hypotheses we predicted a significant three-way interaction 
involving the vector comparing the affirmation condition to the combination of the 
no-affirmation and control conditions: The affirmation condition (but not the no-
affirmation condition or control condition) was hypothesized to alleviate the threat 
to a just world posed by recurrent discrimination, whereas the affirmation condition 
would not be relevant under rare discrimination.  
 The regression analyses for other-directed affect, anger, revealed a 
significant main effect of Attributions to Prejudice only,  = .36, t = 2.27, p = .03. 
Greater attributions to prejudice predicted more anger. No other main or interaction 
effects were significant.  
 The regression representing the fully saturated model for depressed affect 
revealed a significant effect involving the vector comparing the no-affirmation and 
control conditions,  = .25, t = 2.17, p < .04. Participants experienced more depressed 
affect in the no-affirmation (M = 4.21, SD = 1.24) than in the control condition (M = 
3.48, SD = 1.51). However, there were no interactions involving this vector. 
Of primary relevance to our hypotheses, we also obtained the predicted 
three-way interaction involving the vector comparing the affirmation condition to 
the combination of no-affirmation and control conditions, pervasiveness of 
discrimination, and perceptions of prejudice,  = -.42, t = -2.54, p < .02.  As 
illustrated in Figure 3, when discrimination was described as recurrent, across both 
the no-affirmation and control conditions, greater attributions to prejudice were 
related to higher levels of depressed affect,  = .50, t = 3.87, p < .001, the result we 
obtained in Study 4.1. Moreover, this effect was obtained separately for both the no-
affirmation condition,  = .59, t = 3.53, p < .002, and the control condition,  = .49, t 
= 2.53, p < .02.   However, in the affirmation condition, which was designed to re-
establish the world as just, perceptions of prejudice were related to lower levels of 



























Figure 4.3 – Reported depressed affect as a function of attributions to prejudice and 
affirmation of the world as just for perceptions of rare and recurrent discrimination 
(Study 4.2) 
 
As in Study 4.1, when discrimination was described as rare, perceptions of 
prejudice were unrelated to depressed affect.  In particular, in the rare 
discrimination condition, the interaction between perceptions of prejudice and the 


























nonsignificant,  = .05, t = 0.34, p < .73, as well as the main effect for Attributions to 
Prejudice,  = .22, t = 1.39, p < .17.  
The regression for personal self-esteem representing the fully saturated 
model revealed no significant effects.  However, because we had a priori predictions 
about different patterns of results in the recurrent versus rare discrimination 
conditions, we examined the results within each of these conditions separately. The 
analysis for the recurrent discrimination condition yielded the anticipated 
interaction between perceptions of discrimination and affirmation condition 
(affirmation vs. no-affirmation and control),  = .27, t = 2.25, p < .03.  As illustrated 
in Figure 4.4, when discrimination was described as recurrent, across both the no-
affirmation and control conditions, greater attributions to prejudice were related to 
lower levels of personal self-esteem,  = -.31, t = -2.17, p < .05. Effects of similar 
magnitude were also observed when we considered the no-affirmation condition,  
= -.38, t = -1.96, p < .06, and the control condition separately,  = -.31, t = -1.43, p < 
.17.   By contrast, in the affirmation condition, which was designed to re-establish 
the world as just, perceptions of prejudice were not related to personal self-esteem,  
= .20, t = .99, p = .33. 
 When discrimination was described as rare, perceptions of prejudice were 
unrelated to personal self-esteem.  In particular, in the rare discrimination 
condition, the interaction between perception of prejudice and the vector 
representing the affirmation vs. no-affirmation and control conditions was 
nonsignificant,  = .08, t = 0.48, p = .63, as was the main effect for Attributions to 
Prejudice,  = .17, t = 1.02, p < .31.     
Discussion 
 Study 4.2 integrates research on people’s worldviews with prior work on 
the pervasiveness of discrimination by considering whether discrimination that is 
perceived to be recurrent has negative psychological consequences for targets’ well-
being because it threatens core elements in the way people view the world, namely 
their belief in the world as just. In support of this idea, the present study revealed 
that being able to affirm the world as just buffered targets from the negative 
consequences otherwise experienced when perceiving discrimination as recurrent. 
By contrast, affirmation of the world as just did not influence well-being when 
discrimination was perceived as rare. These findings thus indicate that being able to 
affirm the world as just can counter the negative consequences of experiencing 































Figure 4.4 – Reported personal self-esteem as a function of attributions to prejudice and 
affirmation of the world as just for perceptions of rare and recurrent discrimination 
(Study 4.2) 
 
 Because our affirmation of the world as just manipulation likely influenced 
participants’ general mood, it is possible that different general mood across 

























Are well-being effects indeed due to the fact that participants experienced positive 
mood in response to what will have been perceived as a just death of a villainous 
cruel person (i.e., the criminal) and a negative mood in response to the “unjust” 
death of a heroic person (i.e., the surgeon)? Two findings speak against this 
alternative explanation. For one, we find similar well-being effects for both the 
surgeon condition (likely to induce negative mood) and the control condition, in 
which a cook wins a prize (a positive event). Furthermore, the different patterns of 
results for the affirmation manipulation between the recurrent and rare 
discrimination conditions are difficult to explain on the basis of general mood effects 
across affirmation conditions. Thus, although general mood might indeed have 
varied across conditions, these differences cannot readily account for the specific 
pattern of results we obtained. The present results therefore indicate that the 
confirmation of one’s views of the world as just is a positive experience even when it 
concerns a negative event. 
 Surprisingly, the effects of the affirmation of the world as just for self-
directed indicators of negative affect were even stronger than we had expected: In 
this condition, attributions to prejudice not only no longer predicted more negative 
well-being but instead significantly predicted less depressed affect.  The comparable 
effect for self-esteem was not significant, but it was also in the positive direction ( = 
.20). One reason why we find these positive effects on well-being for attributions to 
prejudice within the condition in which discrimination is portrayed as recurrent but 
a just world is affirmed may involve a contrast effect (e.g., Ric & Niedenthal, 2007). 
In particular, the clear message in the affirmation condition that the world is a just 
place in which nasty people (i.e., criminals) get what they deserve may be have been 
particularly reassuring to participants who just had a negative experience of a 
prejudiced person that they could not discount as an unusual incident. 
 Unlike Study 4.1, which found that attributions to prejudice related to 
higher self-esteem (but not to significantly lower depressed affect), the results of 
Study 4.2 revealed no significant relationship between attributions to prejudice 
within the rare discrimination conditions and both self-esteem and depressed affect.  
However, the results were generally compatible with our conclusion in Study 4.1 
that the discounting effect in the rare discrimination condition occurs more strongly 
for self-esteem than for depressed affect, in part because the self-esteem reflects 
feelings of efficacy beyond the immediate context, whereas depressed affect may be 
partially anchored to the failure experience in the experimental context.  In the rare 







self-esteem ( = .17 compared to  = .34 in Study 4.1).  However, in Study 4.2, in the 
rare discrimination condition attributions to prejudice also related to more depressed 
affect ( = .22 in Study 4.2 compared to  = -.02 in Study 4.1).  The buffering effect 
for self-esteem is even clearer when only the control condition in Study 4.2 is 
considered.  Whereas within the control condition for the affirmation of the world 
as just manipulation, attributions to prejudice related negatively to self-esteem in 
the recurrent discrimination condition,  = -.31, these attributions were positively 
related to self-esteem in the rare discrimination condition,  = .21.  The comparable 
effects for depressed affect were  = .03 and  = .49.  Thus, although it was not the 
main focus of the present research, our findings of somewhat stronger support for 
the discounting hypothesis for self-esteem than for depressed affect raise interesting 
theoretical distinctions concerning the self-protective potential of discrimination: 
Do attributions to discrimination that is perceived as rare buffer people from 
personal failure, as has been suggested by the discounting approach, or do these 
attributions (also) protect the self from the negative consequences otherwise 
experienced in response to discrimination. The findings of the present studies 
suggest the value of exploring the different sensitivity of measures of well-being to 
specific contexts of discrimination in future research.  
 In summary, the present study provides further evidence that different 
processes underlie responses to recurrent as opposed to rare discrimination. 
Furthermore, it extends knowledge concerning the processes underlying perceptions 
of pervasive discrimination, revealing that the experience of recurrent but not rare 
discrimination affects people’s core beliefs in how they think about the world. Prior 
research has provided indications that peoples’ individually held system legitimizing 
beliefs, specifically beliefs in individual merit, can influence how people respond to 
situations that can be attributed to discrimination (Foster et al., 2006; Foster & 
Tsarfati, 2005; Major et al., 2007). The present research indicates that the experience 
of recurrent discrimination can affect beliefs that are at a more abstract level that is 
unrelated to concrete aspects in the experience of discrimination. 
  
General Discussion 
 The processes studied in the present research have basic implications for 
understanding the dynamics underlying responses to discrimination. Prior research 
has largely focused on adverse psychological responses to discrimination in terms of 
its direct personal relevance for one’s present and future outcomes. For instance, the 
discounting model (Crocker & Major, 1989) states that targets make attributions to 




discrimination to protect the self; similarly, the rejection identification model 
(Branscombe et al., 1999) builds on the idea that peoples’ responses to discrimination 
are determined by the extent they pose a threat to part of one’s identity, one’s 
identity as a group member. More specifically, pervasive discrimination is thought to 
be harmful because it has negative future implications for the self.  
 Although the present research does not dispute this explanation, it suggests 
an additional possible influence.  Within the area of just world beliefs, for example, 
Lerner and Miller (1978) argued that a threat to one’s just world beliefs does not 
necessarily have to be self-relevant to induce a need to re-establish the world as a 
just place. To the contrary, just world beliefs are unlikely to be threatened “when 
the observer expects to be in a situation similar to that of the victim” (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978, p. 1041, see also Lerner & Simmons, 1966).  Translating this 
perspective to our findings provides indications that responses to pervasive 
discrimination may not only be ego-motivated but also system-motivated, such as by 
the desire to see the world as a just place in which people get what they deserve.  
 Even if it is argued that perceiving the world as just is ultimately personally 
beneficial, in that it enhances the control one can have over one’s fate, the 
distinction between ego-motivated and system-motivated responses (Jost & Banaji, 
1994) offers potentially productive new avenues for future research on responses to 
discrimination. For instance, these processes may operate under different conditions. 
More specifically, instances of rare discrimination may induce more ego-motivated 
processes, and recurrent more system-motivated processes. Taking this a step 
further, people may be egoistically motivated in conditions that are more 
particularistic and not necessarily experienced as embedded within society. In the 
case of discrimination, this could be a situation in which the prejudice of another is 
seen as incidental. By contrast, system motivations are likely to arise in situations 
that are considered more systemic and institutional such as when discrimination is 
experienced as global and pervasive. This implies that responses to discrimination 
can be differentially activated depending on whether people are ego- or system-
motivated, for example by making either ego- or system-motivations salient. 
Although the idea that responses to discrimination may be explained by different 
types of motivation requires further investigation, we think it not only is an 
interesting avenue for future research (for example, future work examining the 
potential moderating role of individual differences in the strength of belief of the 





 The fact that recurrent discrimination poses such a substantial threat to 
people’s worldviews – even in a domain that is unrelated to discrimination – raises 
the question of the long-term consequences of perceiving recurrent discrimination 
for beliefs about the world. Literature in the area of just world beliefs provides 
strong evidence that people consistently try to re-establish their belief in a just 
world when this belief is threatened. This may not be feasible if people’s beliefs in 
the world as just are threatened on a daily basis, suggesting that in the long run, a 
more effective strategy may be to adjust one’s worldviews. Major and colleagues’ 
(2007) research on the relation between belief in individual merit and responses to 
discrimination revealed that those people who had a low belief in individual merit 
actually experienced more positive well-being when being discriminated against. 
The reason given was that low belief in individual merit is congruent with receiving 
unfair treatment; it confirms people’s belief system. Indeed one way of dealing with 
the long term costs for well-being of experiencing recurrent discrimination may be 
to alter one’s worldviews.  
 On a more positive note, our research suggests that reinforcing for people 
the idea that the world is just, may enhance action tendencies and the need to 
address the injustice of discrimination. Our results reveal that people who have been 
able to affirm the world as just experience lower levels of emotions associated with 
passivity (i.e., depressed affect) while nevertheless experiencing relatively high 
levels of emotions associated with action orientation (i.e., anger). Indeed, prior 
research indicates that anger may be an important first step in addressing (personal) 
injustice and engaging in collective action (e.g., Wright, 1997). In a similar vein, one 
might expect that affirmation of the world as just turns the experience of (recurrent) 
discrimination as a threat into a challenge. Although this type of response is difficult 
to establish via self-report measures, physiological measures could provide 
information about these processes.  
 In conclusion, the present research offers an integration of seemingly 
conflicting research findings indicating that the experience of discrimination can be 
both positively and negatively related to well-being. We have provided evidence 
that the personal experience of discrimination can have very different implications 
for well-being, depending on the (future) perspective it offers to targets. Our 
research complements prior research by extending knowledge concerning the 
processes underlying pervasive discrimination. It provides evidence that not only 
the future negative implications for the self of perceiving discrimination as 
pervasive, but also the fact that it communicates to targets that the world is not a 





just place in which people get what they deserve, can account for the detrimental 






1. This chapter is based on Stroebe, Dovidio, Barreto, Ellemers, & John (2008).  
2. We did not necessarily expect attributions to prejudice or the manipulation of 
pervasiveness of discrimination to have overall (main) effects.  Attributions could 
relate oppositely to psychological well-being in the recurrent and the rare 
conditions. Also, female participants may not necessarily generally apply 
information about discrimination against women to their personal experience (see 
research on the personal-group discrimination discrepancy; see Taylor, Wright, & 
Porter, 1994): only when they attribute their failure to some degree to the prejudice 
of the interviewer will the recurrent versus rare distinction have direct relevance for 
their well-being.  
3. Not all participants completed the entire list of dependent measures. This 
accounts for variations in n between dependent measures. 





Chapter 5 Summary and Discussion
 
 
For targets of discrimination it can often be very unclear whether the 
(negative) treatment they are receiving is due to lack of, for example, personal 
deservingness or the prejudice of another with respect to one’s group membership. 
This state of attributional ambiguity with respect to the causes of one’s personal 
treatment can influence both the extent to which members of stigmatized groups 
perceive situations as discriminatory as well as (motivational) responses thereto. 
Attributing a situation to discrimination may be very unpleasant as it increases the 
realization of the negative future implications of one’s devalued group membership 
(referred to as the rejection identification model, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999) yet it may be relatively self-protective as one would otherwise blame the self, 
rather than the prejudice of another, for one’s negative outcomes (referred to as the 
discounting approach, Crocker & Major, 1989). Indeed both ideas have received 
considerable empirical support. The present dissertation focused on the processes 
underlying these seemingly equivocal findings and provided an extension of prior 
theoretical approaches in the area. As outlined in the introduction, one of the 
themes of this dissertation concerned the interplay between an individual and group 
level focus. In an individual level focus people are focused on aspects of the situation 
that relate to themselves such as making interpersonal comparisons and/or dealing 
with (possible) personal failure. In a group level focus people are focused on aspects 
of their (devalued) group membership such as the treatment of other ingroup 
members or the implications of their group membership for their personal future. As 
will become clear in the course of this chapter, it may be important to look beyond 
(as well as redefine) an individual and group level focus to consider system 
motivations (i.e., the need to perceive the world as a just place) in responses to 
subtle discrimination 
In Chapter 2 I considered how an individual level focus (i.e., self relevance 
of personal outcomes, need to search for information) influences information search 
that provides evidence of discrimination as well as studying the consequences of this 
evidence of discrimination for psychological well-being. In Chapter 3 I studied how 
an individual level (nature of personal outcomes) and a group level (treatment of the 
group) focus determine (motivational) responses to discrimination. In these two 





that is self-protective from failure (Chapter 3) or harmful to the  self because the 
devaluation of one’s group has negative (future) implications for the self (Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 4 I integrated these equivocal findings with respect to motivational 
processes by studying a possible moderator of the relation between attributions to 
discrimination and well-being, the pervasiveness of discrimination. Furthermore, I 
argued that in determining the processes underlying responses to discrimination it is 
important to go beyond concerns about the (individual/group) self and look at the 
extent to which discrimination threatens people’s basic view of the world as a place 
in which people are treated on the basis of principles of justice and equality. I 
proposed another more abstract and less self-relevant dimension that may be of 
importance in studying people’s responses to subtle discrimination: system 
motivated responses. Below I outline the results of the studies conducted in this 
dissertation, before providing a more comprehensive discussion of the theoretical 
implications of the research conducted in this dissertation. 
 
Overview of the main findings 
 
Chapter 2: When searching hurts: the role of information search in responding to 
subtle discrimination – an individual level focus on subtle discrimination  
How do individuals come to realize they are targets of discrimination in 
situations in which it is unclear whether they are being treated on the basis of 
individual characteristics or their group membership? Many instances of 
discrimination concern evaluation settings in which individuals are likely to be very 
focused on their personal outcomes and specific individual attributes relevant to 
these outcomes, such as judgments of personal ability or competence. Yet in order to 
recognize discrimination individuals need to shift from this individual level focus to 
an awareness that personal outcomes may be caused by their (devalued) group 
membership. Also we know that the recognition of discrimination in many cases 
may require searching for additional information. Indeed prior research by Crosby 
and colleagues indicates that failure to perceive personal discrimination may be due 
to lack of information (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986; Rutte, Diekmann, 
Polzer, Crosby, & Messick, 1994). Targets typically only have information about 
individual cases of discrimination (e.g. their own treatment), whereas inferring 
discrimination may require the comparison of a larger number of cases (e.g., the 
treatment of other ingroup and outgroup members). Consequently, in many 





can help individuals shift from being focused purely on their personal self, to a focus 
on their group membership and the group self.  
The first aim of the present chapter was to study conditions under which 
targets are motivated to actively search for information about the cause of the 
treatment they receive, when placed in a situation in which it is ambiguous whether 
or not they are victims of discrimination. In both studies of this chapter, the 
information paradigm I designed was such that the information individuals could 
search for provided the only indication that personal treatment might be caused by 
the prejudice of the evaluator. My research revealed that targets can be motivated to 
search for additional information than can provide indications of discrimination 
when personal outcomes (both negative and positive) are highly self relevant. 
Furthermore, targets can shift from being purely focused on the personal self to 
thinking about their group membership: Across both studies targets made 
attributions to prejudice after information search (Studies 2.1/.2) but only when this 
information provided evidence of prejudice (Study 2.2).  
A second aim of Chapter 2 was to consider how searching for evidence of 
discrimination affects targets well-being, both at an individual (i.e., affect) and a 
group (i.e., collective self esteem) level. Does the realization that a personal outcome 
is due to discrimination rather than personal ability have positive or negative 
consequences for personal and group level well-being? And if viewing evidence of 
group level disadvantage has negative consequences for well-being, is this because 
individuals suffer from the fate of their group and the fact that other group members 
are disadvantaged, or because this disadvantage has negative implications for 
themselves (i.e., experiencing personal failure)?  
In the present paradigm, the more information targets sought, the more 
cases of fellow ingroup members (women) they viewed who received unjust 
treatment with regard to outgroup members (men) by a male evaluator (who also 
evaluates the target). Therefore searching for information provides more and 
stronger evidence of discrimination. Both studies 2.1 and 2.2 revealed that searching 
for a lot of information had a negative influence on individuals’ group level (i.e., 
collective self esteem) and individual level well-being (i.e., affect) but only when 
individuals experienced personal failure rather than success (Study 2.1.) and when 
this information indeed revealed evidence of discrimination (Study 2.2). Therefore 
research reveals that viewing evidence of (pervasive) discrimination is harmful 




By varying the nature of individuals’ personal outcomes in the face of group 
disadvantage I was also able to consider why having strong evidence of 
discrimination would have these negative consequences for well-being. Prior 
research (e.g., Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003) has focused on negative 
personal outcomes that can be attributed to the prejudice of another. Therefore, 
negative attitudes with regard to one’s (devalued) group always affected the self. Yet 
this research cannot discern why individuals suffer from the disadvantage of their 
group. In the present research I varied whether (i.e., personal failure) or not (i.e., 
personal success) the disadvantage of the group affected the self. This allowed me to 
consider possible reasons why having strong evidence of group disadvantage has 
negative consequences for well-being. On the one hand, individuals may experience 
negative well-being in the face of strong evidence of group disadvantage because the 
group is a central part of the self, and individuals empathize with and suffer from 
the fate of their fellow group members (empathy explanation). By contrast my 
research provided more support for an alternative explanation, namely that 
individuals suffer from group disadvantage because it has negative consequences for 
themselves, their personal outcomes (personal interest explanation): My findings 
indicate that even though individuals are able to perceive and report group 
disadvantage (i.e., attributions to discrimination), the disadvantage of the group only 
affected targets’ well-being when they had much as opposed to little evidence of 
group disadvantage and were personally affected by this disadvantage. 
Overall Chapter 2 provides evidence that individuals can be motivated to 
search for evidence of discrimination even when they are very focused on personal 
outcomes and this information search may be harmful for well-being. Also, my 
results reveal that rather than protecting the self from personal failure, viewing 
more evidence of discrimination has negative consequences for well-being both at 
an individual and at a group level – even when targets may be motivated to self 
protect from failure because, for example, personal failure is highly self relevant. In 
Chapter 4 I further focus on the role of pervasiveness in determining well-being 
responses to discrimination. Note that in the present studies (2.1 and 2.2) individuals 
who sought less information also reported perceiving discrimination, yet did not 
suffer lower levels of well-being. Therefore this chapter provides initial evidence 
that the experience of ‘pervasive’ discrimination may be particularly harmful to 
well-being whereas less strong evidence of discrimination need not be so harmful 





The present chapter also indicates that an individual level focus (i.e., self 
relevant personal outcomes) need not preclude perceptions of discrimination. 
Furthermore, a stronger individual focus is not necessarily directly related to self-
protective motivations. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation I was interested in 
addressing the relative influence of an individual and group focus on attributions to 
discrimination and well-being. 
 
Chapter 3: For better or for worse: The congruence of personal and group outcomes 
on targets’ responses to discrimination – an individual and group level focus on 
subtle discrimination 
Would the knowledge that you are a successful member of a disadvantaged 
group but that many other members of your group are less successful due to 
prejudice against your group membership dampen the positive experience of your 
personal success? Chapter 2 indicated that people suffer more from discrimination 
when it also affects themselves. Yet these studies tell us little about how knowing 
about the disadvantage of one’s group compares to not having information about 
group disadvantage. Would Bill Cosby, a successful African American actor have 
enjoyed his success more if he had not been African American and aware that many 
other African Americans would never reach this point due to discrimination? Does 
the knowledge of group disadvantage dampen the experience of personal success and 
enhance personal failure? In Chapter 3 I considered the relative influence of 
personal outcomes versus outcomes of one’s group on targets’ attributions, well-
being and justice perceptions in response to discrimination. I focused on the three 
questions summarized below. 
Firstly I considered whether people suffer or profit from the fate of their 
group in the face of actual discrimination and stigmatized group membership. That 
is, by contrasting situations in which people do or do not have information about 
group disadvantage (Study 3.1), I was able to study to what extent responses to 
personal outcomes are augmented or dampened by knowledge about group 
disadvantage. Specifically I focused on whether people discounted personal failure 
(i.e., made less internal and more group-based attributions) in the face of evidence of 
group disadvantage, and how this discounting affected well-being. Study 3.1 
indicated that rather than suffering from the fate of one’s group, knowledge thereof 
actually served to discount failure, and to some extent, enhance personal success. 
Having information about the disadvantage of one’s group – as opposed to not being 




attributions for success. Similarly it allowed individuals to make less internal 
attributions for personal failure and increased personal well-being. Therefore this 
study provided evidence that having information about group disadvantage, rather 
than being harmful for well-being, can enhance the experience of personal success 
and help discount personal failure.  
Secondly, I was interested in considering to what extent discounting (when 
personal and group outcomes are congruent) is the result of the motivation to self-
protect from personal failure or whether this discounting is the result of information 
processing when individuals discover that personal outcomes are congruent with 
and should therefore be attributed to group membership. I studied these alternative 
explanations in Study 3.2 by comparing a ‘standard discounting’ setting (personal 
failure/group disadvantage) with a situation in which it would not be self-protective 
to discount and attribute personal outcomes to group membership: experiencing 
personal success that can be attributed to the advantaged position of one’s group. I 
found that individuals engaged in more discounting of their personal outcomes 
when it served to self-protect from personal failure (i.e., personal failure that was 
congruent with group disadvantage) than when it implied that one could not 
attribute this personal success internally (i.e., personal success that was congruent 
with group advantage) (Study 3.2). This is not to say that individuals who 
experienced personal success did not perceive the disadvantage of their group, rather 
they did not translate this to an individual level (i.e., they did not make less internal 
attributions). In other words, people were highly motivated to attribute personal 
success internally, even when group level information indicated otherwise. It would 
seem that attributions to discrimination are not purely the result of individual and 
group level information processing but also contain a motivational element in which 
individuals make attributions that allow them to discount personal failure and 
enhance personal success and use group level information to achieve this effect.  
As a third question I considered to what extent individuals recognize and 
report injustice against group members when they are not personally affected by this 
injustice (i.e., personal outcomes are positive but group is disadvantaged). Research 
in the area of procedural justice has repeatedly found what is referred to as the ‘fair 
process effect’, namely that perceived procedural fairness has a strong influence on 
how people respond to personal outcomes (Folger, 1977, Greenberg, 1987). At the 
same time research on the person-group-discrimination-discrepancy indicates that 
perceptions of group level injustice do not always translate into perceptions of 





The fact that the present studies assess both general perceptions of procedural justice 
and more specific assessments of perceptions regarding personal outcomes can thus 
help to explore the interplay between justice perceptions and responses to personal 
outcomes that are, in some cases, the result of discrimination. Results across both 
studies conducted in this chapter indicate that not only personal outcome 
attributions but also perceptions of justice seem to be guided by individual level 
motivations. Indeed, looking at reports of group level injustice, I found that 
individuals reported more injustice with respect to treatment of their group 
members when this also matched their personal experiences (despite the fact that 
they did perceive/make attributions to the disadvantage of their group). These 
results indicate that individuals are more likely to perceive and report injustice 
when they also personally affected by this injustice. Overall the present chapter 
provides a picture of somewhat individualistic and egoistically motivated individuals 
who do not seem to suffer from the fate of other group members. 
Does this mean that individuals never suffer from their disadvantaged group 
membership and generally experience relatively positive well-being when personal 
failure can be attributed to group membership? Chapter 2 already provided 
indications that this is not the case, showing that even when individuals are very 
focused on their personal outcomes, evidence of discrimination can be experienced 
as harmful. How can the differential findings across these chapters be explained? In 
Chapter 4 I studied the processes underlying these differential responses by 
considering a possible moderator, the perceived pervasiveness of discrimination. 
Furthermore I focused on the question whether responses to discrimination are 
generally egoistically motivated: do individuals profit (i.e., by discounting) or suffer 
(i.e., by becoming aware of the negative future implications thereof for the self) 
from discrimination because of its positive or negative implications for the self or are 
there elements in the experience of discrimination that do not relate directly to the 
self? In order to study this question I looked at whether the experience of 
discrimination that is perceived as structural and pervasive threatens targets’ view of 
the world as fair and just in which people get what they deserve.  
 
Chapter 4: Is the World a Just Place? Countering the negative consequences of 
pervasive discrimination by affirming the world as just – beyond an individual 
versus group level focus 
 Not only the studies conducted in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation but 




with respect to targets’ well-being responses to discrimination. For members of 
stigmatized groups attributions to discrimination under some circumstances can be 
self-protective because they enable targets to attribute personal failure to the 
prejudice of another, thus avoiding self blame (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 
1991; Chapter 3 of this dissertation). Yet there is also strong evidence that 
attributions to discrimination can be harmful for well-being because the experience 
of discrimination indicates to targets that negative treatment on the basis of one’s 
group membership can also be expected in the future (Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation). In this fourth chapter I study the role of the 
pervasiveness of discrimination as a moderator of these processes. Prior research has 
revealed that discrimination that is perceived as more pervasive has more negative 
consequences for well-being than discrimination that is perceived as rare (Schmitt et 
al., 2003). Yet research so far has not provided evidence of the processes I suggest 
(but see also Schmitt et al. 2003) namely that the same situation of discrimination 
(i.e., being rejected by a prejudiced evaluator) can induce very different processes 
depending on people’s perceptions of pervasiveness of the discrimination they 
experience. Importantly, across both studies the experience of discrimination (i.e., 
personal outcome, prejudice of ‘perpetrator’) and therefore the extent to which 
individuals made attributions to discrimination was the same, only the extent to 
which this discrimination was expected to occur again in the future differed. I 
predicted that perceiving discrimination as rare, and thus incidental, may serve to 
buffer targets from the adverse consequences of negative treatment because it 
provides a convenient external attribution for failure and is relatively unlikely to 
occur again in the future.  By contrast, discrimination that is perceived as pervasive 
may be harmful in part because it implies future negative treatment and outcomes 
on the basis of one’s group membership, which can lead to feelings of helplessness 
and depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a; 
Schmitt et al., 2003). Importantly, in contrast to prior research that has manipulated 
discrimination that is contextually pervasive in the sense that the number of 
prejudiced persons in the specific context differed (see Schmitt et al., 2003), I 
manipulated discrimination that was personally experienced but differed in the 
extent to which it was likely to occur in the future (i.e., temporal pervasiveness: rare 
versus recurrent). In my view this covered the essence of discrimination as being 
threatening – as opposed to self-protective - when it provides targets with a negative 






Results across both studies revealed that overall the experience of 
discrimination, irrespective of whether it was perceived as rare or pervasive, 
increased levels of emotions not directed at the self but at the other, such as other-
directed affect in the form of anger. Importantly, and in line with my predictions, 
when I considered self-directed indicators of well-being (i.e., feelings of self efficacy, 
self-directed affect), I found evidence that being able to make attributions to 
discrimination buffered individuals from the experience of personal failure when 
discrimination was perceived as rare. By contrast, discrimination that was perceived 
as pervasive had negative consequences for individuals’ well-being. Therefore the 
present studies provide strong evidence that very different mechanisms may 
underlie the same situation of discrimination. 
 A further question I considered in Study 4.2 was why pervasive 
discrimination is so threatening. I proposed that attributing a situation to 
discrimination when this discrimination is perceived to be pervasive may not only 
be threatening because it has negative (future) implications for the self, but also 
because it threatens peoples’ worldviews, such as the belief that the world functions 
on the basis of principles of equality and fairness. I hypothesized that being 
disadvantaged in a pervasive and enduring way on the basis of group membership 
threatens perceptions of the world as just, but that rare discrimination can be 
dismissed as an unusual aberration in a world that is still fundamentally fair. In this 
study I manipulated the pervasiveness of discrimination (rare/pervasive) and gave 
individuals the opportunity to reaffirm the world as just. Although prior research 
has not manipulated affirmation of the world as just to counter threat to just world 
beliefs, parallels are to be found in the area of self affirmation (Steele & Liu, 1983; 
Tesser & Cornell, 1991). I reasoned that if the experience of pervasive and structural 
discrimination threatens peoples’ beliefs in a just world, being able to reaffirm the 
world as just in a different domain (i.e., punishment of criminal) should counter the 
negative consequences of experiencing pervasive discrimination. By contrast, 
because discrimination that is perceived as rare can be viewed as an incidental 
occurrence that is not diagnostic of how the world functions, I did not expect any 
effect of just world affirmation in this case. Indeed, Study 4.2 revealed that being 
able to reaffirm the world as just countered the negative well-being consequences of 
pervasive discrimination – whereas it did not influence responses to discrimination 
that was perceived as rare. Therefore being able to affirm the world as just can 







Overall this research provided evidence that the extent to which 
discrimination is perceived as temporally pervasive can determine the extent to 
which the same ‘experience’ of discrimination serves to self-protect people from 
personal failure or has very negative consequences for well-being. Furthermore, 
Study 4.2 provided evidence that discrimination that is perceived as pervasive and 
recurrent threatens peoples’ beliefs in the world as a just place.  
 
Theoretical implications 
One of the main themes in the introduction of this dissertation concerned 
the question of when individuals switch from an individual level focus (i.e., focusing 
on personal failure), to a group level focus (i.e., perceiving group disadvantage, 
prejudiced behaviour of outgroup members). I argued that individuals may think at 
different abstraction levels and that this can determine the extent to which they 
focus on themselves (as individuals) with respect to other individuals – an individual 
level focus – versus making distinctions between themselves (as group members) and 
other groups – a group level focus. The present dissertation has addressed this theme 
in a number of ways. For one, it has considered how a focus on individual level 
aspects of a situation influences responses to information about the disadvantage of 
one’s group. Specifically, it studied whether an individual focus precludes 
perceptions of group disadvantage, how perceptions of group disadvantage translate 
into individual level responses (for example, in contexts in which personal and 
group outcomes are positive or negative) and finally, in linking personal outcomes to 
group treatment, whether individual motives determine attributions to personal 
discrimination. Secondly, building on the distinction between individual and group 
level focus, this dissertation moved a step further to consider the role of system 
motivations (i.e., the need to see the world as a just place) in responses to subtle 
discrimination. Below I outline in more detail the theoretical implications of the 
present dissertation. 
 
Responding to information about the disadvantage of one’s group 
a. From individual to group 
The results reported in this dissertation provide important insights 
concerning how members of stigmatized groups respond to the disadvantage of their 
(fellow) group members. Whereas prior research has largely considered how targets 
respond to discrimination that is also ‘personally’ experienced (e.g., Major, Kaiser, & 






dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3) I was interested in studying the relation between the 
fate of one’s group and individuals’ personal outcomes. The nature of discrimination 
as it occurs in real life is such that personal outcomes (i.e., negative treatment) are 
congruent with outcomes of/attitudes with respect to one’s group (i.e., prejudice of 
an evaluator). By experimentally separating individual from group level treatment I 
was able to focus on whether individuals are able to link information about their 
personal outcomes to information about group level treatment. There are reasons to 
believe that this may be difficult for targets of discrimination. Research on the 
person-group discrimination discrepancy indicates that members of disadvantaged 
groups do not necessarily link information about their personal treatment to 
knowledge about the disadvantage of their group (D.M.Taylor et al., 1990, see 
D.M.Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994 for a review). In this case awareness of group 
disadvantage is not matched by reports of personal experiences of discrimination, 
suggestive of some self-protective mechanisms (see Crosby, 1984). In this 
dissertation I studied situations in which the relevance of individual characteristics 
seems primary (i.e., personal evaluation/selection settings in which positive/negative 
feedback is given) and considered how the provision of group level information then 
impacts interpretation of these outcomes and its effects on individual level well-
being. This focus on individual outcomes might arguably also contribute to less 
awareness (or less perceived relevance) of group level treatment. Importantly, both 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that, irrespective of the extent to which personal 
outcomes are self relevant and the nature of these personal outcomes (i.e., success or 
failure), individuals do notice and report group disadvantage. In other words, 
individuals can be very focused on themselves, and need not personally be the target 
of discrimination to be aware of group disadvantage. But how do individuals respond 
to information group disadvantage? I consider this question below. 
 
b. From group to individual: suffering from the fate of the group 
A further implication of this dissertation is that it can inform us to what 
extent people actually suffer from the fate of their group (as opposed to suffering 
from negative personal outcomes that can be attributed to group membership). Prior 
research, as well as the research conducted in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, 
indicates that individuals may suffer from discrimination, especially when this 
discrimination is perceived to be pervasive within society (Branscombe et al., 1999). 
The research conducted in this dissertation provides evidence that people do not 




other group members have received negative treatment need not in itself lead to 
individual suffering on behalf of the group. Indeed, Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
reveals that information about group disadvantage can help discount personal failure 
whereas information about personal success may enable individuals to positively 
contrast themselves from disadvantaged group members. This is not to say that 
group members never suffer from the disadvantage of their group, Chapters 2 and 4 
reveal that when group disadvantage is perceived as pervasive – and also is 
combined with negative personal outcomes – this can induce lower levels of 
personal well-being (see also next section). Therefore, overall, I can conclude that in 
settings that are very individualistic and in which people are focused on averting 
negative personal outcomes, responses to information about group disadvantage are 
personally motivated such that people use group level information to interpret 
personal outcomes, rather than suffering from the devaluation of their group in 
general.  
 
c. From group to individual: making attributions to personal discrimination 
The present work provides insights concerning the relation between 
motives at an individual level and the extent to which individuals report being 
personally discriminated against (i.e., attributing the disadvantage of the group to 
their personal treatment). Within the literature on subtle discrimination it has been 
suggested that targets may be motivated to maximize (in order to self protect) or 
minimize (when perceiving discrimination is threatening) their attributions to 
discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1991). My research does not 
provide evidence that personal motives determine levels of attributions to 
discrimination. Rather we see that personal motives (e.g., need to self-protect) 
determine the relation between perceptions of discrimination and well-being. Initial 
evidence for this idea is provided Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Results indicate that 
individuals who discount personal failure in favour of a group based attribution to 
discrimination do not make more attributions to group based treatment (rather they 
make less internal attributions) even though arguably they should have a greater 
need to do so than individuals who do not need to discount personal failure (because 
they experience personal success). Further evidence for the idea that personal 
motives do not determine levels of attributions to discrimination is provided by 
Chapter 4: Attributions to discrimination did not differ across pervasiveness 
conditions. In other words, targets do not minimize reports of discrimination when 





there is a potential to self-protect from failure by making these attributions (i.e., rare 
condition). Importantly, these differences in the pervasiveness of discrimination did 
influence the relation between attributions to discrimination and well-being: When 
attributions to discrimination can self-protect people from personal failure they 
experience positive well-being; when these attributions threaten system beliefs 
people experience negative well-being. This suggests that it is here that motivational 
processes (i.e., ego versus system motivation, see below) are taking place.  In sum I 
would argue that the present dissertation provides initial evidence that motivational 
processes do not necessarily influence attributions to discrimination, but that they 
can moderate the extent to which attributions to discrimination affect well-being.  
 
Integrating the discounting approach and the Rejection Identification Model  
Considering the implications of this dissertation for how individuals cope 
with subtle discrimination, one of the main theoretical contributions of the present 
dissertation is that it provides insights on how to integrate - as well as moving 
beyond - two theoretical approaches that so far have provided seemingly equivocal 
results. The discounting approach argues that perceptions of discrimination can 
sometimes protect psychological well-being by allowing targets to attribute negative 
personal treatment and outcomes (e.g., job-related rejection) externally (e.g., due to 
another’s prejudice) rather than internally (e.g., self-blame for lack of ability) 
(Crocker et al., 1991; Major et al., 2003a). Yet there is also ample support for the idea 
posited by Branscombe and colleagues that perceptions of discrimination are 
harmful for psychological well-being because they threaten part of the self, the 
group or social self (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt, Branscombe et al., 2002c). 
Prior research has considered moderators of these effects such as levels of 
identification or meritocracy beliefs (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003; Major, Kaiser, & 
O’Brien, 2007). In the presents dissertation I considered pervasiveness of 
discrimination as a moderator of these effects. 
Prior researchers have raised the idea that the extent to which 
discrimination is perceived to be pervasive and structural within society may 
determine the extent to which perceptions of discrimination are harmful for well-
being (Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt et al., 2003). These studies provided initial 
evidence suggesting that discrimination that is pervasive has more negative 
consequences for well-being than discrimination that is perceived as rare. In 
contrast to prior research I focus on discrimination that is not only contextually 




perspective in which one can expect to be discriminated against. This in our view 
more fully covers pervasiveness as a concept that permeates the lives of targets of 
discrimination, both in the present and in the future.  Importantly, the present 
dissertation advances prior work considering the role of pervasiveness of 
discrimination (i.e., Schmitt et al., 2003) by providing evidence that the extent to 
which discrimination is perceived as pervasive can instigate different underlying 
processes that can be either self-protective or harmful. Although pervasiveness has 
been suggested as a possible moderator in the past, no research so far has actually 
provided evidence that differential motivational processes underlie responses to 
subtle discrimination.  Some initial evidence for this idea is provided by Chapters 2 
and 3 which differ in the extent to which discrimination is experienced as pervasive, 
and in line with my predictions, show these differential effects on well-being. In 
Chapter 4 I more directly tested my predictions by manipulating pervasiveness of 
discrimination. This research indicates that discrimination that is perceived as rare 
and incidental can be relatively self-protective whereas perceiving discrimination as 
pervasive has negative consequences for well-being even if mean levels of 
attributions to discrimination remain the same. The studies conducted in Chapter 4 
therefore indicate that a situation that is entirely the same concerning the nature of 
prejudice the target experiences and the extent to which he/she makes attributions 
to prejudice, nevertheless can have very different consequences for well-being, 
depending on whether targets perceive the discrimination they experience to be rare 
or pervasive. I consider this even stronger evidence that indeed differential processes 
can underlie the same situation of discrimination. My research indicates that the 
processes proposed by these theoretical models are not mutually exclusive but 
depend on peoples’ perceptions of, in this case, the pervasiveness of discrimination.  
 
Ego- versus system-motivation 
Taking this research a step further, an important implication of the present 
dissertation lies in the type of motives that underlie responses to discrimination. In 
Chapter 4 I argued that prior research has largely considered responses to 
discrimination as ego-motivated. Ego-motivation refers to the idea that people’s 
actions are motivated by the desire to maintain a positive image of themselves (i.e., 
personal and group self) both in the present and the future (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). The theoretical ideas developed in the area of subtle 
discrimination are in line with an ego-motivated approach: The discounting model 





protect the self, similarly, the research conducted by Branscombe and colleagues 
focuses on the idea that peoples’ responses to discrimination are determined by the 
extent they pose a threat to part of one’s own identity, namely one’s identity as a 
group member (Branscombe et al, 1999). Indeed Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation 
took a more ego-motivated approach, showing that searching for more evidence of 
discrimination can be harmful to the self or that the nature of one’s personal 
outcomes – and the need to self protect from failure or enhance personal success – 
determine how people deal with group disadvantage and the extent to which they 
report group level injustice.  
Based on the research conducted in Chapter 4 of this dissertation I would 
like to suggest that responses to discrimination may not only be ego- but also 
system-motivated. System motivation refers to people’s need to see the world as a 
place that is based on principles of justice and equality in which people are treated 
fairly and get what they deserve. The perception of the world as fair and just is 
assumed by theories relating to equity and justice to play a fundamental role in 
human motivation (e.g., Lerner & Miller, 1978; Messick & Cook, 1983). For instance, 
research in the tradition of just world beliefs posits a fundamental “need to believe 
in a world where people generally get what they deserve” (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 
1030). This need is broader than one focused on immediate personal outcomes; 
rather, it represents a view on how the world (should) function. A wide range of 
events involving unjust treatment can threaten beliefs in a just world such as 
learning about victims of sexual assault, robbery or cancer (Hafer, 2000; Sherman, 
Smith, & Cooper, 1982-3). In the present dissertation (Chapter 4) I argued and 
provided evidence that incidents of discrimination that are perceived as rare can be 
protective of the individual self, whereas discrimination that is perceived as 
pervasive and therefore diagnostic of how society functions, may threaten people’s 
beliefs in the world as just. Therefore, responses to discrimination may be motivated 
not only by the concern to retain or affirm a positive view of the self (i.e., personal 
or social identity) but also by the concern to maintain a view of the world as just and 
fair.  
An important implication of the distinction between ego and system 
motivated processes lies in the possibility of differentiating situations that are more 
likely to raise ego or system motivated processes. As indicated by the studies 
conducted as part of the fourth chapter, instances of rare discrimination may induce 
more ego-motivated processes, and recurrent more system-motivated processes. 




that are more particularistic and not necessarily experienced as embedded within 
society. In the case of discrimination, this could be a situation in which the 
prejudice of another is seen as incidental. By contrast, system motivations are likely 
to arise in situations that are considered more systemic and institutional such as 
when discrimination is experienced as global and pervasive. This implies that 
responses to discrimination can be differentially activated depending on whether 
people are ego- or system-motivated, for example by making either ego- or system-
motivations salient. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
In Chapter 2 I considered how information search influences perceptions of 
discrimination, arguing that more evidence of discrimination increases perceptions 
of pervasiveness. An interesting avenue for future research is to reverse the direction 
of causality to study how perceptions of discrimination as pervasive influence 
information search, or at a more abstract level to consider the following question: 
Do individuals who perceive discrimination to be pervasive view their surroundings 
differently than those who perceive discrimination to be rare and incidental? Very 
little research in the area of subtle discrimination has focused on the types of 
comparisons individuals make in order to judge the causes of their personal 
treatment when it is unclear whether this treatment is due to personal ability or 
group membership. Research in the area of relative deprivation provides indications 
that individuals become aware of the deprivation and disadvantaged position of their 
group by making more intergroup social comparisons (see Walker & Smith, 2002 for 
an overview). Although I think a focus on intergroup social comparisons may in 
many cases explain why some individuals (i.e., those high in stigma sensitivity) 
perceive more discrimination than others, it may not necessarily explain differences 
in the types of judgments those who perceive discrimination to be chronic versus 
incidental make. Indeed if differences in social comparisons would explain 
differences in responses to pervasive versus rare discrimination, one would expect 
individuals who perceive discrimination to be pervasive also to make more 
attributions to discrimination. Yet the studies conducted in Chapters 2 and 4 all 
provide evidence that the extent to which discrimination is perceived as pervasive 
need not necessarily be coupled with a greater awareness of (i.e., attributions to) 
discrimination. In essence, pervasive discrimination communicates ‘remaining 
rather than being in a disadvantageous position’. This may imply that in addition to 





consider the kinds of temporal comparisons those who perceive discrimination to be 
pervasive make.  Temporal comparisons may occur both with respect to the past and 
the future, and they may be essential in determining how individuals respond to 
situations in which they are the target of discrimination. I suggest that different 
perspectives of targets of discrimination (i.e., prior experience of discrimination as 
rare or pervasive) may determine the types of comparisons targets make in judging 
situations of discrimination that are ambiguous. Possibly those that perceive 
discrimination to be pervasive are more focused on the past and future whereas 
individuals who perceive discrimination to be incidental focus more directly on the 
context at hand, making only within context social evaluations and comparisons.  
Moving from perceptions of to responses to discrimination, the distinction 
between ego and system motivated responses introduced in Chapter 4 provides a 
number of interesting avenues for future research. Although I discussed situations of 
discrimination that may be more likely to induce ego versus system motivated 
responses, more empirical work is needed to fully conceptualize these motivations. I 
touch on some issues relevant to this dissertation in the following paragraphs. 
In this dissertation I defined ego-motivation as the need to have a positive 
view of oneself and the group one is a member of. Yet in my work the focus so far 
has largely been on the extent to which attributions to discrimination allow 
individuals to retain a positive view of the self by attributing personal failure more 
externally, to the prejudice of another. In Chapter 2 I do touch on another type of 
ego-motivation, the need to protect one’s social identity and view of one’s group. 
Indeed research in line with the rejection identification model provides ample 
evidence that discrimination can threaten people’s social identity thus inducing 
negative well-being in response to discrimination (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Schmitt et al., 2002c). Although in some cases the negative well-being group 
members experience after feeling threatened in their social identity may be due to a 
more abstract threat at the system level, social identity threat should not be equated 
with a system motivation. I here, for ease of reference, refer to this social identity 
threat as group-motivation (see also Jost & Burgess, 2000) but consider it part of an 
ego-motivated process. People are more likely to be ‘group motivated’ when the 
group is a central part of themselves (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003; Major et al., 
2003b). Indeed, research indicates that those who identify highly with their group 
suffer more from discrimination than low identifiers for whom discrimination can 
self-protect from failure (i.e., ego-motivation) (McCoy & Major, 2003). I think the 







recognized but not considered integrally or conceptualized as ego-motivated in the 
past) and system motivation are an important step in providing a more integral 
theoretical model of individuals (motivated) responses to subtle discrimination. 
With the present basis I can start considering questions such as the following: 
How can we determine which motivation will be induced in response to 
discrimination? From the perspective of subtle discrimination this is an important 
question because it can provide a more integral framework to determine under 
which circumstances individuals are relatively likely to be more threatened at the 
personal, group or system level. Although there is a lot of evidence that these 
processes are taking place, and even know factors that may induce these processes, 
the area lacks an integral model considering determinants of these processes. An 
important first step may be to consider how these motivations relate to on another. 
Research in the area of system legitimizing beliefs provides indications that 
motivations at different levels of abstraction may be in conflict with each other. Jost 
and Burgess (2000) studied conflicts between the group and the system and revealed 
that members of low status groups, but not those of high status groups, who 
witnessed discrimination against their ingroup reported more ambivalence with 
respect to their ingroup the higher their need to legitimize the system. The process 
underlying this ambivalence were reasoned to be a conflict between the need to 
maintain a positive view of one’s group and the need to perceive the system as just 
and therefore to view the low status of one’s group as justified. Concerning the 
relative strengths of ego, group or system motivations, my research provides some 
indications that system motivations may overrule ego-motivation: When people 
experience personal failure, the need to avert the negative consequences of personal 
failure (i.e., ego-motivation) is overruled by threats to the world as just (i.e., system 
motivation) – in other words, attributions to discrimination only self protect from 
failure when people’s worldviews are not threatened. In order to provide a more 
integral model of how targets of discrimination respond to subtle discrimination I 
believe it is important to focus on the interplay between these motivations, and to 
further study the processes underlying them. In my research an important step in 
doing so has been to consider the processes underlying system motivated responses 
by considering the role of pervasiveness in responses to discrimination. 
One of the most important contributions of this dissertation was the finding 
that people can be made resilient to the experience of pervasive discrimination: 
Affirming the world as just can counter the negative consequences of pervasive and 





processes, it also raises a number of questions with regard to how system affirmation 
actually worked. My research indicates that being able to affirm the world as just in 
the face of pervasive discrimination reduces the extent to which individuals feel 
they lack self efficacy or experience negative self-directed emotions such as 
depression. At the same time targets still report anger with respect to the 
discrimination they experience. In considering more in depth the mechanisms 
underlying these findings, I reasoned that being able to affirm the world as just 
might turn the experience of pervasive discrimination from being a threat into a 
challenge. Challenge occurs when individuals have sufficient resources to meet the 
demands of a situation, whereas threat occurs when individuals cannot (i.e., have 
insufficient resources) meet the demands of the situation (Blascovich & Tomaka, 
1996). This type of response is difficult to establish via self-reports, but has 
frequently been studied with the aid of physiological measures (e.g., Blascovich, 
Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Indeed, there is 
even evidence revealing that people with high individually held beliefs that the 
world is just, in this case high just world beliefs, appraise stressful tasks as more 
challenging than low believers (Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994). Although it is 
important to distinguish individually held beliefs (in situations of discrimination, see 
Major, Kaiser, & O’Brien, 2007) from the contextual affirmation I want to study, this 
research provides initial indications that peoples’ views of the world may be related 
to appraisals of threat and challenge. The use of physiological measures would make 
it possible to test whether, as I predict, it is possible to transform a threat response in 
the face of pervasive discrimination into a challenge response by affirming the world 
as just.  
At a more abstract level, an important avenue for future research lies in 
understanding the processes determining system motivated responses. The research 
conducted in this dissertation (Study 4.2) provides indications that discrimination 
that is perceived as pervasive threatens individuals because this type of 
discrimination is inconsistent with people’s need to see the world as a just place. In 
line with dissonance theory, there is reason to believe that individuals may have the 
need to solve this inconsistency between their worldviews and pervasive 
discrimination (Festinger, 1957). One way of doing so, I have argued, is to reaffirm 
the world as just – thus creating resilience with respect to pervasive discrimination. 
Yet, drawing a parallel to dissonance theory, another way of doing so may in the 
long run be to adjust ones worldviews to encompass pervasive discrimination. 




consistent with people’s worldview (i.e., low belief in meritocracy), this actually 
induces higher levels of well-being (Major et al., 2007). I believe it is important to 
distinguish between short and long term threats to one’s worldviews and to consider 
what happens to individuals whose beliefs in the world as just are threatened on a 
daily basis. Indeed, whereas research in the area of just world beliefs indicates that 
in the short term individuals are motivated to re-establish the world as just, we 
know very little about the long-term consequences of having one’s worldviews 
threatened on a daily basis. It is possible that people who experience pervasive and 
structural discrimination, in the long run adjust their worldviews to accommodate 
the experience of discrimination. In other words, from challenging the system 
individuals may move to acquiescence in which they accept the world (and thus 
discrimination) as it is. One implication of this ‘acquiescence’ is that individuals are 
unlikely to address discrimination, let alone engage in collective action to counter 
group devaluation. 
A first step in considering how individuals respond to long term daily 
threats to system beliefs (via pervasive discrimination) would be to study whether 
those who perceive themselves to be structurally discriminated against have 
different worldviews (i.e., lower beliefs in a just world) than those who incidentally 
experience discrimination.  At a more abstract level, I would argue future research 
should consider circumstances that induce resilience versus acquiescence with 
respect to discrimination. 
 
Practical implications 
The example of the African American post office attendant who felt his 
client reacted aggressively to his jokes because of his ethnicity at the beginning of 
this dissertation described one incident of discrimination; unfortunately this type of 
experience may be part of the daily life of many members of stigmatized groups. The 
present dissertation does not provide answers with respect to how to prevent 
discrimination, or how to address it when it does occur. Yet looking at how targets 
recognize and cope with discrimination, as has been the focus of this dissertation, 
can provide indications on how to give members of stigmatized groups the 
possibility of becoming more aware of, coping with and possibly increasing the 
ability to address discrimination. 
Not all members of stigmatized groups may be as likely to make attributions 
to discrimination as the post office attendant. How can we ensure that targets of 





individual characteristics to attributing treatment to the prejudice of another1? 
Throughout this dissertation it has become clear that individuals are very focused on 
their personal outcomes, even in the face of group disadvantage. At the same time 
the present dissertation reveals that even when individuals are very focused on their 
personal outcomes and, in first instance, have no cues regarding possible group 
disadvantage they nevertheless can search for and process information containing 
evidence of group disadvantage. This means that individuals potentially should be 
able to recognize when and whether ambiguous situations can be attributed to 
discrimination. Yet in order to realize that the self and other group members are 
being disadvantaged on the basis of group membership, it is very important that this 
information about treatment of other group members is available. In the present 
research (Chapter 2) individuals sought information and recognized discrimination 
on the basis of aggregate information about the treatment of other ingroup and 
outgroup members. Prior research reveals that it is essential for individuals to have 
aggregate information, in fact when provided with piecemeal information (i.e., 
treatment of separate cases of males or females) individuals are unlikely to perceive 
discrimination (e.g., Crosby et al., 1986). Yet aggregate information may not always 
be available. For example at an organizational level it would require publishing 
salary information of men versus women or White versus African American 
employees. From the perspective of creating awareness of discrimination, it may be 
very important to encourage organizations to publish this kind of data. Beyond 
merely publishing, this data needs to be easily accessible to individuals. My research 
(Chapter 2) indicates that individuals are likely to process information about 
personal outcomes, but they may be less likely to do so once this information 
processing becomes too effortful or does not seem personally relevant enough. Even 
if Chapter 2 indicates that individuals are able to perceive discrimination when they 
are less motivated to search for information (and engage in less information search), 
information was easily available in the paradigm I employed. This may mean that 
individuals who are not motivated to search for information may not even attempt 
to access information that is not readily at hand.  
In sum if we consider how members of stigmatized groups can be aided in 
becoming more aware of discrimination that is very subtle it is important that 
information be provided, for example at an organizational level, about the relative 
treatment of ingroup and outgroup members. Furthermore, this information needs 
to be provided in aggregate form and should be easily accessible to individuals. 




discrimination may have very negative consequences for individuals’ psychological 
well-being, in the long run awareness of discrimination is essential in addressing this 
injustice. 
The present dissertation has a number of implications with respect to 
helping individuals to cope with knowledge of the disadvantaged status of their 
group in general and personal discrimination in particular. For one, it makes very 
clear that targets’ perceptions of group disadvantage and personal discrimination 
may differ. When targets experience the disadvantaged position of their group or the 
prejudice of another as something that is pervasive and likely to affect them again in 
the future, this has far more negative consequences for well-being than 
discrimination that is perceived as a one-off incident (which it may not necessarily 
be). Furthermore the fact that pervasive discrimination threatens people’s beliefs in 
the world as just ultimately may have more far-reaching consequences with respect 
to individuals’ attitudes towards society. As outlined in early work by Lerner and 
Miller (1978), without a belief in the just world it “would be difficult for the 
individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long-range goals or even to the 
socially regulated behaviour of day-to-day life” (p. 1030). Translating this back to 
members of chronically stigmatized groups, one might expect chronic 
discrimination to, in the long run, induce societal disengagement as people come to 
believe that whatever they do, society is unlikely to treat them on the basis of 
fairness and equality. This could become a vicious circle, as the less members of 
stigmatized groups conform to societal norms, the more likely they are to be treated 
negatively or even discriminated against. This has implications within society when 
one considers the fact that for some low status groups or group members 
discrimination may be (experienced as) more chronic than for others. It means that 
some groups may not only suffer more discrimination, they may also suffer more 
from discrimination. Therefore it is important to pinpoint which groups or group 
members within society are most likely to experience discrimination as pervasive 
and to make sure the possible ways of coping with group disadvantage that I outline 
below are focused on these groups or group members.  
The present dissertation suggests one concrete intervention that may help 
individuals cope with (pervasive) discrimination: Buffering targets from the 
experience of pervasive discrimination by (re-)affirming the world as just (see 
Chapter 4). Indeed, my research indicates that this type of affirmation counters the 
threat posed to beliefs in the world as just by pervasive discrimination. Although 





occur in a different domain than the one in which discrimination is experienced. For 
members of stigmatized groups this may mean creating environments in which they 
see that people (and they themselves) are treated on the basis of fairness and 
equality. 
The consequence of this affirmation, as also discussed in prior sections, may 
be that individuals experience lower levels of emotions associated with passivity 
(i.e., depressed affect) while nevertheless experiencing relatively high levels of 
emotions associated with action orientation (i.e., anger). In other words, from the 
perspective of the individual target, affirming the world as just may provide 
(temporary) relief from the experience of discrimination while nevertheless, given 
action oriented emotions such as anger, inducing a readiness to possibly address this 
personal injustice. This may be essential in preventing victims of structural 
discrimination from disengaging themselves from society. But, it is important to be 
aware of the fact that this intervention although providing short term relief, may 
have a number of long term drawbacks. For one, one cannot be sure to what extent 
affirmation of the world as just works in the long run. Can the experience of daily 
societal level injustice be countered by the experience of a just world and just 
procedures in other domains? And to what extent is this affirmation advantageous if 
one considers the collective interest of the group? As discussed above, it may be the 
case that people who generally see the world as just are less likely to perceive unjust 
procedures such as societal discrimination. Therefore, whereas affirmation may 
make individuals feel better, it may actually harm, or at least not improve, the 
position of the group.  
Focusing on further practical implications concerning how targets can cope 
with the disadvantaged status of their group, the present dissertation stresses the 
importance of creating opportunities for members of disadvantaged groups. 
Throughout this dissertation it has become evident that even in the face of group 
disadvantage individuals are very focused on their personal outcomes. The research 
presented in this dissertation reveals that those who experience personal success 
suffer less from the disadvantage of their group – even when this disadvantage is 
perceived to be fairly pervasive (see Chapter 2). At a more abstract level this means 
that individuals are able to think at different levels, at the personal (or individual) 
level with respect to their personal outcomes, at the group level with respect to the 
disadvantage of their group. With this knowledge in mind I would like to stress the 
importance of emphasizing opportunities for personal success as well as success 




feeling that they can be successful, and making salient success experiences of other 
group members, may release group members from the debilitating feeling of being a 
member of a disadvantaged and stigmatized group with little personal opportunities. 
This can be done in different ways, by emphasizing domains in which members of 
devalued groups are successful2 (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2006), by providing 
more opportunities for success (e.g., addressing scarcity of work experience places 
specifically for members of low status groups such as Moroccans in the Netherlands) 
and by ‘creating’ role models (e.g., women/ethnic minority members in top 
positions). Knowledge of individual level success can help live with, or perhaps even 
counter3, being a member of a disadvantaged group.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The research presented in this dissertation aimed to provide more insights 
into how members of devalued groups cope with situations in which is unclear to 
them whether they are being treated on the basis of their individual characteristics 
and behaviours or on the basis of their devalued group membership. On the on hand 
I have shown that in settings that are very individualistic, group members do not 
necessarily suffer from the plight of their group, in fact information about group 
devaluation or personal discrimination may even help to (positively) interpret 
personal outcomes. On the other hand this dissertation provides evidence that when 
individuals view substantial evidence of discrimination against other group 
members, or expect to experience considerable prejudice in the future they suffer 
from the experience of personal discrimination. This dissertation contributes to prior 
work in the area of subtle discrimination by providing more insight into the 
motivational processes underlying these responses to discrimination. Furthermore, 
the focus of this dissertation on discrimination that is not only ego-motivated but at 
a more abstract level, also motivated by the need to maintain a view of the world as 







1. Although from the perspective of individual targets of discrimination perceiving a 
situation to be due to discrimination may not always be desirable because it, among 
others, induces negative psychological well-being, from the perspective of 
addressing collective injustice it is important that targets recognize and report 
discrimination within society.  
2. Note that this research stresses the importance of also valuing domains in which 
high status groups are successful, otherwise members of low status groups may 
disengage from these domains. 
3. From the perspective of addressing collective injustice, research indicates that 
those who achieve successful positions (i.e., tokens) are unlikely to help other more 
disadvantaged members of their groups (e.g., Ellemers, Heuvel, Gilder, Maass, & 
Bonvini, 2004). On the other hand, once more members of disadvantaged groups 
achieve successful positions, this may change the (negative) image that high status 
members may have with respect to these groups – thus ultimately decreasing the 
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Voor leden van gediscrimineerde groepen kan het onduidelijk zijn of de 
(negatieve) behandeling die zij ervaren het gevolg is van, bijvoorbeeld, gebrek aan 
eigen kwaliteiten of het vooroordeel van een ander. Stel je voor dat je Marokkaans 
bent en je hebt gesolliciteerd op een baan waar je jezelf geschikt voor acht. 
Vervolgens hoor je dat je bent afgewezen. Maar waarom? Hoe weet je zeker dat je 
bent afgewezen doordat je niet de juiste kwaliteiten had voor deze baan? Het zou 
immers ook kunnen dat je het slachtoffer bent van discriminatie en vooroordelen. 
Wat zouden de gevolgen zijn van deze verschillende attributies (ik mis de juiste 
kwaliteiten versus ik ben gediscrimineerd) voor hoe je je over jezelf voelt? Deze 
staat van attributionele ambiguïteit  met betrekking tot de oorzaken van eigen 
uitkomsten kan zowel de herkenning van discriminatie, als ook de gevolgen voor 
psychologisch welzijn beïnvloeden. Hoe dit precies in zijn werk gaat heb ik in dit 
proefschrift bestudeerd. 
 
De herkenning van discriminatie 
Hoewel veel eerder onderzoek (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; 
Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003) de 
gevolgen van discriminatie voor welzijn heeft bestudeerd, weten we vrij weinig over 
de omstandigheden waaronder slachtoffers discriminatie herkennen. Veel gevallen 
van discriminatie betreffen situaties waarin personen individueel geëvalueerd 
worden - zoals bij een sollicitatie – en slachtoffers van discriminatie kunnen 
daardoor zeer op zichzelf en hun eigen gebreken gericht zijn. Zoals ik in dit 
proefschrift beargumenteer is het om discriminatie te herkennen nodig dat 
slachtoffers kunnen overschakelen van een focus puur op zichzelf (zoals op de eigen 
persoonlijkheid en gebreken; individual level focus) naar een focus op hun 
lidmaatschap van een (mogelijk gediscrimineerde) groep (group level focus). Eerder 
onderzoek toont aan dat slachtoffers discriminatie vaak niet herkennen door 
gebrekkige informatie voorziening (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986; 
Rutte, Diekmann, Polzer, Crosby, & Messick, 1994). Slachtoffers hebben veelal 
alleen informatie over individuele gevallen van discriminatie (bijv., zichzelf). Zo kan 
een vrouw het salaris van zichzelf en een naaste vrouwelijke collega weten. Hoe 
komt deze vrouw erachter dat vrouwen in haar bedrijf structureel minder loon 
ontvangen dan mannen in vergelijkbare posities? Herkenning van discriminatie 
vereist juist dat men van een groter aantal groepsleden weet dat zij eveneens anders 
behandeld zijn dan leden van een niet-gediscrimineerde groep. Met andere 
 
 
woorden, de vrouw in bovenstaand voorbeeld moet haar loon kunnen vergelijken 
met dat van andere vrouwen en mannen in vergelijkbare posities. Deze informatie is 
uiteraard niet altijd beschikbaar, en de herkenning van discriminatie vereist dan ook 
vaak dat men op zoek gaat naar aanvullende informatie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift heb ik een informatie-zoekparadigma 
ontwikkeld om te bestuderen in hoeverre slachtoffers op zoek te gaan naar 
aanvullende informatie over mogelijke discriminatie. Ik keek naar discriminatie bij 
selectieprocedures. Stel je bent afgewezen voor een baan die je zeer belangrijk vindt. 
De kans is groot dat je gaat nadenken over je eigen (gebrek aan) vaardigheden. Maar 
ga je ook kijken naar hoe anderen het hebben gedaan, en zo ja, maak je een 
onderscheid in of het gaat om, bijvoorbeeld, mannen versus vrouwen? In mijn 
onderzoek zocht ik antwoord op deze vragen. Ik wilde weten in hoeverre vrouwen 
die net door een mannelijke interviewer zijn afgewezen (of aangenomen) voor een 
baan gemotiveerd zijn/kunnen worden om actief naar informatie te zoeken die meer 
inzicht kan geven in de oorzaak van deze afwijzing. Ik varieerde de mate waarin de 
uitkomst van de sollicitatie relevant (hoog/laag) was voor deze vrouwen. Hierdoor 
kon ik bestuderen of vrouwelijke proefpersonen, wanneer ze sterk op zichzelf 
gericht zijn (hoge zelf relevantie van uitkomsten), op zoek gaan naar aanvullende 
informatie over hun uitkomsten, en ondanks hun focus op zichzelf in staat zijn om 
te herkennen dat ze op basis van hun vrouw-zijn anders behandeld zijn.  
De aanvullende informatie die vrouwen konden bekijken gaf informatie 
over hoe andere mannen en vrouwen het in dezelfde sollicitatieprocedure hadden 
gedaan. Als je de informatie bekeek kon je zien dat veel mannen zijn aangenomen, 
terwijl andere vrouwen, ondanks gelijke geschiktheid, juist afgewezen waren. Mijn 
onderzoek laat zien dat vrouwen gemotiveerd zijn om aanvullende informatie over 
eigen uitkomsten te zoeken, juist als uitkomsten (zowel positieve als negatieve) zeer 
zelf-relevant zijn. Hoewel je dus zou kunnen denken dat wanneer vrouwen zeer op 
zichzelf gefocused zijn ze juist niet openstaan voor informatie in hun omgeving en 
daardoor niet herkennen dat ze gediscrimineerd zijn, laat mijn onderzoek het 
tegendeel zien. Bovendien kunnen slachtoffers overschakelen van een gerichtheid 
op het persoonlijke zelf naar een focus op hun groepslidmaatschap: Beide studies 
lieten zien dat slachtoffers herkennen dat ze gediscrimineerd zijn (studies 2.1/2.2). 
Het is trouwens niet zo dat ze in het wilde weg aantijgingen van discriminatie 
zouden maken, ze rapporteerden alleen dat ze gediscrimineerd waren als de 
aanvullende informatie daadwerkelijk evidentie gaf voor discriminatie (studie 2.2). 
Ik vind geen bewijs voor het gangbare idee dat leden van lage status groepen 






Gemotiveerde reacties op discriminatie? 
Hoe voel je je als je erachter komt dat je bent afgewezen omdat je een 
vrouw of een Marokkaan bent? In alle hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift heb ik 
bestudeerd wat voor gevolgen de ervaring van discriminatie heeft voor het 
psychologisch welzijn van een slachtoffer. Eerder onderzoek laat zien dat het 
toeschrijven van een negatieve uitkomst aan discriminatie zeer onprettig kan zijn 
omdat je beseft dat je lid bent van een gedevalueerde groep, bijvoorbeeld de groep 
vrouwen. Ook wordt duidelijk dat dit groepslidmaatschap negatieve implicaties voor 
de eigen toekomst heeft – een keer afgewezen worden omdat je een vrouw bent 
belooft immers niet veel goeds voor de toekomst (Branscombe et al., 1999). Maar, 
aan de andere kant, het eigen falen aan discriminatie kunnen toeschrijven betekent 
wel dat een slachtoffer de schuld voor falen niet alleen bij zichzelf (bijv. gebrek aan 
eigen vaardigheden) hoeft te leggen. In plaats daarvan kan het slachtoffer immers 
iets anders, om precies te zijn het vooroordeel van de ander, de schuld te geven voor 
de eigen afwijzing (Crocker, & Major, 1989). Met andere woorden: ontdekken dat je 
gediscrimineerd bent kan prettig zijn omdat je niet aan jezelf of je eigen kunnen 
hoeft te twijfelen. In dit geval is het toeschrijven van een uitkomst aan discriminatie 
zelfbeschermend voor het welzijn van het slachtoffer. 
 Er is vrij veel empirische steun voor beide benaderingen. Maar wanneer is 
het toeschrijven van een uitkomst aan discriminatie daadwerkelijk schadelijk of 
zelfbeschermend voor het welzijn van slachtoffers? In het huidige proefschrift geef 
ik inzicht in deze vraag door de processen te bestuderen die ten grondslag kunnen 
liggen aan deze tegenstrijdige resultaten. Ik laat zien dat discriminatie voornamelijk 
zelfbeschermend is als het als incidenteel gezien wordt, terwijl het besef dat 
discriminatie aanhoudend kan zijn en ook in de toekomst vaak zal plaatsvinden 
negatieve gevolgen heeft voor hoe je je voelt (hoofdstuk 2 en 4). Met andere 
woorden, als je afgewezen wordt voor een baan dan kan het prettig zijn om deze 
afwijzing toe te schrijven aan discriminatie in plaats van aan jezelf wanneer je denkt 
dat deze negatieve uitkomst incidenteel is. Maar als je verwacht dat je in de 
toekomst ook vaak afgewezen gaat worden, niet omdat je niet geschikt bent voor 
een baan, maar vanwege het feit dat je bijvoorbeeld een vrouw bent, zul je je een 
stuk minder goed voelen wanneer je de uitkomst toeschrijft aan discriminatie.  
Op basis van het onderzoek in dit proefschrift geef ik bovendien een 
uitbreiding van eerdere theoretische benaderingen in dit vakgebied door niet alleen 
een mogelijke moderator (aanhoudendheid van discriminatie) van dit proces te 
bestuderen maar ook door dieper in te gaan op motivaties de ten grondslag liggen 
aan reacties op discriminatie. Hieronder behandel ik eerst de mogelijke motivaties 





‘Eigen lijden’ of lijden onder het lot van een benadeelde groep? 
Waar richten mensen zich eigenlijk op als ze gediscrimineerd worden? 
Denk je aan jezelf en de implicaties van deze gebeurtenis voor jezelf (personal 
interest), of denk je ook na over het lot van je groep, het feit dat veel andere 
groepsleden eveneens negatief behandeld worden (group interest)? En hoe zit het als 
je zelf succesvol bent maar weet dat andere groepsleden benadeeld worden. Hoe 
voelt het bijvoorbeeld om Bill Cosby of rapper Ali B te zijn – succesvol maar lid van 
een benadeelde groep? Deze vragen heb ik in hoofdstuk 3 bestudeerd. Ik vond 
weinig bewijs dat succesvolle of benadeelde leden van een gestigmatiseerde groep 
lijden onder het lot van de rest van de groep. In dit onderzoek bekeek ik hoe 
succesvole of niet succesvolle vrouwen zich voelden als ze wisten dat ook andere 
groepsleden (vrouwen) benadeeld en gediscrimineerd waren. Mijn vrouwelijke 
proefpersonen bleken voornamelijk bezig met hun eigen uitkomsten (personal 
interest verklaring): Als vrouwelijke proefpersonen informatie hadden over de 
benadeling van andere vrouwen voelden ze zich juist beter over zowel hun 
persoonlijk succes (ik deed het beter dan andere vrouwen) als over hun persoonlijk 
falen (het ligt niet aan mij maar aan mijn vrouw-zijn dat ik afgewezen ben). Extra 
ondersteuning voor deze personal interest verklaring was dat als ik vrouwen vroeg 
of ze de benadeling van andere vrouwen (los van hun eigen behandeling) illegitiem 
vonden, ze hier alleen bevestigend op antwoordden als ze zelf ook benadeeld waren 
(m.a.w. zelf negatieve uitkomsten bereikten). Bovenop het feit dat vrouwen niet 
leden onder het lot van andere vrouwen, waren ze ook alleen in staat om dit ‘lot’ als 
illegitiem waar te nemen als ze zelf ook nadelig behandeld waren – ze profiteren 
ervan omdat ze zichzelf geen schuld meer hoeven geven voor eigen falen, en hun 
eigen succes kunnen spiegelen tegen het falen van andere leden van de groep. 
 
Wanneer is een attributie aan discriminatie zelfbeschermend of schadelijk voor 
persoonlijk welzijn? 
Betekent dit dat mensen nooit lijden onder de benadeling van hun groep en 
in feite altijd profiteren als andere groepsleden benadeeld worden? Er zijn genoeg 
voorbeelden uit de praktijk die deze constatering niet aannemelijk maken. Ook het 
huidige proefschrift biedt evidentie dat mensen wel degelijk lijden onder 
discriminatie. In tegenstelling tot onze bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3, laat hoofdstuk 2 
juist zien dat vrouwen zich minder goed voelden als ze veel informatie over de 
benadeling van hun groep (vrouwen) hadden gezocht, en ze zelf ook benadeeld 
waren als gevolg van discriminatie. Hoe kunnen we deze verschillende resultaten 
verklaren? Hoofdstuk 4 biedt uitkomst op deze vraag. Hier bekijk ik de rol van 





afwijzing voor een baan kan toeschrijven aan discriminatie, wetende dat het 
onwaarschijnlijk is dat men in de toekomst gediscrimineerd gaat worden, dan heeft 
deze attributie het voordeel dat men zichzelf niet de schuld voor afwijzing hoeft te 
geven, en ook niet bang hoeft te zijn voor de verdere gevolgen van discriminatie. Als 
men aan de andere kant de afwijzing aan discriminatie toeschrijft, wetende dat men 
ook in de toekomst negatieve uitkomsten zal ervaren zonder dat naar eigen kunnen 
gekeken wordt, dan is de kans dat deze attributie zelfbeschermend is een stuk 
kleiner. Dit is inderdaad wat ik vond in hoofdstuk 4. Ik varieerde in hoeverre 
slachtoffers dezelfde situatie van discriminatie (vrouwen worden door een man 
afgewezen voor een baan) als incidenteel of als aanhoudend waarnamen. In twee 
studies liet ik zien dat als vrouwen hun afwijzing als eenmalig en incidenteel 
ervoeren, ze zich beter voelden als ze een afwijzing aan discriminatie konden 
toeschrijven. Als vrouwen echter het idee hadden dat zij ook in de toekomst 
gediscrimineerd zouden kunnen worden, voelden ze zich slechter als ze hun 
afwijzing aan discriminatie in plaats van eigen falen toeschreven. In dit geval is een 
attributie aan discriminatie dus schadelijk voor welzijn. Deze twee studies laten zien 
dat als we willen weten in hoeverre discriminatie zelfbeschermend of schadelijk 
voor welzijn is, het van belang is om te kijken of het slachtoffer zijn discriminatie als 
aanhoudend en structureel waarneemt. Als je dit in de praktijk toepast zie je helaas 
veel groepen waarbij dit het wel het geval is.  
 
Gemotiveerde reacties op discriminatie: ego- of systeem- motivatie 
In hoofdstuk 4 wilde ik verder uitdiepen waarom slachtoffers lijden 
wanneer ze discriminatie als aanhoudend ervaren. Eerder heb ik aangestipt dat 
mensen nogal egoïstisch lijken te reageren op discriminatie: ze lijden er alleen onder 
wanneer ze zelf gediscrimineerd zijn en schijnen zich niet veel van het lot van hun 
groep aan te trekken. Als je deze ‘egoïstische’ redenering doortrekt naar de vraag 
waarom mensen lijden onder aanhoudende discriminatie dan zou je voorspellen dat 
het komt doordat het negatieve implicaties voor hun toekomst heeft: hoe goed je 
ook bent, je wordt toch niet aangenomen. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat er ook 
andere redenen zijn waarom slachtoffers lijden onder aanhoudende discriminatie: 
Hoe mensen op discriminatie reageren heeft niet alleen te maken met een ‘ego’ focus 
op (bescherming) tegen eigen falen of het besef dat men gedevalueerd wordt op basis 
van groepslidmaatschap. Discriminatie is ook op een minder zelf-relevante manier 
(m.a.w. niet direct aan het zelf of groepslidmaatschap gekoppeld) van invloed op 
welzijn – omdat het bedreigend is voor hoe slachtoffers denken dat de wereld in 
elkaar zit. 
Onderzoek toont aan dat mensen een sterke basisbehoefte hebben om





uitgaat dat mensen over het geheel genomen rechtvaardig behandeld worden en 
krijgen waar ze recht op hebben (Lerner & Simmons, 1966; see Hafer & Bègue, 2005, 
and Lerner & Miller, 1978, voor reviews). Mensen hebben bepaalde verwachtingen 
binnen deze samenleving: Als je hard werkt krijg je hier erkenning voor, als je 
aardig en behulpzaam bent dan zijn anderen dat ook voor jou. Maar wat als je 
dagelijks ervaart dat deze veronderstellingen niet kloppen? De behoefte om de 
wereld als eerlijk en rechtvaardig te zien gaat zo ver dat mensen bereid zijn om 
onschuldige slachtoffers de schuld te geven, als het dit wereldbeeld beschermt. 
Onderzoek toont bijvoorbeeld aan dat proefpersonen slachtoffers van verkrachting 
de schuld voor hun verkrachting gaven omdat een dergelijke verkrachting anders 
hun wereldbeeld bedreigde (Jones & Aronson, 1973).  
Ik redeneerde dat het ervaren van discriminatie die men als aanhoudend, en 
dus als onderdeel van deze samenleving ziet, een bedreiging vormt voor het 
wereldbeeld van slachtoffers. Immers, aanhoudende discriminatie geeft in feite aan 
dat jij en andere medegroepsleden systematisch (nu en in de toekomst) oneerlijk en 
onrechtvaardig behandeld worden. Discriminatie zou dus voornamelijk het 
wereldbeeld van slachtoffers moeten bedreigen wanneer het als aanhoudend (en dus 
diagnostisch voor deze wereld): in plaats van als incidenteel gezien wordt. Ik heb al 
uitgelegd dat discriminatie negatieve gevolgen heeft voor welzijn als het als 
aanhoudend ervaren wordt. Als dit komt doordat het wereldbeeld van mensen 
bedreigd wordt, wat gebeurt er dan als we mensen ‘verzekeren’ dat hun wereldbeeld 
wel klopt? Stel je voor je bent net heel onredelijk tegen een student geweest en 
twijfelt of je beeld van jezelf als lief en aardig persoon wel klopt. Als je op dat 
moment een collega kan helpen (en dat ook doet) en deze heel dankbaar is dan kan 
dat je beeld van jezelf als lief en aardig weer herstellen (zie ook Steele, 1988).  
Hetzelfde principe voorspelde ik in deze studie. Als je je slecht voelt omdat 
aanhoudende discriminatie je wereldbeeld bedreigt dan zou een actie die je 
wereldbeeld herstelt ervoor moeten zorgen dat je je minder slecht voelt. Dat is 
precies wat ik in studie 4.2 ook vond.  
Dit hoofdstuk biedt dus vernieuwende theoretische inzichten. Aan de ene 
kant omdat het conflicterende theorieën op het gebied van discriminatie integreert 
door inzicht te bieden in wanneer discriminatie zelfbeschermend of schadelijk voor 
slachtoffers is. Aan de andere kant doordat het dieper ingaat op de verschillende 
krachten die reacties op discriminatie kunnen beïnvloeden: Reacties die meer op het 
zelf en bescherming tegen eigen falen (ego-gemotiveerd) gericht zijn versus, op 
abstracter niveau, gericht op het behoud van een beeld van de wereld als eerlijk en 






Een paar praktische implicaties 
Maar wat kunnen we in de praktijk met deze kennis? Hier ga ik in 
hoofdstuk 5 uitgebreid op in; voor nu zal ik een paar belangrijke implicaties 
aanstippen. Het feit dat discriminatie die als structureel en aanhoudend ervaren 
wordt niet alleen negatieve gevolgen voor psychologisch welzijn van slachtoffers 
heeft omdat het hun toekomstige middelen (e.g., het verkrijgen van een baan) 
bedreigt maar ook omdat het invloed heeft op de basale behoefte van mensen om de 
wereld als eerlijk en rechtvaardig te kunnen zien heeft verregaande praktische 
implicaties. Wanneer men structureel oneerlijk behandeld wordt, zo laat mijn 
onderzoek zien, is het moeilijk om de wereld nog als eerlijk en rechtvaardig te 
blijven zien. Zoals Lerner en Miller (1978) zeer treffend beschrijven, wanneer we de 
wereld niet meer als eerlijk en rechtvaardig waarnemen dan “zou het moeilijk zijn 
voor individuen om zich te committeren aan het navolgen van lange-termijn doelen 
of zelfs aan het sociaal gereguleerde gedrag van het dagelijkse leven” (p.1030). 
Immers, als je weet dat je toch in deze samenleving niet krijgt waar je recht op hebt 
en op dagelijkse basis onrechtvaardig behandeld wordt, waarom zou je dan nog je 
best doen, en sterker nog, waarom zou je je nog willen houden aan de regels van 
deze samenleving? Met andere woorden, op de lange termijn kan het ervaren van 
structurele discriminatie leiden tot terugtrekking uit de samenleving – iets wat we in 
bepaalde groeperingen al zien. Helaas kan dit leiden tot een vicieuze cirkel, immers, 
des te minder leden van gestigmatiseerde groepen zich aan sociale normen houden, 
des te groter de kans dat zij negatief behandeld en/of gediscrimineerd worden. Om 
dergelijke gevolgen te voorkomen is het belangrijk om na te gaan welke 
groeperingen in de huidige samenleving zich structureel gediscrimineerd voelen. Uit 
mijn proefschrift blijkt dat wanneer je zelf wel positieve persoonlijke uitkomsten 
ervaart, je minder lijdt onder het lot van zijn groep. Een manier om structureel 
benadeelde groepen weer in de samenleving te integreren kan zijn om hun kansen 
op persoonlijk succes te benadrukken – en deze kansen ook te bieden. Dit kan op 
verschillende manieren gebeuren, door de domeinen waarin leden van 
gestigmatiseerde groepen wel succesvol zijn te benadrukken (Derks, Van Laar, & 
Ellemers, 2006), door meer mogelijkheden voor succes te bieden (bijv. meer 
werkervaringsplekken creëren, tegenwoordig een probleem voor Marokkanen in 
Nederland) en door rolmodellen saillant te maken (zoals vrouwen of etnische 
minderheden die hoge posities bekleden). De wetenschap dat persoonlijk succes 
mogelijk is kan leden van gestigmatiseerde groepen helpen om te gaan met hun 
benadeelde status. Misschien dat het op lange termijn het onderliggende probleem 
zou oplossen: het gevoel dat je structureel binnen de samenleving gediscrimineerd 





slachtoffer maar van de samenleving, zowel in houding als in beleid ten aanzien van 
benadeelde groeperingen.  
 
Conclusie 
Stel je voor je bent Marokkaans en je hebt gesolliciteerd op een baan waar je 
jezelf geschikt voor acht. Vervolgens hoor je dat je bent afgewezen.  
Ik begon mijn samenvatting met dit voorbeeld en mijn proefschrift met het doel om 
meer inzicht te bieden in de vraag of en wanneer leden van gestigmatseerde groepen 
discriminatie herkennen en hoe ze op deze herkenning reageren. Aan de ene kant 
laat mijn proefschrift zien dat zelfs in situaties waarin mensen zeer gericht zijn op 
zichzelf en weinig oog hebben voor het feit dat ze ‘ook’ lid zijn van een 
gedevalueerde groep, ze wel in staat zijn om informatie te vergaren die hen duidelijk 
maakt dat ze gediscrimineerd zijn.  
Hoe reageren slachtoffers op discriminatie? Wat motiveert deze reacties? 
Mijn onderzoek laat zien dat als je eigen falen aan discriminatie kan toeschrijven dit 
tot op bepaalde hoogte zelfbeschermend kan zijn. Je hoeft immers niet meer alleen 
jezelf de schuld van je falen te geven. Ik stel in mijn proefschrift dan ook dat mensen 
enigszins egoïstisch gemotiveerd zijn, je zou immers discriminatie ook erg kunnen 
vinden omdat het wel betekent dat je groep gedevalueerd en in het algemeen slecht 
behandeld wordt. Mijn onderzoek laat zien dat groepsleden niet lijden onder het lot 
van hun groep (devaluatie). Sterker nog, informatie over de devaluatie van de eigen 
groep, of over persoonlijke discriminatie, kan zelfs de mogelijkheid bieden om de 
eigen persoonlijk uitkomsten in een positiever licht te plaatsen – ik ben beter dan 
mijn groepsleden. Maar, dit is niet het hele verhaal. We weten uit eerder onderzoek 
dat mensen wel degelijk kunnen lijden onder discriminatie. Wat we nog niet wisten 
is wanneer slachtoffers lijden onder discriminatie, en wanneer discriminatie relatief 
zelfbeschermend is. Mijn onderzoek biedt inzicht in deze vraag door te laten zien 
dat de aanhoudendheid van discriminatie een belangrijke rol speelt. Discriminatie 
kan zelfbeschermend zijn als het als incidenteel wordt ervaren, het is schadelijk voor 
welzijn als je ook in de toekomst verwacht op structurele basis gediscrimineerd te 
worden. Maar waarom is aanhoudende discriminatie schadelijk voor welzijn? Dit 
hangt af van de motieven die ten grondslag liggen aan de reactie op discriminatie. Ik 
laat zien dat mensen niet alleen egoïstisch gemotiveerd en gericht op zichzelf en 
eigen prestaties zijn. Een reactie op discriminatie kan ook op een abstracter niveau 
gemotiveerd zijn, namelijk door de behoefte om de wereld als eerlijk en rechtvaardig 
te blijven zien. Discriminatie heeft niet alleen invloed op jezelf en je eigen 





conclusie, het betekent dat de ervaring van discriminatie belangrijke gevolgen heeft 
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